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The European Union has been the pioneer and undisputed
leader of regional integration processes.  Since its inception in
the 1950s, following the Schuman Declaration that set in motion
Jean Monnet’s innovative idea to join together European coal
and steel industries, Europe has offered a useful model for
regional integration. Strengthened by the 1957 Treaty of Rome
(exactly half a century ago), this bold entity was later trans-
formed into the European Union by the Maastricht Treaty.
Having successfully accomplished its primary goal (“to make
war unthinkable and materially impossible”), the EU is currently
facing challenges associated with its expansion and the deep-
ening of its pooled sovereignty.  On the other hand, the effects
of the EU in international relations are of paramount relevance.
While the forceful transposition of national and regional struc-
tures into other regions is a historical error, the essence of the
EU as a model to be adapted by other regions is a viable
approach to enhance stability and welfare. In this regard, this
volume examines the current challenges of the EU and the per-
spectives of regional integration in Africa, Asia and Latin
America. 
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Preface 
 
 
 
Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domínguez 
  
 
The present book is the result of considerable consultation and an enriching 
debate held in several seminars, symposia, and conferences throughout 2006 and 
2007, under the auspices of the Miami-Florida European Union Center of 
Excellence (a partnership of the University of Miami and Florida International 
University), the Jean Monnet Chair of the University of Miami, and the Inter-
national Studies Association (ISA). The contents of this book are divided in three 
sections. 
The first section opens with chapter that analyzes the historical dimension of 
the Treaty of Rome.  Joaquín Roy argues that the main difference between 1957 
and today is that back then there was an identifiable leadership and a mission to 
be accomplished – to stop the European wars. This task was to be implemented 
by a function. Once this was identified, the institution was created. However, 
today, the leadership capable of defining the current functions of the EU seems to 
be absent.  
The chapter by Gaspare M. Genna reviews the range of theories of regio-
nalism and synthesizes power transition and institutional theories of regional 
integration. Specifically, his argument is that the likelihood of institutionalized 
regional integration increases under a power preponderance, structural condition 
and high levels of trade which promote homogenization of domestic institutions. 
Increasing homogenization, in turn, promotes trade and integration. Markus Thiel 
compares in the following chapter the major international organizations present 
in Europe (EU, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe) and examines if there exists, 
at a minimum, a normative concern for minority rights and the promotion of 
societal security and secondly, what kind of institutional mechanisms and 
responses these organizations developed to attain these goals.  
The second section of the book covers the experiences of regionalization in 
Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean region.  Olefumi Babarinde asserts that while 
it can be useful to employ tools and lessons from the experience of the EU to 
critically examine the AU, there are, nonetheless, limits to the comparison of the 
AU and the EU: “The AU will have to chart its own course, travel at its own 
pace, find its own rhythm, and write its own history.” On the other hand, in the 
case of Asia, Katja Weber sustains that while institutions are being created to 
enhance transparency, efficiency and trust, the East Asians need to address their Roy and Domínguez 
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historical legacies to promote security. As to the case of the Euro-Med, Astrid B. 
Boening argues that even though some progress has been made, too much needs 
to be done in the regions bordering the Mediterranean to remove obstacles not 
only to economic traffic but to build bridges to traverse the cultural and political 
diversity between the East and the West and the North and the South of the 
Mediterranean, and to substitute military clashes with peaceful socio-economic 
and cultural interactions.   
The third section of the paper analyzes the cases of regionalism in the 
Western Hemisphere.  Laura Gómez-Mera focuses on compliance and im-
plementation gaps in the four main regional organizations in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, namely, CACM, CAN, MERCOSUR and CARICOM.  Her re-
sults suggest that, consistent with enforcement perspectives, trade dependence on 
the regional market and regional hegemony are important explanatory variables 
for predicting implementation achievements. By contrast, she argues, limited 
empirical support is found for hypotheses linking regime type and state capacity 
with implementation.  
  As to the study of specific regions, Roberto Domínguez analyzes the 
recent evolution of NAFTA and states that the operation of NAFTA has set in 
motion a process of regionalization in North America, and gradually an 
increasing number of policies encompass a regional dimension.  As to the 
CARICOM, Wendy Grenade affirms that there have been concrete steps toward 
deeper integration, for example, the establishment of the Caribbean Court of 
Justice (CCJ) and the launch of the Caribbean Single Market (CSM) in 2005 and 
2006 respectively.  Yet, despite those visible attempts to deepen integration, the 
emerging institutional design still caters for a minimalist form of integration.   
With regard to South America, two chapters explain the dynamic in the re-
gion. Aimee Kanner, on the one hand, argues that since 2005 the CAN and 
MERCOSUR have initiated but not consolidated exercises of good governance, 
particularly in the social, environmental, and cultural competences.  On the other, 
Marcos Aurelio Guedes de Oliveira showcases how the decline of trade as a 
central issue for the integration of South America and discusses the new period 
of integration in the region marked by security issues, whereby the South 
American Community of Nations (SACN) offers a new perspective for the 
regionalization in the area. 
We truly hope that the contributions of these chapters will shed considerable 
light onto the most crucial aspects of comparative regionalism. It is with this 
belief in mind that we would like to express our gratitude to the many staff 
members of the EU institutions and its leaders for the confidence bestowed on us 
for both the twin awards of the European Union Center and the Jean Monnet 
Chair.  After all, we sincerely believe that, in this particular region of the world, 
the EU model, if properly modified and adapted, has great potential for success. 
Works like this owe much to many people and institutions, impossible to all 
be listed here. However, the editors would to especially like to recognize the Reflections on the Treaty 
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support and assistance during the conferences and symposia and in the prepara-
tion of the chapters and their previous partial distribution as occasional papers. 
We offer our special gratitude to Catherine Cottrell, Eloisa Vladescu, Aimee 
Kanner, Carlyn Jorgensen and Michail Vafeiadis.  
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I.  General Trends on Integration 
 
 
   
 
 
Reflections on the Treaty of Rome and Today’s EU
♣ 
                                               
 
Joaquín Roy 
 
 
A Year of Truth 
 
It may sound too dramatic, but two years after the Spanish initial effort in Febru-
ary of 2005 to ratify the EU constitutional text, it was felt that “it is now or never 
for the EU.” The year 2007 was considered to be decisive for the organization for 
the coincidental reason that fifty years ago the EU took its second daring step 
with the Treaty of Rome of March 1957. This epoch-making document trans-
formed the initial European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), announced by 
the Schuman Declaration on May 9, 1950, and officially born in 1951, by incor-
porating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community. The new entity was collectively and legally called the Euro-
pean Communities. Then it was simplified to be known as the European 
Community (EC), though it would come to be popularly called the Common 
Market, a label still used by generations of Europeans. 
This thoroughly economic dimension signaled that the new creation had 
made it to the third stage of economic integration. It had hereby graduated from 
the second stage, the Customs Union, which imposed a system of common ta-
riffs. It had come a long way from the ECSC, the first experiment that included 
(in a limited common market) only two products. However, they were strategic 
and necessary to produce weapons. The new entity was intended to “make war 
unthinkable” and eventually “materially impossible.” 
In the mid-1980s, almost three decades after Rome, the architects of the ex-
periment realized that in order to complete the Common Market as contracted in 
1957 they would need over three hundred individual regulations. This was the 
only way to guarantee the full circulation of goods, capital, services, and people. 
So Jacques Delors, president of the Commission, the EC's executive body, con-
vinced the Council of the need to approve a Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 
which had also prepared the way a few years later for the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) which created the European Union. 
Then the double coup came in. First, the EU adopted the euro as a common 
currency (anchoring the fourth level of integration, a monetary union). Second, it 
proceeded to execute the most spectacular broadening in its history --it almost 
                                                 
♣ Bibliographical reformatting was provided by Leonardo Capobianco and Maxime Larivé. 
Final editing was provided by Astrid Boening. Roy 
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doubled in size-- with three phases of additions. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden were incorporated because of the exhaustion of their ''neutral'' stance 
during the post-war period. Then in 2004, ten countries were added in a single 
move, eight of which had been part of the Soviet bloc for almost 60 years, plus 
Cyprus and Malta. Finally, in early 2007, two other countries, Romania and Bul-
garia, joined the EU, bringing the members total to 27. The EU already 
comprises half a billion people. All of this has been accomplished in just 15 years 
since the end of the cold war.
1 
The impasse of the constitutional process marks its presence five years since 
the adoption of the euro by 300 million citizens in the thirteen countries of the 
EU, as well as a handful of mini-states that had previously used the currencies of 
the EU Member States. The euro was a success in all basic monetary operations. 
Although the dollar remains dominant in terms of the setting of prices and tally-
ing debt, as an exchange currency the euro is on the verge of surpassing it. And 
while the dollar remains ahead of the euro as the official reserve currency, the 
euro is catching up in this regard as well (Lorca 2007). 
However, while these two ambitious moves proved to be highly successful, 
the warnings have not diminished regarding the need for the institutional reform 
of an organization used to dealing with fifteen more-or-less collegial members. In 
response, the EU committed itself to complete its legal framework with the ap-
proval of a constitutional treaty that would serve to codify and update the various 
proposals to render the integration project more viable and effective and give it 
an international profile more in keeping with the demands of today's complex 
world. Unfortunately, the Constitution was derailed halfway through the ratifica-
tion process with the rejection by Dutch and French voters (Roy 2005c). 
With the project put on hold until more favorable conditions emerge, observ-
ers were looking towards the German presidency of the EU in the first semester 
of 2007, with an eye placed on the results of France's May elections. The energy 
of the German government and the disposition of the new leadership in Paris 
would certainly determine the future course of the EU. 
Three crucial dimensions deserve an analysis in comparative terms of how 
the EU looked half a century ago and how it is today. The first is related to the 
different nature of its leadership, then and now. The second calls attention to the 
fact that the 2007 anniversary was in a way unfair and inaccurate in anchoring 
the birth of the European Union solely on the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and the 
implementation of the trio labeled European Communities with the addition of 
the EEC and EURATOM to the original ECSC. The third, closely connected with 
the spirit of the second, is a subtle, but decisive, contrasting approach, and theory 
applied to regional integration then and now, and how this issue affected the 
process of the European Union. 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive collection of essays on the enlargement, see Joaquín Roy and Roberto 
Domínguez, eds., 2006. Reflections on the Treaty 
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European Leadership 
 
Elitist, cultivated, cosmopolitan, technocratic, visionary, arrogant. These have 
been some of qualifiers bestowed on the foundational protagonists of the Euro-
pean integration process. By applying these epithets to the personalities of a 
couple of emblematic Frenchmen (Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman) and then 
extending the label to German Konrad Adenauer, Italian Alcide de Gasperi, and 
Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak, one can easily understand the spectacular success of 
the project as expressed in the current reality of the European Union.  
Today we can see that without the original decisive leadership of the 
“founding fathers” nothing would have been the same. Moreover, while “nothing 
would have been possible without the work of these men” (as Monnet loved to 
cite the Swiss philosopher Amiel), “nothing would be lasting without the institu-
tions, pillars of civilization.” Monnet believed the project of integration to be 
solidly grounded on independent entities, armed with a budget capable of meet-
ing the expectations for success.      
These men knew then that they faced a crucial choice. On the one hand, they 
wanted to avoid repeating the errors of the past. They rejected the inventing of 
grandiose pseudo-federal schemes equipped with no political will that led no-
where in terms of providing economic and social stability and were incapable of 
stopping the endemic European wars. On the other hand, they had to opt for in-
novating, in a bold and elitist move, through a decisive manner, a new, practical, 
“functional” approach.  
Additionally, their decision was impelled by the firm conviction of correcting 
the failure of the traditional political formations, the historical parties that were 
part of the problem, instead of finding a solution. The leadership at the time also 
distrusted the masses, kidnapped by totalitarian ideologies. These dogmas, in ad-
dition to outbursts of racist hypernationalism, had pushed Europe to the brink of 
suicide, risking the near destruction of its civilization, orphaned of institutions. 
Monnet and Schuman, and later the drafters of the Treaty of Rome, consi-
dered themselves free from guilt, although they collectively accepted the 
European original sin for causing wars. They faced the new task of integration 
with responsibility (in its etymological sense), already in their mature years, 
without having to avoid the risks that would endanger their careers. They became 
responsible, not in front of “God” or “History” (as in some extremist regimes), or 
of even the “Nation,” but to Europe, which they disposed of its false Arian con-
notation given by Hitler. 
Free from unneeded political ballasts, they pretended with some degree of 
wisdom to play simultaneously the Atlantic loyalty and the Pan European speci-
ficity. Without a nod from the United States (with its Marshall Plan and its 
nuclear umbrella), the integration project would had floundered. What was Roy 
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avoided was the dark choice between becoming “a Russian colony” or “an 
America protectorate.”  
Ideologically, they insisted on fusing liberal positions with socialist ideas. 
While it was assumed that the capitalist system would be strengthened in its eco-
nomic dimension, it would also be reinforced with a social pact. The need for 
political redemption and effective reconciliation made possible the success for 
cooperation between personalities on the left and right, a solution whose legacy 
is still present today in its fundamental issues. 
Thanks to this elitist approach, the founding fathers did not have to depend 
on opinion polls and the capricious inclinations of the masses, avoiding the ef-
fects of the “re-nationalization” of the integration process, now subjected to the 
electoral cycles. Today, European leaders cannot afford the luxuries of their pre-
decessors a half a century ago. Or, at least, they do not want to face the risks 
(Viñas 2006). 
This early privilege of having a hands-free power for deciding and influen-
cing the first steps of the European integration process is the key for explaining 
why the dawn of the EU was dominated by a political vision that was enshrined 
on a sectoral, concrete operation, pretending that the states are not to be the do-
minant actors. At the same time, a keen analysis has been detecting that the 
reaction coming from the national governmental structures was also present at 
birth, ranging from subtle to obvious in the evolution from the original Schuman 
Declaration to the crafting of the subsequent institutional framework to manage 
the European Coal and Steel Community. Moreover, this evolution became 
clearly and empirically apparent by the legal web as exposed by the Treaty of 
Rome that put together the new triangular structure. 
 
Two Contrasting Approaches  
 
From a “vertical” perspective as shown on May 9, 1950, Europe evolved towards 
a rather “horizontal” approach in implementing “an ever closer union” on March 
25, 1957. In essence, this oscillation is still present today. A widening “federal-
ist” concept of regional integration was put in practice by the Treaty of Rome 
design, derailing the foundational mission anchored in sectoral integration, as 
expressed in the Schuman Declaration (Sebesta 2006). 
The scant lines of this intriguing document are enough proof of its intentions 
and offer a mechanism for obtaining the primary purpose (the end to European 
wars). The functionalist approach, a political theory elevated to doctrine, insisted 
on this need of acting upon a limited dimension, a sector. However, this tactic 
had to be executed decisively. Instead of planning and compromising alliances, 
the functionalism hidden behind the Schuman-Monnet offer would build a “de 
facto” solidarity. Moreover, the sharing of a concrete portion of economic sove-
reignty (coal, steel, oil, etc.) should be placed in the hands of an entity designed 
for that purpose only. Reflections on the Treaty 
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The alternate approach was to be expressly elaborated in mapping out of the 
European Economic Community, born at the same time as the sectoral 
EURATOM (designed around one industrial activity). In contrast, what was en-
visioned by the organization that was commissioned to manage the Common 
Market was in fact the seed of a federal state. Ironically, this expression that with 
time became a taboo, not to be mentioned any longer in official documents, was 
actually inserted as a blunt ending in the Schuman Declaration: “this proposal 
will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federa-
tion indispensable to the preservation of peace”. This “F” word became the target 
of the empty chair tactic of De Gaulle (De Gaulle 1994) and it was the trademark 
of Margaret Thatcher’s opposing the deepening of the EC (Thatcher 1994). 
Forgotten by many as mere additional words with no substance, the pream-
bles of the successive treaties that supported the founding of the initial EU 
provide a striking comparative glimpse about the priorities of each one of the 
documents and their political and economic philosophy (European Communities 
1994). With this idea in mind, significantly, the preface of the ECSC treaty in-
sists on the issues of the need for peace. It commits itself to build a new Europe 
based on “practical achievements” that will create “real solidarity.” It also ad-
vances the intent to raise “the standard of living” through institutions and the 
establishment of “an economic community” to substitute for “age-old rivalries.” 
In turn, the preamble of the Treaties of Rome stresses the plan for “an ever closer 
union” through economic an social progress, eliminating barriers and obstacles, 
strengthening the unity of economies and ensuring harmonious development, re-
ducing differences in regions and restrictions to international trade. But the 
document ends with a commitment to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty. 
The result of this comparison is a subtle mirror image: the ECSC promised to 
implement a political goal through step by step actions (functions), while the 
EEC furthered the tackling of the economic and social advancement. In a way, it 
predicted the need for the future support of the integration process, to be sus-
tained by economic and social results easily perceived by the citizens. The 
maintenance of peace was to be taken for granted. 
When the EEC and the EURATOM projects became operational and their 
ratification in sight, Monnet supported the new stage of the integration process 
from the backstage perspective of the Committee for the United States of Europe, 
the consultative and lobbying entity where he took refuge when he declined 
having a second term as president of the High Authority. However, this was not 
his standing attitude. He had expressed doubts about the switch to a “horizontal” 
Europe, away from the “vertical” sectoral approach that presided over the logic 
of the Schuman Declaration and the foundation of the ECSC (Monnet 1978; 
Monnet 1994; Duchene 1994; Schuman 1963; Hallstein 1962). When the design 
of the European Defense Community collapsed, Monnet and others pondered 
about the next move and saw that in the absence of an alternative project, the fu-
ture of the Coal and Steel scheme was in doubt. They then turned their attention Roy 
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to identifying other sectors. They found them in the area of energy and transport, 
and narrowed them down to nuclear energy. This identification, once more, was 
in tune with the preoccupations of the U.S. administration that under Eisenhower 
engaged in selling the “Atoms for Peace” initiative. 
 
Theoretical Prisms 
 
From the point of view of the theory of integration, the ideological/philosophical 
support of the Schuman/Monnet idea was explained by the “functional” theory 
expressed earlier by David Mitrany (Mitrany 1966). As reinterpreted by Monnet, 
the function dictated the shape of the pieces of the organization, not the other 
way around. Hence, the novelty and specificity of the High Authority was called 
by the precise, revolutionary function of the pooling of the coal and steel indus-
tries. As reshaped and enriched by Ernest Haas in what was known as 
“neofunctionalism,” this theory downgraded the role of the state as a “delivering” 
actor to meet the demands of the complex societies of Europe (Haas 2004). The 
key for the successful implantation of this logic of integration was the “spill 
over” effect of one sector acting under the pressure of “pooling” sovereignty to 
cover other portions of the economic and societal fabric.  
The exhaustion of the “neofunctionalist” view contributed to the rise of an 
analytical and theoretical mapping that owed much to the realist tradition. In turn, 
it demanded due credit to the role of the states and national governments. “Lib-
eral Intergovernmentalism” then interpreted that the success of the subsequent 
stages of the EU from the Treaty of Rome to Maastricht could be easily ex-
plained by the cooperation of the governments, downplaying the autonomous 
work of the institutions (Moravcsik 1998, 1994; Chryssochoou 2001; Diez and 
Wiener 2004; Marks 1996; Rosamond 2002; Nelsen and Stubb 2003). 
The problem was that no matter what degree of credit the institutions receive, 
the reality is that the EU could not cope with the new task (“function”). As 
created by the post-Maastricht revolution, Brussels prepared for the incorporation 
of a large group of countries of which a majority was previously under Soviet 
influence. The structure was seen as designed for a small number of national ac-
tors with a certain degree of cohesion and similar development level. 
The traditional custom of modifying the original Treaty of Rome with subse-
quent documents composed of amendments was considered imperfect and 
obsolete. Hence, the decision was made to design, discuss and approve a new 
legal framework that would be called a “Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe,” known for short as the “Constitution.” After a long, open, elaborate 
process and democratic as much as possible, within the intergovernmental logic, 
the result was a huge text, a sort of encyclopedia of principles, regulations and 
methods that only a minority of legal experts could comprehend and make sense 
of. It is not surprising that some governments, in an exercise of hypocrisy be-
cause they commissioned high level representatives to participate in the drafting Reflections on the Treaty 
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process, expressed doubts about the ratification possibilities of the “Constitu-
tion.” Meanwhile, some European societies gave clear signs of planning to use 
the referendum opportunities to punish their own governments and Brussels for 
problems experienced in their own context and out of fear hovering over their 
heads. The result is that the constitutional process was frozen since the rejections 
rendered by the French and Dutch electorates. 
From the perspective of the historical context during the times of the Schu-
man Declaration and the Treaty of Rome, the obvious contrast is given by the 
decisive (negative, oppositional) presence of a divided public opinion and the 
absence of an effective political leadership, much needed in times of crisis.  
 
Friends in Madrid 
 
As a repeat of the Spanish initiative two years earlier to lead the ratification 
process, the representatives of eighteen European countries (with the moral sup-
port of two others) of the EU met in Madrid on January 25, 2007. These twenty 
Member States had already approved the constitutional project or had promised 
to do so (Portugal and Ireland). Only Spain and Luxemburg had ratified the com-
plicated code in popular referendum. The rest prudently had bestowed their seal 
of approval in a parliamentary process (Torreblanca 2007).
2 
These “Friends of the Constitution,” as they called themselves, had a com-
mon goal. They yearned for the revival of the approval process. They regretted 
with pain that a handful of millions of European citizens took hostage more than 
60 percent of the population of the EU, numbering half a billion voters. Twenty 
Member States saw their EU plans derailed and frozen by the stubbornness 
shown by two dissidents (actually, only a portion of their potential electorate) 
                                                 
2 For a selected review as reflected in the press: Mark Beunderman, “Luxembourg calls off EU 
constitution conference”. EU Observer  http://euobserver.com/9/23321/?print=1, Jan. 23, 2007; 
Andrés Ortega, “En busca del tratado perdido.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/interna-
cional/busca/Tratado/perdido/elpepiint/20070122elpepiint_6/Tes, 22 enero 2007; Wolfgang Mun-
chau, “Europe’s constitution may not be dead after all”. Financial Times, Jan. 23, 2007; George 
Parker, “Minister and friends seek to save EU treaty”. Financial Times, Jan. 23, 2007; Financial 
Times. “A better starting point for Europe’s constitution debate”. Jan. 25, 2007; Margot Wallström, 
“From muddle to huddle in Europe’s”. Financial Times, January 25, 2007; Quentin Peel, “Fresh 
battle lines drawn over revised constitution for Europe”. Financial Times, Jan. 31, 2007; The Econ-
omist. “A monster lives again”. http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm, Feb. 3, 
2007; Andreu Missé, “Veinte países de la UE aceptan cambios para recuperar la Constitución 
europea”.  El País,  27 enero 2007 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Veinte/pai-
ses/UE/aceptan/cambios/recuperar/Constitucion/europea/elpepiint/20070127elpepiint_3/Tes,;  El 
País, Editorial. “El enfermo europeo”. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/enfermo/eu-
ropeo/elpepiopi/20070127elpepiopi_3/Tes, 27 enero 2007; Newsweek. “Europe’s sneaky attempt to 
revive its Constitution”. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/168480358/site/newsweek/print/1dis-
playmode/1098/, Feb. 5, 2007; Andy Clark, “What next for the European Constitution?”, Jan. 25, 
2007. Roy 
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and the ambivalence expressed by two others (the United Kingdom and the gov-
ernments of the Czech Republic and Poland).  
For this reason, the majority of the Europeanist and federally-inclined popu-
lation consider that the result, in the first place, is not fair. Secondly, it damages 
the general welfare of the EU in a complex and uncertain world that needs the 
effective action of political blocs and economic conglomerates, equipped with 
impacting influence and political vision. An EU marooned half way, with insti-
tutions thought for a half a dozen of members, housing already twenty seven, is 
not the best method to advance. 
Facing this situation, the Spanish government took the initiative and con-
voked the Madrid meeting to exchange ideas to help the EU progress of the 
constitutional trap. The government of Rodríguez Zapatero seems to have ac-
cepted the same risk when coming to power in 2004, when it planned the early 
referendum as a launching pad of its Europeanist example. Spain delivered mag-
nificently with more than two thirds of the votes as “yes” for the text. 
Let’s remember that the Spanish path through the EU labyrinth reveals a per-
ceptible oscillation. Observers easily will note the contrast between the 
enthusiasm by which the successive administrations led by Felipe González since 
1982 undertook the process of European integration versus the ambivalence of 
the government of José María Aznar, especially his second term from 2000 to 
2004 supported by an absolute majority.  
In part because the adventure taken by U.S. President George W. Bush in 
Iraq, Aznar led the inclination of the “New Europe” towards a neo-Atlantism, 
damaging the deepening of the EU. Although the Spanish government (and the 
representatives of the governing Partido Popular, delegated by Madrid) actively 
participated in the elaboration of the Constitution (Borrell et al. 2003; López Gar-
rido 2005; Méndez Vigo 2005). The discussions caught Aznar when retiring from 
power with a veto inflicted on the voting system. This decision retarded the 
process and timed it wrong, casting further doubts in other electorates and 
governments eager to obtain last minute advantages of effective power results. 
Only the electoral victory of the PSOE got rid of this obstacle (Roy 2005). 
Nonetheless, the subsequent difficulties of the ratification process advised 
Madrid of a margin of prudence during the “reflection period” to be taken in 
search of solutions. This term was exhausted without innovative ideas. Hence, 
the Spanish government took the initiative, coinciding with the German presi-
dency, of providing an incentive to find a solution. It was not easy and the 
meeting ended without decisions. It was further discovered that even this group 
of “friends” had contrasting opinions. Under the pressure of other governments, 
Luxemburg decided to postpone its follow-up meeting.  
The record and the background of the Madrid extraordinary conclave show 
that Spain and the most daring allies consider that the text should be further rein-
forced with more social warranties and the strengthening of the subsidiarity 
dimension (respect for state and local sovereignty). They also demand better Reflections on the Treaty 
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protection for the environment, attention towards climatic change, legislation to 
regulate immigration, an effective energy policy, more precise conditions for new 
membership, and a deepening of the European security and defense policy 
(Rodríguez Iglesias y Torreblanca 2006). 
Other members with a more cautious approach signal that these measures are 
already present in the existing treaties. The text should then be reduced to codify 
some of the most innovative initiatives: a stable presidency with a two and a half 
years term, extended to a second for a total of five years (a mandate coinciding 
with the term of the president of the Commission and the Parliament), a Foreign 
Minister doubling as Vice President of the Commission, the expanding of the 
qualified majority vote, and reinforcing the power of the Parliament (Mangas 
2007). This represents a challenge for the German presidency, facing a unique 
opportunity of showing leadership and searching for equilibrium.  
  
Berlin Expectations 
 
What were, then, the real perspectives of the project? It depended, in the first 
place, on the energy applied by the presidency and on what kind of positive co-
operation it receive from the most audacious allies, and second how the 
opposition could be neutralized.
3 Finally, it all also hinged on what kind of leg-
acy the German presidency would delegate to the succeeding presidencies of 
Portugal, Slovenia and France. While the enthusiasm of Slovenia will be backed 
by a general consensus, it remained to be seen who will preside in France, and 
what kind of attitude the new leadership would show once in power, free from 
the constraints of the electoral season. Only then would the EU be able to have a 
real reading of the demand made by Nicolas Sarkozy to negotiate a “mini-treaty” 
and the promise made by Ségolène Royal to subject any project to a new referen-
dum. In any event, it all would ultimately hinge on the solution offered by the 
United Kingdom under either a new Labour leader or, worse, Tory conservative 
(which has threatened to bury the Constitution) in Downing Street.
4 This may 
help end or at least clarify the Hamletian doubt that has perennially dominated 
the British mind regarding the EU. Czechs, Polish and allies will probably en-
dorse a consensus in the end, without risking the appearance that they are 
applying to leave the Union.  
In any event, the double burden was on the German presidency. On the one 
hand, it was commissioned with a clarification of the Constitutional process. On 
the other, it had to face the drafting of a declaration in commemoration of the 50
th 
anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. The first temptation was to make the two is-
sues apart, without even mentioning the polemic text in the address due on March 
                                                 
3 The amount of policy papers produced before and during the German presidency is impres-
sive. See a sample: Thomas More Institute, 2006. 
4 Sources Say, “UK conservative leader determined to bury EU Constitution”, March 7, 2007. Roy 
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25
th. This alternative was the chosen in view that a direct mention of the Consti-
tution would be taken as an unneeded irritation, before the actual plan of tackling 
what to do with the text or its content in May and June. So, the elected solution 
apparently was to avoid the direct reference. Instead, euphemisms such as “po-
litical engagement” were to be used. The sensitive point of the conditions for 
membership would be solved by leaving the door open but insisting on the re-
quirement of meeting all the criteria. The second challenge was still equally 
daunting because it involved electing between issuing one bland, general, diplo-
matic statement, or elaborating on the accomplishments and the future missions 
to be taken by the EU. A compromise seemed to be accepted with the insertion of 
references to the euro and the social model.
5   
All this has to be placed in the context of the record of member states activity 
in the long period of reflection since the shock of the French and Dutch rejections 
of the Constitution. The balance is pessimistic and does not say much regarding 
the primacy of the initiative of the governments exposed by the “liberal govern-
mentalist” view. From May of 2005 to mid 2007 not a single fresh, concrete, 
innovative idea (beyond convoking the Madrid meeting and the testing words by 
the German presidency) came from the capitals of Europe (Torreblanca 2007). In 
contrast, at least the Commission tried to explore a strategy of explaining the 
process and alternatives (e.g., the task taken by Vice President Margot 
Wallström). The Parliament energetically pursued a similar line with practical 
studies (Duff-Voggenhuber report). Meanwhile, all initiatives and speculations 
hinged on three basic alternatives. The first was sticking to a plan for the ap-
proval of the existing text, a process that would only be possible if there would 
be a second referendum in the two rejecting states. A positive outcome would 
then convince the doubtful to take the same route by avoiding the public referen-
dum. The second was the rescuing of the treaty by getting rid of the unneeded 
ballast and presenting it as a reduced text. The third was the opposite, which in-
volved salvaging of the good merchandise now encapsulated in the EU ship at 
risk of sinking. Let it sink, advocates of this solution said, and just implement the 
needed measures, subject to ratification by the governments or parliaments. This 
practical solution would avoid another fiasco.  
 
Time to Make a Decision 
 
On the eve of the 50
th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the German presidency 
was mandated with the issuance of a Declaration. It was to be a short address, 
easily understood by the common citizens. However, its background ran the risk 
of presenting it as a convoluted document that encountered difficulties in 
                                                 
5 Sources Say, “EU presidency seems to advance in 50
th anniversary declaration” March 9, 
2007; Diario las Américas, “UE no mencionará la palabra Constitución en 50 aniversario.” 7 marzo 
2007. Reflections on the Treaty 
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achieving a consensus. Observers (Torreblanca 2007) accurately pointed out that 
the EU had previously missed the opportunity to define itself both at the 50th 
anniversary of the Schuman Declaration and when the Treaty of the European 
Coal and Steel Community’s half-century term expired in 2002. Josep Borrell, 
the Spanish president of the EU Parliament, claimed that in order to develop a 
declaration based on principles and values, the EU leadership would only have to 
look at the proposed constitutional treaty and read its preamble, part I and the 
Charter, key documents that all 25 members had signed and that now some were 
pretending to ignore. For its part, the Commission insisted on taking measures as 
counteractive to a rejection of the referendum by stressing the need to complete 
the internal market, deepen social dimensions, reinforce the space for freedom, 
security and justice, open up a debate on future enlargements, establish cohe-
rence on issues of external action, implicate national parliaments in the 
legislative process, and achieve an agreement on institutional reform. The Decla-
ration would therefore represent a substantive exercise, rather than just a bland 
historical commemoration. 
With this in mind, Torreblanca recalled that early in 2006 the President of the 
Commission, José Manuel Barroso, addressed the EU Parliament with a wish list: 
“solidarity” in terms of economic and social cohesion; environmental sustaina-
bility; institutional responsibility; “security” perceptible by the citizens; and the 
promotion of EU values in the world. Even though the Council had accepted this 
political scope in mid-2006, the conclave held at the end of the year limited itself 
to the commemoration and the reaffirmation of the values of the Europe. 
Following the constitutional gathering organized by the Spanish government 
in Madrid, the difficulties of the process became increasingly evident. Though 
the Commission insisted on the endorsement and the social reinforcement of the 
five priorities expressed by Barroso, the UK expressed satisfaction with the EU’s 
enlargement and the fall of the Berlin wall, while the Czech and Polish govern-
ments insisted on the insertion of liberalism, Atlanticism and the Christian roots 
of Europe. Whereas Sarkozy’s proposal of a mini-treaty was surpassed by a ma-
jority soliciting a “Constitution-plus”, the alarm sounded when signals from 
London indicated that the Labor party would avoid the “Europeanization” of the 
election in 2008 at all cost. Ironically, the strategy of respecting the “red lines” in 
order to anchor the UK in the EU was no longer valid. Among other reasons, this 
is because these privileges have enraged the Left in countries like France. In fact, 
the French “no” made the UK referendum practically impossible. Although rep-
resentative of only a minority overall, Belgium and other states would push for 
provocation of the unthinkable. 
Finally, after much speculation and last minute details, language reformula-
tion and in-depth analysis, the Declaration was issued, reflecting a minimal 
consensus and a strategy developed by the presidency that had limited success. 
The very short text (barely 650 words) had an introductory section in which the 
EU congratulates itself on its accomplishments. It deals with the combination of Roy 
 
12 
the rights of “the individual”, the uncertainty of the world arena, and then out-
lines the Emus’ most valuable dimensions. Finally, Section III of the Declaration 
returns to the “unification” of Europe as a dream of “earlier generations” that has 
now become a reality. However, history reminds us that we must “always renew 
the political shape of Europe in keeping with the times.” That is the reason why 
today we are “united in our aim of placing the European Union on a renewed 
common basis before the European Parliament elections in 2009.” In any event, 
the Declaration pledges once again that “Europe is our common future.” 
Although the word “constitution” was dropped from the text, it still read as hav-
ing the intention of finding a solution for a documentary commitment to the spirit 
and purpose of the Constitutional Treaty. The time frame provided a temporal 
context for the “road map” which is supposed to be issued at the end of the Ger-
man presidency in June of 2007. Skeptics evaluated this compromise simply as a 
postponement of the thorniest issues, such as those detected by the Polish gov-
ernment regarding the voting system. The same can be said about the diplomatic 
compromise to gloss over the European socio-economic “model,” a source of 
conflicting interpretations during the disastrous ratification process in France and 
the Netherlands. In the background of this Declaration, the German presidency 
took itself to execute the second crucial step: the issuing of the skeleton of the 
draft of the new Reform Treaty. 
 
The Birth of the Reform Treaty 
 
In numerous Mediterranean countries there is the custom of preparing bonfires 
on June 23, which is erroneous, because the solstice falls on the 21th. In the 
North of Europe, pagan traditions still survive that celebrate the centrality of the 
sun, making it to return when the winter solstice is approaching. In any event, 
that night of June 23 was the longest night of the year for the EU. Or at least this 
was the experience of the German presidency when at dawn Chancellor Angela 
Merkel manager to extract an agreement from her colleagues to fix the Basic line 
of the projected Treaty of Reform, filing the vacuum left by the failed European 
Constitution. 
The European leader that went to rest with the greatest satisfaction was Por-
tuguese Primer Minister José Sócrates. Without an accord, Portugal would had 
inherited the impasse that shackled the EU for two years, and would had ruined 
the semester presidency until the end of the year. Until then, according to the de-
sign agreed upon in Brussels, the European leadership would have to draft and 
approve a new text of a Reform Treaty. This new fundamental law of the EU 
would adjust the Treaty of Rome, 50 years after its birth, by which the European 
Economic Community was founded, and the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, that 
transformed it into the European Union. The new deal would have to be finally 
ratified by each of the countries in 2008. Reflections on the Treaty 
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With the basic points agreed, the next step was the drafting of a more elabo-
rate text. Thanks to the energetic work of the legal services of the Commission, at 
the end of July,
6 just before the traditional European summer vacations, the EU 
was able to offer the final draft of the new Treaty,
7 to be discussed by the Inter 
Governmental Conference, in session during the first part of the fall.
8 The final 
conclusions of its deliberations would have to be presented to the European 
Council, scheduled for October 18-19.
9 
 
General scope   
 
•  The text was envisioned by some opinion makers and leaders as a “mini 
Treaty,” but the result has 145 pages, printed in standard type. If not a 
“mini treaty,” then insiders call it a “simplified treaty.” 
•  Nonetheless, although it is much shorter that its predecessor (more than 
500 pages) the complexity of the draft text is similar. However, the new 
document is full of legalistic stipulations. The new proposed text amends 
the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), better known as Maastricht 
(1992), and the foundational treaty of the European Community (1957), 
that will be converted into a “Treaty for the functioning of the EU.” 
 
  Among the salient items of the old text that have been kept in the new 
proposal are the following: 
 
•  A principle that is not explicitly mentioned in the main body of the draft 
treaty, the primacy of EU Law, it is preserved by a footnote to remember 
that the EU process is based on frequent decisions of the EU Court to the 
effect. 
•  A  double majority rule for Council decisions (55 percent of member 
states and 65 percent of the EU's population) is needed to support a pro-
posed EU legislation to pass. However, due to fierce Polish opposition, 
the new voting system will only apply from 2014 on, with an optional 
extra transition period until 2017 when additional provisions, making it 
easier to block a decision, will apply.  
                                                 
6 Mark Beunderman, “Portugal kicks off formal EU treaty talks EU Observer, 23.07.2007 
http://euobserver.com/9/24517/?rk=1 
7 Conclusions of the Council: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/-
pressData/en/ec/94932.pdf; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=131.  
8 Conclusions of the Council: See explanations by the EU Delegation in Washington: 
http://www.eurunion.org/newsweb/HotTopics/Treaty.htm 
9 Mark Beunderman, “EU unveils bulky new treaty draft”, EU Observer, 23.07.2007 
http://euobserver.com/9/24522/?rk=1 Roy 
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•  This qualified majority voting will be extended to 40 more policy areas, 
among them asylum, immigration, police cooperation and judicial co-op-
eration in criminal matters.  
•  There will be a permanent Council presidency, whose main purpose will 
be to end the confusing rotation semester of the presidency. Its main 
function will be to chair EU Summits and to represent the EU world-
wide. Its term will be two-and-a-half years, renewable once (instead of 
the current six-month rotation). However, individual policy councils will 
be presided in the traditional way, with the exception of Foreign Affairs, 
which will be coordinated by the new High Representative.     
•  The treaty will keep the post of a 'double-hatted' High Representative of 
the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This position will replace 
the current EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, held by Javier 
Solana, and the position of External Relations Commissioner. The new 
high officer will become simultaneously Vice President of the Commis-
sion. Under the pressure of the United Kingdom, the feared label of EU 
‘Foreign Minister,’ as envisioned in the Constitution, was dropped.  
•  With the adoption of the new Treaty, the number of Commissioners will 
be reduced from 27 to 15, but this drastic measure will not be in effect 
until 2014. Until then, each country will keep the right to nominate one 
commissioner.   
•  The new treaty will provide a single legal personality for the EU. That 
means, among other aspects, that the old system of awarding the Com-
mission and/or the “Community” role will be terminated. The EU will 
then be a fully recognized international entity.   
•  The national parliaments will be granted the right to raise objections 
against draft EU legislation. Through a more demanding application of 
the subsidiarity principle, the national parliaments will be equipped with 
an “alert” mechanism and the option of opposing the draft legislation 
drafted by the Commission and presented by the Council by a simple 
majority. The Commission then will have to elect to withdraw the 
project, to maintain the proposal (with proper justification) or to amend 
it. Moreover, the existing process of co-decision, shared between the 
Council and the Parliament, will be extended to other areas such as jus-
tice and home affairs. 
•  As a novelty in the existing treaty arrangements, an “exit clause” was 
introduced in the new draft, making it possible for members to leave the 
EU. Ironically, this clause was designed to make the membership of the 
newcomers more comfortable. However, observers have been pointing 
out that the procedure could be easily applied to old members (such as 
the UK). 
 Reflections on the Treaty 
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Among the items appearing in the constitutional project that were dropped 
were the following: 
 
•  The 'Constitution' label, a trademark of the failed project, was summarily 
discarded. The Reform Treaty will go back to the traditional method of 
Treaty change. This new legislation will amend both the EC and EU 
Treaties. 
•  In a rather pathetic move, the symbols of the EU (flag, anthem and 
motto) were denied explicit mention. This is ironic, because the symbols 
are regulated by separate legislation, which will not change. According 
to protocol and custom, the flag and anthem will continue to be used. 
Each one of the member states is free to use them according to internal 
rules. Some member states have announced new measures to make the 
use of the flag compulsory in government buildings. Some (Italy, for ex-
ample) do it consistently. Some leaders (France, notoriously) place the 
EU flag along the national in press conferences and TV appearances.    
•  The insertion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the constitutional 
treaty will be replaced by a cross-reference with the same legal value. 
However, due to strong British opposition, the Charter will not be legally 
binding in the UK.  
•  An explicit reference to “free and undistorted competition” as the EU's 
goals was taken out of the main body of the text at France's request. 
President Nicolas Sarkozy argued that competition was not an end in it-
self. Nonetheless, the concept is included in an additional protocol. In 
any event, this issue will not challenge the general competition policy 
competence of the Commission.  
•  The new Treaty will also drop the constitutional proposal consisting of 
calling “laws” and “framework laws” what has been traditionally labeled 
in EU’s terminology as “Regulations,” “Directives,” and “Decisions,” 
This compromise is interpreted as a victory of the states that consider 
“laws” to belong only to the sovereignty of the states.  
 
Among the new elements intended to be included are: 
 
•  a reference to  new challenges, such as  climate change and  energy 
solidarity, especially encountering concerns by Lithuania and Poland 
about heavy energy dependence on Russia, 
•  new opt-in/out provisions to some new policy provisions, such as poli-
cies on border checks, asylum and immigration, judicial co-operation in 
civil matters, judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police co-oper-
ation. 
 Roy 
 
16 
Among the problems contemplated to become obstacles in the arduous task 
of ratification are: 
 
•  The German Presidency was criticized for holding "behind closed-door 
talks" with member states, leaving the public out of the debate. This as-
pect will be certainly used by Euro skeptics and populists during the 
ratification process.  
•  According to polls, 75% of the EU citizens who were questioned said 
that they were in favor of giving people a say in a referendum or citizen 
consultation. Most governments are planning to avoid this process, and 
elect the parliamentary route. Some will feel the heat of going directly to 
consult the public, with the threat of a repeat of the French and Dutch de-
feat.  
 
A Dangerous Path 
 
The leaders of the previous failed process expressed a negative reaction to the 
new text, with diverse degrees of irritation and sarcasm. Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing, who presided the Convention that drafted the Constitution, considered 
that the new changes are purely “cosmetic” and they were designed to avoid a 
Reform Treaty that looks identical to the Constitution.
10 According to former 
Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato, vice-president of the Convention, the 
new treaty was made “illegible” on purpose in order to avoid the need for a refe-
rendum.
11  
In any event, whatever the judgment of experts and protagonists, the new text 
will have to go through a double inspection. First it will be studied by the IGC,
12 
dominated not only by the interests of the governments, but also scrutinized by a 
juridical dissection. Then it will be presented to a process of ratification in each 
one of the countries, which will mirror the Calvary experienced by the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution.   
Who won and who lost with these decisions? In one listens to the voices of 
the protagonists, all managed to get what they were seeking. All went back home 
with a trophy. Some (Polish and British) could boast that they resisted until the 
end and extracted concessions or delays in the application of the text. Others 
(specially Germany, in the case of a succesful process) will go down in history as 
authors of the rescue mission of the Community method, frozen for two years, in 
danger of permanent damage. Some (France, Spain) could feel satisfied for hav-
                                                 
10 Mark Beunderman, “EU constitution architect deplores 'cosmetic' text changes”, EU Ob-
server, 17.07.2007 .http://euobserver.com/9/24498/?rk=1 
11 Lisbeth Kirk, “Treaty made unreadable to avoid referendums, says Amato,” EU 
OBSERVER, 16.07.2007, http://euobserver.com/9/24481/?rk=1 
12 See its profile and functions: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/show-
Page.asp?id=1296&lang=en Reflections on the Treaty 
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ing served as intermediaries for ingenious formulas. Most of them would rate the 
result as positive, in spite of the fact that the 18 members, that already had rati-
fied the Constitution, would feel disappointed. 
Nonetheless, numerous voices have pointed out that the path towards ratifi-
cation is not going to be easy, because in addition to the forced referendum to be 
executed in Ireland, other countries may experience difficulties when needing a 
majority of votes in congress (two thirds in some, three fifths in others). Ac-
cording to calculations, 18 countries will not opt for a referendum, 8 are doubtful, 
and one (Ireland) is forced to it. Through parliamentary vote, 24 could be suc-
cessful, while 3 are considered doubtful. Finally, opting for a referendum, two 
would pass it, 3 are doubtful, 2 probable, and one (the United Kingdom) would 
fail. Taking into account that the rules for the approval of the Reform Treaty are 
identical to the ones applied in the case of the Constitution, the uncertainty is 
similar, even if it is softened by the parliamentary option. It should be noted that 
in doubtful cases, the alternative is the even more method to sideline this diffi-
culty by the domestic constitutional reform (Hagemann 2007).
13 
Finally, the double process (IGC approval and national ratification) might be 
converted the topic of the suitability of the Treaty, as an alternative to the Con-
stitution, into an electoral weapon used by Euro-skeptic parties and interests that 
would take advantage of what might be the last collective opportunity of electoral 
scrutiny in the elections for the European Parliament of 2009. The perspective of 
converting this election, until very politically innocuous, into a plebiscite on the 
existence of the EU, terrorizes the leadership of the EU institutions and the gov-
ernments that do not want to deal with this sensitive topic. 
It should also be taken into account that the compromise represented by the 
Reform Treaty, in cases that it is successful and the ext be ratified, should be 
considered a blessing.
14 The alternative was the blunt resistance presented by the 
hard nucleus that claims their rights to be trampled. On the other side, the oppo-
sition presented a serious threat for the process of integration and consequently 
meant the effective death of the EU itself. Facing this panorama, the clearest 
option for the “federalists” was to provoke the exit of opponents, a “solution” 
that also faced serious problems for the EU.              
 
Conclusion 
 
What is doubtful is whether the reformed institutional framework will fit the new 
demands of an “ever expanding Union”, without explaining in a comprehensive 
document what the nature of the resulting entity is. More practical observers in-
sist that this labeling is not needed, because the reality is that the EU is a unique 
                                                 
13 Mark Beunderman “EU treaty ratification may be difficult, experts say” EU Observer, 
27.07.2007. 
14 See commentary by Romano Prodi: “Reform Treaty 'best compromise we could get,'” EU 
Observer, 23 July 2007. Roy 
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creature (Stephens 2007). This common sense notion is significantly in line with 
two other referential anchors. 
One is the elaborate evolution of the theoretical framework analyzing the 
EU, balancing the supranational primacy and the intergovernmental reaction, fi-
nally pondering with rather hybrid solutions such as the multi-level governance 
and the fusion proposal (Mariscal 2003). The other is the geniality once pointed 
to by a key practitioner and crafter of one of the most decisive stages of the inte-
gration process, Jacques Delors. The EU, after all, he said, is a UPO 
(Unidentified Political Object) (Drake 2000). Perhaps that explains in part the 
resistance of the German presidency to define it in precise terms. And this also 
may explain in part why the Constitutional Treaty cover encountered so many 
difficulties, and was finally erased from the Reform Treaty.
15 
Finally, all this shows that things apparently were much simpler and clearer 
during the first five years of the history of the EU from the Schuman Declaration 
to the Treaty of Rome of March 25, 2007. The difference was that then there was 
an identifiable leadership and a mission to be accomplished – to stop the Euro-
pean wars. This task was to be implemented by a function. Once this was 
identified, the institution was created. Today, the absent leadership is not capable 
of defining the function. That is why the institutions that are needed to manage 
this mission do not seem to be able to be reshaped by either an elaborate consti-
tutional treaty, or by a simple document. 
To sum up, from a historical perspective, when the EDC failed by a stabbing 
inflicted by the French Assembly, the leadership then saw the danger of the dis-
appearance of the ECSC. Then, it was decided to push forward for the relance 
leading to the foundation of the vertical atomic energy and the horizontal eco-
nomic treaty. The impasse, that succeeded the success of the approval of the new 
structure presided over by the Common Market, caused by a combination of 
factors including the obstacles caused by the national leadership (De Gaulle, 
most especially, but not exclusively), inertia and economic depression, lasted 
three decades until another French leader, Jacques Delors, rescued the EC with 
the Single European Act (SEA). Only time will tell if today the EU is just barely 
beginning another long period of euroesclerosis.
16 Worse, fears are that the 
process may suffer a regression if enough potential allies listen to the modern 
siren songs that propose the transformation of the EU into an organization of Eu-
ropean States.
17 But the challenge of today is similar to the one existing in 1955 
and 1985. Nonetheless, the Reform Treaty offers considerable hope that the EU 
will once more be able to overcome the difficulties and periodic crises, on the 
path to “an ever closer union.” 
                                                 
15 For a discussion of the nature of the EU, see Roy (2005a), pp. 77-111; Roy (2004), pp. 183-
202; Roy (2005d); and Roy and Kanner (2006), pp. xli-lix.  
16 For a speculation on the future of the EU: Roy (2004a), pp. 217-232. 
17 For a review of the difficulties encountered by regional integration in Europe and America 
during 2006, see: Roy (2006b).  
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Introduction 
 
What explains the variation of regional integration worldwide? The literature on 
regional integration is as old as the first attempts to establish the European Union 
(EU), but the attempt to develop generalized theories with systematic testing is 
relatively new.  As the number of regional projects increases, and with the added 
complexity of overlapping memberships, we are faced with task of explaining 
and predicting these new movements of cross border cooperation. The project 
outlined in this chapter attempts to continue the current trend of theory 
development and empirical analysis. After reviewing the range of theories, a 
central argument will be developed that will synthesize power transition and 
institutional theories of regional integration. Specifically, the likelihood of 
institutionalized regional integration increases under a power preponderance 
structural condition and high levels of trade which promote homogenization of 
domestic institutions. Increasing homogenization, in turn, promotes trade and 
integration.  
A common definition of regional integration states that it is a shifting of 
certain national activities toward a new center (Haas 1958). Integration therefore 
is a form of collective action among countries in order to obtain specific goals. 
These goals can be as grand as political unification (in the case of the EU) or a 
free trade area, as found in the North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA). Lindberg refines the definition by proposing that it is an “evolution 
over time of a collective decision making system among nations. If the collective 
arena becomes the focus of certain kinds of decision making activity, national 
actors will in that measure be constrained from independent action” (1970: 46). 
In economic terms it is “a series of voluntary decisions by previously sovereign 
states to remove barriers to the mutual exchange of goods, services, capital, or 
persons” (Smith 1993: 4). Also in the vein of economics, integration can also 
simply mean the degree of market merger among states. This refers to the amount 
of goods, services, capital, and labor flows among states. While this captures an 
essence of what is occurring, it misses the institutional aspect of integration 
which is central to its definition. The degree of market merger occurs because the Genna 
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states have negotiated an established practice of market flows and their 
regulation.  
For the purposes of this paper, the definition of integration will follow 
closely the definitions purposed by Hass and Lindberg. Regional integration
1 is 
the establishment of regular collective decision making among states for the 
intention of establishing and regulating market flows. The degree of integration 
refers to the degree of collective decision making. At one end is an 
intergovernmental arrangement in which states make common decisions but are 
autonomous in regulating those decisions. If a regional authority does exist, it 
services at the pleasure of the individual states. On the opposite end is the 
supranational arrangement, in which regional institutions do exist and make 
decisions alongside intergovernmental arrangements or supersede the member-
states’ authority.  
The rest of the paper examines the literature on regional integration with the 
aim of reviewing, critiquing, and synthesizing prior theories. The synthesis is the 
establishment of a general theory of regionalism. The subsequent sections will 
examine the method to test the key hypotheses using systematic measures of the 
variables and future direction of this proposed research.  
 
The Literature on Regional Integration 
  
Although the literature on regional integration has an extensive epistemology, 
general theories of regionalism are still at the early stages of development. In 
addition, most of the research is Eurocentric. Theories of regional integration can 
be roughly grouped into three perspectives: (1) neofunctionalism and 
institutionalism; (2) international power and security theories; and (3) domestic 
politics and intergovernmentalism.  
In the first group, neofunctionalism posits that regional integration arises due 
to increasing technological, economic, and other complexities and problems that 
states can no longer effectively solve unilaterally (Haas 1958; Mitrany 1975). 
According to this perspective, governments are likely to enter into cooperative 
arrangements in order to cope with various functional needs, such as the 
improvement of economic welfare for their citizens. Once the political elite 
establish a cooperative arrangement, the theory predicts that integration would 
become self-perpetuating through a “spillover” process (Haas 1958). Through 
this mechanism, success in one functional area increases demands for 
cooperative arrangements in other functional areas due to two reasons. First, 
demand would increase because successful integration in one area would gain 
supporters in other areas. Second, further integration in another area or areas 
would allow integration in the original area to fully succeed. While 
neofunctionalism was influential in the 1950s and 1960s, it has been criticized as 
                                                 
1 The terms regionalism and regional integration will be used interchangeably in this paper. Power Preponderance 
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being a post hoc theory having difficulties in generating testable hypotheses 
because many of the variables in question are not easily operationalized. 
Neofunctionalism also cannot predict a priori the issue-areas in which regional 
cooperation or integration occurs. In addition, functional needs do not necessarily 
predetermine the direction of change that states may choose to pursue (see 
Pentland 1973).  
Institutionalism, which emerged in the 1980s, inherited the thinking of the 
neofunctionalist school. Put simply, institutionalists argue that international 
institutions promote cooperation by helping states overcome collective action 
problems. By lengthening the shadow of the future and by increasing 
transparency and enforcement of cooperation, international institutions facilitate 
issue-linkages and strategies of reciprocity and make international commitments 
more credible (Axelrod and Keohane 1986; Martin 1992; Simmons 2000). 
Keohane (1984), for example, claims that it is possible to create and sustain, even 
after the decline of a hegemonic power, international regimes in order to cope 
with market failures, reduce transaction costs, and respond to other problems that 
are difficult to be managed at the national level. With respect to European 
integration, institutionalists have studied the impact of the European Union 
institutions on the decision-making process, such as the agenda-setting power of 
the European Parliament (Tsebelis 1994; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996). Garrett and 
Weingast (1993) argue that institutions are not simply the facilitators of 
efficiency gains in the process of regional integration; they also provide focal 
points—precedents and symbols around which actors’ behaviors converge—that 
help determine particular choices made at critical decision points.  
Institutionalism has stimulated important research on international 
cooperation and integration. However, applying this research to understand non-
European regional integration has been limited. This dearth of research may be 
due to the weak supranational institutional developments outside Europe. 
Moreover, the degree of institutionalization itself is a variable that needs 
explication, but institutionalism, except for resorting to the functionalist 
argument of efficiency gains, has a difficulty explaining the emergence of 
supranational regional institutions. Furthermore, researchers have criticized 
institutionalism for its focus on absolute gains, neglecting the possibility of 
absolute losses (Oatley and Nabors 1998) and relative gains (Grieco 1988).  
Another take on the institutional argument focuses on state level institutions 
and how variation in domestic institutions influences the degree of regionalism. 
Feng and Genna (2003) reexamine the concept of institutions. Instead of looking 
at the rules and pattern of organized governance, they examined the established 
set of preferences in key areas of liberalization: (1) money and inflation, (2) 
government operations and regulations, (3) takings and discriminatory taxation, 
and (4) international exchange. They find that the homogeneity of institutions 
among member-states not only facilitates integration, but that integration 
promotes greater homogeneity among members. This mutually reinforcing Genna 
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mechanism not only explains the level of integration in Latin America, Southeast 
Asia, and Europe, but also explains the varying pace of integration in each case.  
Power theories stress the distribution of power among states as a central 
factor influencing international outcomes. Among power theories, neorealism 
argues that the asymmetric gains from exchange tend to hinder international 
cooperation (Waltz 1979; Grieco 1988). However, many neorealists do not 
completely rule out such possibilities. For example, Gowa and Mansfield (1993), 
Gowa (1994), and Mansfield and Bronson (1997) argue that commercial 
liberalization is more likely among states that are political and military allies than 
among states that are actual or potential adversaries. They propose a defensive 
realist approach in which commercial liberalization strengthens mutual security 
among allies: states prefer to have strong allies and trade can aid in strengthening 
allies’ economies and thereby improving military capabilities. Grieco (1997) 
advanced a “relative disparity shift” hypothesis where a trend of shifting relative 
disparity in the capabilities of states within a region is likely to lead 
disadvantaged states to oppose the development of formal regional institutions 
while relative stability of capabilities tends to foster the establishment and 
deepening of such regional arrangements. Grieco’s study comparing relative 
capability change and the development of regional integration in Western 
Europe, East Asia, and the Americas largely supports his hypothesis.  
Hegemonic stability theory likewise emphasizes the importance of power for 
international political and economic outcomes. The early version of hegemonic 
stability theory concerned the rise and maintenance of the liberal international 
economic order (Krasner 1976; Gilpin 1987). Proponents of hegemonic stability 
theory argued that the presence of a hegemonic state (that is capable of and 
committed to promoting economic liberalism) was a necessary condition to 
sustain liberal international commerce. The erosion of hegemony, by contrast, 
tends to give rise to protectionism. In line with this argument, Gilpin (2001) 
recently advanced a thesis that the existence of one or more powerful states 
committed to integration is the key to the successful evolution of regional 
economic institutions.  
Like other power-centered theories, power transition theory focuses on the 
relative power of countries in the international system. However, power 
transition scholars differ from neorealists in important areas. First, power 
transition scholars do not assume an anarchic international system but assume a 
hierarchic order presided over by the preponderant power (Organski 1958; 
Organski and Kugler 1977, 1980; Tammen et al. 2000; see Lemke 1996, 2001 for 
application to local hierarchies). The preponderant power establishes a set of 
status quo arrangements with the help of willing allies either at the global or 
regional level, or both, depending on the size of the preponderant power; the 
larger the power of the state, the greater its capabilities and therefore the longer 
its territorial reach. A status quo arrangement is the set of conditions under which 
all states operate. One important example is the demarcation of territorial Power Preponderance 
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boundaries and border permeability. There theory stresses the satisfaction with 
the status quo relationship between dyads of countries and the dynamics of a 
power transition that occurs when a subordinate power approaches and exceeds 
the capabilities of the preponderant power. As applied to international conflict, 
power transition theory posits that conflict is likely to occur when the subordinate 
and preponderant powers are at near parity and are dissatisfied with the status 
quo relationship. In contrast, a peaceful transition occurs if both powers share 
compatible preferences and are therefore jointly satisfied with the status quo 
relationship. Efird and Genna (2002) extend the theory and argue that the 
development of regional integration after a power transition between two 
satisfied powers improves because the formerly less powerful country has a vital 
interest in not only maintaining but also furthering and institutionalizing the 
arrangements that it believes to have contributed to its rise.
2 Efird and Genna’s 
statistical test provides strong support for their hypothesis. Genna and Hiroi 
(2004; 2005; forthcoming) modified the theory by focusing in on the impact of 
trade dependence in one time period on the degree of integration at a subsequent 
time period. Explanatory power improved in the cases of Latin American 
integration by examining the satisfaction of trade dependence instead satisfaction 
with the status quo in general.  
The final group of regional economic integration research stresses the 
importance of domestic politics and intergovernmental bargaining. By “taking 
preferences seriously” (Moravcsik 1997), this literature emphasizes the 
distributional consequences of economic policies for domestic societal groups 
and the desire of political leaders to hold onto power. At its core, scholars 
working with this approach contend that governments’ economic policies are 
strongly influenced by distributional conflict among societal groups; that groups 
that expect to lose from integration will oppose it and those that anticipate to 
benefit from it will support it; and that economic policies often reflect the 
preferences of the more powerful and better organized interest groups in society 
(Frieden 1991, 1998; Milner 1988, 1997; Rogowski 1989; Moravcsik 1997).  
Interest group politics, however, is not the whole story. Politicians have their 
preferences and interests. This literature assumes that a politician’s desire to 
retain office is the crucial guiding principle of policy making. Moreover, 
domestic political institutions are argued to shape the patterns of interactions 
between domestic groups and whose interests will be represented in 
governments’ policies (Putnam 1988; Garrett and Lange 1995).  
Similarly, intergovernmentalism posits that economic interests are the 
driving forces of regional integration. Moravcsik (1998) argues that commercial 
interests of leading domestic producers, macroeconomic preferences of ruling 
governmental coalitions, bargaining among powerful national governments over 
the distributive and institutional issues account for the developments of European 
                                                 
2 See also Efird, Genna, and Kugler (2003).  Genna 
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integration. Haggard (1997) generally agrees with Moravcsik’s thesis. Haggard 
(1997) contents that the more powerful states largely shaped the bargaining 
agendas of economic integration in Asia and the Western Hemisphere. However, 
the interests of weaker states also affect—although to a lesser degree—the 
regional economic agreements. What is crucial for economic integration to 
proceed, in Haggard’s view, is the convergence of preferences among parties to 
regional agreements that facilitate the bargaining and construction of regional 
economic blocs. He claims that the differences between the developments of East 
Asian and Latin American regional integration are due to the differences in the 
convergence or divergence of preferences of member countries about the 
direction and extent of economic integration.  
 
A General Theory of Regionalism 
 
The literature in total provides several important variables in developing a 
general theory of regionalism. First, the distribution of capabilities in regional 
systems matter. The empirical evidence shows that asymmetric distribution of 
power is a more favorable condition for this interdependence to develop. This is 
due to the ability of the preponderant power to coordinate efforts and distribute 
incentives to other members. Second, states do have a favorable interest to 
become economically interdependent. The central assumptions of neorealism 
lead us to believe that states prefer low to no levels of interdependence because 
their level of security diminishes. However, defensive realists agree that 
interdependence will occur among allies due to their need for mutual security. 
Hegemonic stability and power transition theories also agree that states do seek 
these benefits. Third, preferences are highly important. Being satisfied with 
prevailing conditions influences states to protect the status quo. By 
institutionalizing the status quo, states improve the certainty of a favorable 
future. Fourth, the link between regional level and domestic level politics helps 
explain the production of preferences. Preferences develop as a result of an 
aggregation of domestic desires. These desires spawn from competing groups 
that interact in the domestic arena, with the preferences of the more power groups 
being more likely to be expressed. Fifth, the homogeneity of institutional 
preferences lowers the costs of cooperation because states follow similar polices. 
States that wish to free ride on other states’ policies are not likely to be present 
thereby improving the certainty that distribution of benefits will be based on 
negotiated market interactions and not harmful unilateral state action. Sixth, the 
relationship between homogeneity and integration is reinforcing. As already 
stated, homogeneity of institutions increases the likelihood of regionalism. But 
the effect of increased regionalism also increases the likelihood of further 
homogeneity. Finally, a synthesis of the prior findings suggests that another 
feedback mechanism is present. As integration and homogeneity increases, then 
the level of satisfaction is likely to improve. This assumes that regionalism Power Preponderance 
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produces the benefits hypothesized by liberal economic theory (Krugman and 
Obstfeld 2002).  
Figure one maps out the causal pathways of regionalism given the reviewed 
research. The structural conditions for regionalism include the presence of a 
regional preponderant power and a satisfaction with trade dependence among 
potential or existing member-states (the status quo). The two variables interact 
since together they are a necessary and sufficient condition for integration. This 
set of conditions promotes greater institutional homogeneity. The preponderant 
power can lead in promoting similarities among institutionalized policies such as 
inflation targets, government regulations, taxation, and international exchange. 
Satisfaction among the relatively smaller powers gives the preferences of the 
preponderant power credence. The increased homogeneity increases the 
likelihood of creating or deepening integration. With homogeneity uncertainty 
and costs of integration are lowered, leading states to cooperate. Integration 
furthers the likelihood that homogeneity among the member-states will increase 
and thereby leading to further integration. As the reinforcement of homogeneity 
and integration continues this will feedback to the level of satisfaction with 
interdependence. If integration is successful in providing aggregate benefits, then 
satisfaction with interdependence will improve. This in turn interacts with the 
asymmetric power conditions and thereby further strengthens the homogeneity-
integration cycle. The likelihood that pathways will breakdown or slowdown 
increases during the relatively brief period of power transition. Since integration 
will spawn high levels of status quo satisfaction, integration will promote 
peaceful power transitions.  
 
Figure one  
Causal Pathways of Regionalism 
 
The entire pathway cannot be tested as a whole. Instead it can be 
deconstructed into various linear pathways: 
 
(Preponderance*Status Quo Satisfaction) → Homogeneity → Integration 
 
(Preponderance*Status Quo Satisfaction) → Integration → Homogeneity 
Homogeneity Integration  Preponderance*Status Genna 
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Homogeneity → Integration → Status Quo Satisfaction 
 
Integration → Homogeneity → Status Quo Satisfaction 
 
These pathways can be tested using the following equations: 
 
(1) Integrationt+2= α1 + β1Institutiont+1+ γ1Power Preponderancet + γ2 SQ 
Satisfactiont + γ3(Power Preponderance*SQ Satisfaction)t+ 
εt+b 
(2) Institutiont+3= α2 + β2Integrationt+2+ γ1Power Preponderancet + γ2 SQ 
Satisfactiont + γ3(Power Preponderance*SQ Satisfaction)t + 
εt+c 
(3) SQ Satisfactiont+4= α3 + β3Integrationt+2+ γ3Institutiont+1 + εt+d 
(4) SQ Satisfactiont+4= α4 + β4Integrationt+2+ γ4Institutiont+3 + εt+d 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
I test the hypotheses using the generalized least squares method. Since each 
of the dependent variables at time t will have a large correlation with the 
variables at time t + n, AR(1) autocorrelation is assumed to apply to each panel. 
Therefore the estimated coefficient of the AR(1) process is specific to each panel 
and not the entire data set. The unit of analysis is the non-directed regional dyad 
from 1960-2000.
3 Regional dyads are countries that share a common border or 
separated by no more than 300 miles of water. Non-directed dyads best fit the 
present research because no theoretical assumption is made that country A would 
initiate integration with country B (or vise versa). It is assumed that regardless of 
identity of the initiator, regional integration is a negotiated process whose success 
is theoretically specified. Therefore including directed dyads will only produce 
redundancy in the data. I generated the list of dyads and some of the variables 
using EUGene software (Bennett and Stam 2000). The remainder of this section 
describes the variables used in the analysis.  
The operationalization of regionalism must include a systematic coding so 
that the analysis can distinguish varying levels while still comparing similar 
attributes. This is done by using a multidimensional measurement referred to as 
the integration achievement score (IAS), which was first developed by Hufbauer 
and Schott (1994) and latter refined and applied in Efird and Genna 2002; Efird, 
Genna, and Kugler 2003; Feng and Genna 2003; and Genna and Hiroi 2004. The 
calculation of the IAS in Hufbauer and Schott’s work involves a smaller number 
of regional integration organizations for a single year, 1994. The updated score 
                                                 
3 Some dyads do not include all years due to a country’s independence after 1960 and missing 
data.  Power Preponderance 
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adds greater precision to their method, includes a greater number of regional 
integration projects, and involves an expanded timeframe. It gauges the level of 
regional integration by looking at six categories commonly attributable to 
regionalism: (1) trade in goods and services, (2) degree of capital mobility, (3) 
degree of labor mobility, (4) level of supranational institution importance, (5) 
degree of monetary policy coordination, and (6) degree of fiscal policy 
coordination. The coding system also breaks down the six categories into five 
levels along a Guttman scale (see appendix table one). The final measure is an 
average of the six categories allowing for an equal weight for each. The data used 
to estimate the IAS comes primarily from the Europa World Year Book and 
cross-referenced with other specialized sources. Of the various macro-geographic 
regions, the level of integration in Africa is the lowest. Levels of Asian and North 
and South American integration are higher than those in Africa, with the highest 
levels found in Europe. Currently, the score is being updated to include all cases 
of regional integration registered with the World Trade Organization from 
inception to 2003. The final data will be used in the subsequent versions of this 
paper.  
Power preponderance is relatively simple to operationalize. The formula is 
the natural log of the absolute difference (plus one) of the dyad: 
 
Power Preponderance = ln (|GDPi – GDPj| + 1) 
 
The GDP data come from the World Development Indicators (2005) and are 
in constant US dollars.
4  I operationalize satisfaction with the status quo through 
the use of mutual trade interests (MTI). MTI is the ratio of the total value of 
exports among the country dyads to total dyadic output:  
 
∑
∑ =
GDP
Exports
MTI  
 
Exports are used instead of total trade (imports plus exports) to prevent 
double counting. Also, it is less likely for states to misrepresent their export 
values relative to import values. A ratio of total output is needed so as to 
determine the level of trade dependence among the member-states. The trade 
values come from Gleditsch 2002 (a revision of the International Monetary Fund 
direction of trade statistics) and are in millions of US dollars. Since the ratios are 
small, each MTI value is multiplied by one million to improve interpretation of 
the results. MTI outperforms other traditional measures of status quo satisfaction 
                                                 
4 GDPs of Soviet block countries are missing. Efforts are currently underway to find 
estimations of these data so as to remove possible bias.  Genna 
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(similar alliance portfolios or UN voting records) when examining regional 
integration (Genna and Hiroi 2004).  
Institutional homogeneity is determined by using the democracy scores of the 
Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). Each country’s democracy score 
is an index of four authority dimensions: competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, executive constraints, and 
competitiveness of political participation (Gleditich and Ward 1997). I measure 
the degree of homogeneity by taking the absolute different of each country’s 
democracy score and dividing by ten. This produces values between zero and 
one, with lower values indicating higher levels of homogeneity.  
 
Preliminary Findings 
 
Table one displays the estimations of equations one through four. Overall, 
the results are as expected with the partial exception of estimations three and 
four; estimations one and two are completely within expectations. The first 
model demonstrates that power preponderance and mutual trade interest at time t 
and institutional homogeneity at time t+1 are good predictors of the level of 
regional integration at t+2. The greater the power asymmetry and the higher the 
mutual trade interest, the higher the level of regional integration. Figure two, 
parts a and b, displays the conditional effects of the interaction term. The black 
line segment represents the portion of the conditionality that remains significant 
at the p≤.10 level, while the dashed line segment represents the portion that is not 
significant. Figure two-a depicts the conditional coefficients of power 
preponderance at varying levels of MTI. As the level of MTI increases, the 
preponderance coefficients become increasingly positive. Figure two-b indicates 
a similar relationship. As the level of power asymmetry increases, the coefficient 
of MTI increases. For example, when the value of preponderance is 1 or near 
parity, the coefficient of MTI is -14.07. This means that a one-point increase in 
the MTI value decreases the level of integration in terms of IAS by about 14. 
However, when preponderance is 29, then the MTI coefficient is 5.73 (i.e., a one-
point increase of MTI increases the IAS by about 6). Between approximately 19 
and 21 on the values of preponderance, the MTI coefficients are not significant, 
meaning that the trade in this range does not significantly influence the level of 
integration. Institutional homogeneity’s negative coefficient indicates that the 
more homogeneous the political institutions are at t+1, the higher the level of 
integration. The second model indicates that higher levels of power asymmetry 
and mutual trade interests, the more homogeneous the institutions among the 
regional dyads. Recall that lower levels of the homogeneity measure translates to 
higher levels of homogeneity. Figure three a and b displays the graphical 
interpretation of the preponderance-MTI interaction term. Figure three-a shows 
that as MTI increases, the preponderance coefficient becomes increasingly 
negative. The exception of this relationship is at the lower end of MTI’s values. Power Preponderance 
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Figure three-b also demonstrates a similar relationship, except for preponderance 
levels between 23 and 27. The higher the level of integration at a one year lag 
also produces higher levels of homogeneity. The two models together indicate 
that preponderance and mutual trade interests precede homogeneity and 
integration. The estimations also indicate that homogeneity and integration are 
mutually reinforcing.  
The second set of estimations (three and four) in table one only partially 
confirms expectations. The level of integration at t+2 is associated with the level 
of mutual trade interests at t+4 and leads to the conclusion that higher levels of 
institutionalized integration produces greater mutual trade interests. However 
greater institutional homogeneity does not seem to influence the levels of MTI. 
Given the reinforcing nature of institutional integration and homogeneity, 
perhaps only one of these variables can account for the variation in mutual trade 
interests.  
 
Conclusions: Next Steps in the Research Project 
 
The work thus far has introduced a general theory of regionalism and some 
preliminary results. The results show some promise in supporting the theory but 
greater testing rigor is needed. We do see a pathway of conditions that estimates 
the level of integration around the world. Power asymmetry and status quo 
satisfaction in terms of MTI are the precursors to greater institutional 
homogeneity and institutionalized integration. Integration and homogeneity are 
also reinforcing factors. Integration does improve status quo satisfaction. An 
overall system develops that improves integration. The limiting factor, so far, is 
the level of power asymmetry. When power among the dyads is more evenly 
distributed, the system brakes down and integration is limited.  
The following are the next steps in this project. All involve improving the 
testing rigor. First, the data on integration needs to be expanded. While the 
current data is a representative cross-section of integration on each of the 
continents (except Antarctica), it is not complete. There are a number of 
integration projects (mainly in Africa and Asia) that need to be included. This 
will require coding of these projects and merging the data into the current data 
set. Second, an array of institutional homogeneity needs to be tabulated. While 
the current measure taps into the degree of political institutional homogeneity, 
economic institutions should also be included (Feng and Genna 2003; Souva 
2004). This will include various indicators such as money and inflation, 
government operations and regulations, takings and discriminatory taxation, and 
international exchange. Other economic institutional variables can include such 
things as property rights. Political institutions can also be expanded to include 
electoral rules and influence of pressure groups such as trade unions and the 
military. Third, the unit of analysis can also include the cases of integration, 
alongside the current regional dyads. This will require reformulation of the Genna 
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independent variables. The parallel testing of dyads and regional groups may be 
helpful in unveiling potential biases of power asymmetries. Currently the dyadic 
method allows for a pair-wise analysis of all regional members, but may under- 
or over-report the influence of the larger country vis-à-vis all other members. 
Fourth, the method of estimation needs improvement. The GLS method is 
appropriate for the first cut, but a method of simultaneous equation analysis is 
needed either through a three stage method or perhaps the Markov Chain method. 
Finally, a set of control variables may be necessary in order to compare future 
results with possible alternatives to the theory.  
 
Table One 
Generalized Least Squares Autocorrelation Corrected Regressions 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
Variables 
IAS (t+2)  Institutional 
Homogeneity 
(t+1) 
Mutual Trade 
Interest (t+4) 
Mutual Trade 
Interest (t+4) 
Power 
Preponderance (t) 
0.011*** 
(0.0027) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
  
Mutual Trade 
Interest (t) 
-14.78*** 
(3.20) 
8.28*** 
(3.11) 
  
Power 
Preponderance · 
Mutual Trade 
Interest (t) 
0.71*** 
(0.14) 
-0.341*** 
(0.137) 
  
Institutional 
Homogeneity (t+1) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
 -.00001 
(.0003) 
 
Institutional 
Homogeneity (t+3) 
    -0.0004 
(.0003) 
IAS (t+2)    -0.054*** 
(0.007) 
0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
0.003*** 
(0.0003) 
Constant -0.068 
(0.061) 
0.042 
(0.049) 
.005*** 
(.0003) 
0.004*** 
(0.0003) 
Observations  10435 10435 10117 10117 
Number  of  dyad  432 432 436 436 
χ
2  115.87***  80.92*** 79.40*** 83.28*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure Two 
Graphical depiction of conditional coefficients  
for the GLS regression model one 
 
(a)  Conditional coefficients of power preponderance at varying levels of MTI 
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(b) Conditional coefficients of MTI at varying levels of preponderance 
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Figure Three 
Graphical depiction of conditional coefficients  
for the GLS regression model two 
 
(a)  Conditional coefficients of power preponderance at varying levels of MTI 
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(b) Conditional coefficients of MTI at varying levels of preponderance 
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Appendix 
Table A-one: Integration Achievement Score (coding system) 
1.  Trade in Goods and Services 
0 = No agreements made to lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
1 = Preferential Trade Agreement 
2 = Partial Free Trade Area 
3 = Full Free Trade Area 
4 = Customs Union 
5 = No barriers among member countries 
2.  Degree of Capital Mobility 
0 = No agreements made to promote capital mobility 
1 = Foreign Direct Investment allowed in limited form 
2 = Capital withdrawal allowed 
3 = Full access for foreign investment and capital withdrawal, except for national 
government procurement 
4 = Full capital mobility expect for large scale merges and acquisitions 
5 = Full capital mobility without restriction 
3.  Degree of Labor Mobility 
0 = No agreements made to promote labor mobility 
1 = Right of movement granted for select professions 
2 = Full right of movement 
3 = Transferability of professional qualifications granted 
4 = Transferability of pensions and other retirement devices 
5 = Full freedom of movement 
4.  Level of Supranational Institution Importance 
0 = No supranational institutions 
1 = Establishment of nominal institutions 
2 = Information gathering and advisory role 
3 = Ability for institutions to amend proposals 
4 = Ability for institutions to veto proposals 
5 = Supranational institutions operate as primary decision node 
5.  Degree of Monetary Policy Coordination 
0 = No monetary policy coordination 
1 = Consultation regarding policy 
2 = Commitment to maintain parity  
3 = Coordinated interventions 
4 = Regional Central Bank establishment 
5 = Single currency 
6.  Degree of Fiscal Policy Coordination 
0 = No fiscal policy coordination 
1 = Consultation regarding policy 
2 = Commitments regarding deficit spending and taxation 
3 = Sanctions regarding breaking commitments 
4 = Uniform tax code 
5 = Single budget 
   
 
 
Cultural Identity, Security and Regional Integration 
 
 
 
Markus Thiel 
 
Introduction 
 
An observer of current European politics may almost automatically assume that 
the regional integration process in Europe, led successfully by the European Un-
ion (EU) and reinforced by other organizations, has resulted in the weakening of 
national identities and the pacifying of potential identity-related conflicts in the 
area. A closer look, however, reveals that the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs) in particular are still being caught in various security dilem-
mas ranging from the traditional military-related spheres to more subtle yet 
similarly destructive societal security issues with the potential to produce ethnic 
conflicts, even civil wars. The explanatory theoretical framework behind ‘so-
cietal security’ is fairly new and thus, often underestimated in the relative 
pacified European and Eurasian regions; yet, it presents a particular challenge to 
the multiethnic and fragile democracies there. In this chapter, I compare the ma-
jor international organizations present in the field (EU, NATO, OSCE, Council 
of Europe) and examine if there exists, at a minimum, a normative concern for 
minority rights and the promotion of societal security and secondly, what kind of 
institutional mechanisms and responses these organizations developed to attain 
these goals.  
 
Setting the agenda: collective identities and societal security 
 
Identity as a focus of international politics has become increasingly important 
with the harmonizing pressures of a globalized world and the expansion of inter-
national civil and human rights recognizing the right for self-expression. While 
identities exist on an individual as well as collective level, only the latter is of 
significance here since it leads to the virtuous cycles of emancipation and possi-
bly, vicious ones of self-determination, often labeled ‘identity politics’. In its 
simplest definition, the main referent in this paper along with the state, a national 
group, can be understood as a result of an identity securing social system. As 
such, a nation represents a prime example of a collective identity.  
To further clarify the often undifferentiated terminology about nations, 
Bloom proposes a national identification theory which states that “in order to 
achieve psychological security, every individual possesses an inherent drive to 36                                                                                       Thiel 
 
internalize – to identify with – the behavior, mores and attitudes of significant 
figures in her/his social environment […] i.e. people actively seek to enhance and 
protect identity” (Bloom 1990: 16). This has, he argues, significant implications 
for national identity and its security, which both develop along the same lines of 
protection and benefits for its members.  
The ontological backdrop for questions relating to collective identities and/or 
societal security is found in the constructivist or culturalist schools (Roe, 2005: 
47; Kolodziej 2005), both of which recognize the strength of collective belief 
systems but differ on the extent of changeability of these self-ascribed percep-
tions in that the latter sees ethnic security dilemmas between groups as most 
problematic whereas the former recognizes the malleability of the conflict-gene-
rating perceptions between groups. This distinction is important because it 
constraints to what extent societal security conflicts can be modified, reduced or 
securitized – which is where organizations such as the OSCE possess a compara-
tive advantage and vantage point as their approach most closely mirrors the 
mechanisms by which societal security can be attained. Social Constructivism 
thus points to the fluidity and socially constructed nature of security, which re-
sults in the Wendt’s modified axiom that ‘security is what states or nations make 
of it’.  
Another contributing strand of thought comes from the field of critical secu-
rity studies (Booth 2005), which focuses on the subjectivity of the term ‘security’ 
and its changing character from a potentially threatening ‘securitization’ to a pa-
cifying ‘desecuritization’, depending upon the context in which it is sought. The 
Copenhagen School neatly fits into this theoretical school, emphasizing not only 
the changing nature of security but also calling for renewed attention to com-
munities and the role identity plays for the attainment of security. While I do 
certainly adhere to the main tenets of the Copenhagen School, I disassociate my-
self from some of the deconstructive claims made about the importance of 
traditional, i.e. military security because of the inherent interplay between the 
various aspects of security. 
Returning to the referent question, according to sociologist Melucci, collec-
tive identity can be defined as “an interactive and shared definition produced by 
several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their 
actions as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their actions 
takes place” (1996: 75). This quite political definition raises questions about 
equal rights for all members of a multiethnic state’s society in which competing 
collectives claim their rights, especially the right to exist autonomously and the 
right to be recognized as such. The former point needs to be taken seriously be-
cause collectivities tend to have a so-called ‘in-group bias’, which puts their own 
group above others and is otherwise referred to as the ‘us versus them’ or ‘self-
other’ differentiation (Neumann 1998). It also emphasizes the co-constitutive 
character of both, individual and collective identity. Recognizing the fundamen-
tal difference between nations and states, the above terminology calls attention to Cultural Identity 
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the potential frictions between multiple national minorities or between a national 
minority and a majority state government. 
Collective Identities are varyingly classified and extend beyond the classic 
national – European dichotomy. Ichijo and Spohn, for example, sketch five basic 
constitutive dimensions of collective identities in Europe, which are: Ethnic-ter-
ritorial, religious-cultural, socio-economic, political-legal and lastly, political-
military functions (2005). All of these identitive aspects ought to be intact to 
ideally promote and maintain the societal security of a collective group.  
The existence of national minorities raises two essential questions: to what 
degree of self-governance do these communities aspire to and, of particular signi-
ficance for this analysis, how then can multiple nations coexist in previously 
defined territorial states? These aspects of collective identities produce a need for 
the protection of ethnic minorities within states, particularly in states that are as 
multi-ethnically constituted as the Central- and Eastern European ones. There has 
always been a theoretical distinction between the more civic oriented national-
isms that developed in Western Europe (e.g. France), as opposed to the ethnic-
cultural nationalisms which became predominant in Central and Eastern Europe 
(e.g. Germany, Hungary) and have continued to create friction for the past cen-
tury after the end of integrating empires such as the Austro-Hungarian or the 
Ottoman ones. 
Societal security as one of the expanded notions of security refers to the se-
curity of collective groups in relations to other communities or the institutions of 
the state in which they reside. Security is not so much about security between 
states but between societies, often within states (Buzan 1993). As such, it con-
sists not only of an expansion of security, but it is also a move away from the 
state-centric view to other reference points such as ethnic minority groups, 
eventually proposing a duality of state and societal security. Threats to societal 
security then constitute perceptions and/or actions that inhibit the expression of a 
national groups’ identity, be it through their culture, language, religion or any 
other form of self-expression (Roe 2005). Formed out of the insecurities over 
ethnic and national identities that come in conflict with other resident (majority) 
groups or the state government in which they are located, these issues have be-
come more significant in relation to those over state sovereignty in contemporary 
Europe, with the break-up and ensuing civil war in the former Yugoslavia as the 
prime example of societal insecurity. With ever more states calling for autonomy 
and even declaring independence, questions of citizenship add to the multifaceted 
problems in group-to-group relations.  
Societal security concerns mainly the relations of minorities and groups 
within a society or nation, and as such can be distinguished from other forms of 
security, such as human security, in that the latter refers to general living condi-
tions of individuals and collectives while societal security emphasizes the 
relations between these groups. Societal issues are by nature collective, thereby 
referring to the rights associated with freedom of expression and association, use 38                                                                                       Thiel 
 
of language and native education, religious expression and participation in the 
state’s policy-making process.  
The Copenhagen School, which first publicized the expanded notions of se-
curity, added to the traditional military aspects others such as political, economic 
and environmental ones – all of which can affect societies in their security (Bu-
zan, Waever and De Wilde 1998). They view societal security not only as a 
matter of the security of the affected minority group, but of the state government 
as well. But if, as Waever claims, the main goal for each affected party is to de-
securitize, i.e. to preventatively avoid the triggering of tensions between 
minorities and the state (Roe 2004), it remains unclear how such measures could 
be implemented by minorities that don’t have the power or resources to do so. It 
is this power differential that leads me to believe that state governments have to 
assume primary responsibility for the (de)securitization of minority rights. How-
ever, it might not always in the interests of both to securitize the bilateral 
relationship because it might actually lead to power shifts from one side to the 
other, or to foreign attention to this issue.  
In addition, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde provide a three-pronged classifica-
tion of societal security threats, consisting of migration, horizontal and vertical 
competition, the former referring to demographic changes caused by 
(im)migration and the latter two specifying competitive pressures from dominant 
groups or from integration processes respectively (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 
1998). While we find a distinction in the literature pertaining to minorities be-
tween the traditional national groups and the so-called ‘new’ minorities arising as 
(im)migration populations, this paper is largely concerned with the previous 
ones, since the latter group is usually not sufficiently recognized as a single ent-
ity. 
With regards to the overall security situation in CEECs, the diminishing of 
traditional politico- military conflict in most of these countries almost automati-
cally led to the (re)emergence of societal security issues. Many of these countries 
are, at a basic level, pacified and integrated in a complex security-democracy 
web through organizations such as NATO, the EU and the OSCE. In addition, 
some NGO’s, such as, for example, the Project on Ethnic Relations, work closely 
on conflict prevention with the IGO’s in the region. However, the economic and 
particularly, social conditions in most of these countries are still problematic and 
not sufficiently securitized. It ought to be clear that such an environment, while 
not anarchic, still causes enough insecurity to perceive other identity groups or 
the majority in government as a threat to societal peace and integrity. In sum, 
identity politics and the link between identity and (societal) security has moved 
to the forefront of European security theories: “one of the central themes of con-
temporary discourse on European security is the importance of identity” (Hyde-
Price and Aggestam 2000). 
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The promotion of minority rights as keystone for societal security  
 
Minority rights have come to be regarded as a fundamental component of the 
international human rights regime; hence they are important for the international 
relations of Europe and cannot solely be considered a state’s internal prerogative 
anymore (OSCE 1991). How can then be national minorities reconciled with the 
majorities and/or the governments of the state they live in? Even more so, can 
one reasonably expect that these collective groups uphold and promote their col-
lective identities in a manner compatible with the state’s objectives? The 
preceding questions touch upon the core of societal security matters and goes 
beyond the basic rights of freedom of expression, association and the freedom 
from discrimination.  
Historically, nations and states – particularly in Central and Eastern Europe -  
have rarely coincided; rather, nations had to continuously fight for their own ter-
ritory (such as in the Polish case), they were subject to a redrawing of the 
boundaries and a forced move (which affected many ethnic Germans in the re-
gion), or they were left within another, potentially hostile state after the 
reconfiguration of states (as occurred to many ethnic Hungarians that found 
themselves in Slovakia and Romania). At the same time, there were a few posi-
tive examples of territorial partition as in the Czech & Slovak cases; however, in 
this case two nations of roughly equal size were present. The promotion of mi-
nority rights is particularly important where there has been a long-standing 
historical conflict in existence leading to ‘ancient hatreds’, such as in the case 
between the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians (Hearn 2006). 
Recent historical developments such as the dissolution of the USSR and the 
ensuing breakup of the Balkan region continues to motivate national minorities 
and exert pressure on the governing state (or the partisan neighbor) in which 
these are located, with varying effects on domestic political stability and the final 
outcome. Divergent examples of this ongoing phenomenon include Montene-
gro’s peaceful secession and Kosovo’s long-standing but contentious attempt to 
do so. In general, though, territorial integrity is still regarded as a fundament of 
international law, which makes the resolving of minority conflicts and affirma-
tion of societal security in pre-existing states even more important. 
The state as one of the main referent points for the maintenance of societal 
security is in most cases agent as well as referent of (de-)securitization. Societies 
might attempt to act against threats by either taking certain measures themselves 
or by somehow moving the threat onto the state’s agenda (Roe 2004: 281). If the 
state fails to provide security (which would constitute a case of ‘negative’ chal-
lenge to societal security) or actively discriminates against a minority group 
(representing a ‘positive’ societal security threat), for example in the case of the 
Albanian ‘minority’ in Kosovo, the collective group might take action to defend 
themselves against ‘outside’ threats. In that respect, ‘security’ is much more than 
just the absence of war; rather, it is the provision of stability and protection by 40                                                                                       Thiel 
 
the state. For the sake of definitional clarity, ‘the state’ should be specified here 
as the acting elites governing the state institutions and ‘national minorities’ as 
mainly ethnic minorities who aim at a certain degree of cultural self-expression, 
territorial autonomy and political participation (in contrast to religious or no-
madic minorities).
1 
However, not every case is as dramatic: the threat can often materialize in 
rather subtle terms, e.g. by not recognizing linguistic or educational demands for 
the cultural autonomy of minorities, or by simply ignoring any calls for partici-
pation and representation at the governmental level as occurred in the case of the 
Hungarian minorities in Slovakia or Romania. Since security and subjectivity are 
closely linked, minorities tend to be more cautious and assertive about the pro-
tection of (their) civil rights and easily perceive themselves as in need of special 
protection – a demand that poses additional demands on governments. As pre-
viously mentioned, at times societal insecurity can arise from another national 
group within a weak state, which intimidates or negates another national group’s 
demands for autonomy or cultural expression. But then again, the constitution of 
a state government is crucial as a functional state should be able to constrain or 
mitigate such issues. Causes of such conflicts also do not always need to consti-
tute a direct threat posed at the society itself; often, conflicts are about the 
territory that national minorities inhabit and so intrinsically are part of their col-
lective identity.  
Here, the question how to judge the competing claims about securing collec-
tive identities becomes significant. In minority-majority or related conflicts, who 
or how started the conflict, and what can be done to alleviate societal insecurity 
and ethnic strife? (Bilgin 2003: 213). This is where some of the organizations 
analyzed below, particularly the EU and the OSCE, come into play by utilizing a 
neutral expert, the High Commissioner on National Minorities and applying so-
called ‘Confidence-Building Measures’ to enhance the prospects for a peaceful 
co-existence of national minorities and majorities in any given state.  
One of the major ironies of the work of many security-related organizations 
is that when their activities are successful, they don’t receive much public atten-
tion. Only where a conflict escalates, the media and the international community 
take notice. In a similar paradoxical manner, the inability of a state to guarantee 
total security to its citizens is theorized as the success of the projected need of 
governments for the attainment of such a security: “the inability of the state 
project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state’s continued success as 
an impelling identity” (Campbell 1998: 12). In this respect it is essential to be 
                                                 
1 For a good overview of the array of questions relating to conditions for societal security, 
ranging from media perceptions to housing access, see: Mudde, Cas (ed). Racist Extremism in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Routledge: New York, 2005, Appendix 2.   
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aware that the power of a state government can be a provider of societal security 
to one’s minority and a threat to another. 
Another important aspect that needs to be taken into account is the regionali-
zation of ethnic minority groups in Central and Eastern European Countries. It 
seems unclear, however, in how far the regionalism of these populations can be 
positively viewed as an alternative form of creating a societal security for them-
selves without creating a conflict within a given state, or if it rather precipitates 
the secession by gaining transnational strength & obtaining partisan external 
support (Buzan and Waever 2005: 356). If latter should apply, as the aspirations 
of the Hungarian or Albanian minorities show, it actually exacerbates regional 
security by drawing in several states. 
 
The role of the European Union (EU) in the promotion of societal security 
 
The EU as Europe’s most significant conglomerate of democracies has always 
had a regard for minority rights and the promotion of human and societal security 
more generally, but it reemphasized these objectives in the Copenhagen 
Declaration, which eventually became known as the prerequisites for Union 
membership (EU Council 1993). Its ‘soft’ security agenda, focusing in addition 
to the traditional politico-military aspects on newer and more comprehensive 
ones such as energy security, environmental security and non-military, 
diplomatic interventions in crisis regions, in addition to its broad enlargement 
objective of ‘desecuritization by integration’, certainly distinguishes the Union 
from all other organizations in Europe.  
In my view, one of the Union’s most intriguing yet underrated strategies 
regarding the promotion of societal security lies in the gradual deemphasizing of 
national governance structures and the coinciding strengthening of (Euro-
)regions, thereby reducing the conflict potential between national minorities and 
state governments. In addition, the EU’s comprehensive integration process 
covering economic, political and social issues and the monitoring through the 
Commission engulf EU member states in a complex network of interrelated 
states bound to the liberal-democratic legally expressed human and minority 
rights norms that have emerged as one of the most progressive ones in existence. 
A so-called ‘minority clause’ was also inserted in the draft Constitution for 
Europe.
2 It is argued that if the Balkans would have received EU-accession 
prospects earlier, we might not have witnessed the civil wars in the successor 
states of Yugoslavia due to the EU’s moderating integration effects (Serfaty 
2003: 240). 
Yet not all states in Europe are member states of the Union, thus some are 
exempt from the above mentioned membership obligations, with the EU 
concentrating mainly on the upholding of minority rights in the accession 
                                                 
2 Upon recommendation of the OSCE HCNM, Article I-2. 42                                                                                       Thiel 
 
countries through annual assessments. This could mean that, in fact, any 
preclusion of membership of these states will likely have a negative impact on 
the maintenance of human and minority rights, which is why concepts such as the 
EU’s ‘absorption capacity’ have become a highly sensitive matter of debate. Both 
of the above factors make the EU the most significant ‘soft’ security provider 
among its member states, but also spell out the Union’s biggest disadvantage 
over institutions such as the OSCE: it includes only countries that are in the 
European (geographic) or membership realm. The prospect of membership is 
frequently used as an incentive for the upholding of minority rights - as in mutual 
Greek-Albanian relations- , but has been a slowing constraint on potential 
accession countries such as Turkey and its treatment of the Kurdish minority 
there. 
Another issue that needs to be regarded concerns the scrutiny with which the 
EU has influenced and monitored minority rights in new member states, e.g. in 
Slovakia (and Romania, Croatia etc). In this multinational state, more than 
500,000 ethnic Hungarians live in the south and southeast, accounting for about 
10 percent of Slovakia's population. The demands of the vocal Hungarian 
minority for municipial electoral representation and linguistic emancipation has 
only improved with legislation passed in accordance with the EU’s accession 
progress reports and the OSCE’s HCNM pushing for a more balanced 
administrative reform process before the 2004 accession– though without 
specifically mention the discrimination still existing there (Biro and Kovacs 
2001: 289). But societal security in this EU member state remains to this day 
fragile and tensions between the Hungarian minority and the Slovak majority are 
continuously present as evidenced when the governing party coalition of Social 
Democrats and Slovak National Party warned of independence for Serbia's 
disputed province of Kosovo because it could spark secession of Slovakia's 
ethnic Hungarians.  
The EU actively seeks the expertise of the OSCE in many minority rights 
cases, and has delegated the judgment on a state’s minority policies to the 
HCNM (Ilcheva 2006). This makes sense as far as both organizations have a 
similar constructive-engagement approach and all EU members states being 
OSCE ones as well, but it results in limited oversight for the organization to 
independently monitor accession candidates in Central and Eastern Europe. On 
the other hand, the EU contributes financially and seconds personnel to election 
observation missions of the OSCE (EU Commission 2007). In yet another 
example of the cooperation between both organizations and the implicit EU 
approach of securitization through integration, the "overwhelming majority" of 
EU states backs Kazakhstan's bid to chair the OSCE in 2009, although a decision 
on this has been put on hold because the U.S. and some EU states are concerned 
on human rights grounds. Many in the Union believe Kazakhstan's bid would 
promote reforms in the country. The EU and the OSCE seem to prefer, particular 
in its dealings with the more remote Central Asian states, an ‘engagement first, Cultural Identity 
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reform later’ approach that likely overlooks and potentially contradicts the 
societal security needs of oppressed minorities in these states. 
Overall, the EU seems to apply in both, its proclamations as well as policies, 
general normative standards that do prohibit discrimination against minorities in 
member states, though the organization does not spell out specific objectives for 
the maintenance or even promotion of minority rights. Rather, most of the 
Union’s policies regarding societal security issues are subsumed under human 
rights and issues of national minorities are not explicitly mentioned there – or 
only under reference to the OSCE’s activities. As such, the EU certainly 
possesses the most comprehensive ‘soft’ security agenda relating to human rights 
and societal security, but it is limited in that its influence is largely based upon 
the membership incentive and its reliance on the OSCE. 
 
Other regional security providers – NATO, the OSCE and the Council of 
Europe 
 
Comparisons between the various security-related institutions in Europe are 
usually focused on the traditional military-aspects (Meyers 2005: 199-138). 
Although I concentrate in this paper on the OSCE as an instrument for the 
attainment of societal security, the consideration of other actors in the region 
provides an overview of the task-splitting – and the missed opportunities – these 
IGO’s have in common.  
One of the similarities that these organizations below share is the discrepancy 
between states and the intergovernmental organizations that arise out of the 
multilevel governance system, particularly the reporting requirements for ethnic 
conflicts. So, for example, do (inter-)national estimates of minority populations 
in the countries as well as their actual number often diverge, either because they 
are downplayed by governments or not adequately counted in the process. In a 
related matter, there is a great discrepancy between national and 
intergovernmental minority rights laws and the reality faced by minorities 
(Meijknecht 2004). This fact alone represents a substantive problem in the 
societal relations within states as it contributes to the assumption that societal 
threats are not necessarily only perceived by national minorities but can be 
substantiated by the detrimental conditions they find themselves in. 
In the following section, I will survey the other main actors in the field, their 
involvement regarding societal security and compare their effectiveness in 
maintaining and promoting it. 
 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
 
In the OSCE, societal security issues are mostly dealt within the so-called 
‘human’ dimension, which is why I concentrate solely on this particular area of 
OSCE action.  In the larger context of security studies, the objective of the OSCE 44                                                                                       Thiel 
 
lies in the creation of a pan-European security community, i.e. a group of people 
or states sharing a minimum level of common understandings about the peaceful 
coexistence and settlement of disputes. With 56 member states, the organization 
is certainly the largest of all IGO’s in the region, extending from the Atlantic to 
Central Asia. 
The promotion and stabilization of societal security can be assessed under the 
OSCE’s activities surrounding ‘the human dimension’. In contrast to the politico-
military and the economic-environmental activities, these refer specifically to the 
inclusion and integration of citizens and in a broader context, human right issues 
(OSCE 2007). The OSCE focuses on aspects related to human and societal 
security, most prominent among these are electoral monitoring processes, 
followed by the assistance to national minorities and the supervision of rule of 
law, freedom of media etc. Because of the consensual nature of conflict 
prevention in the participating member states, military options remain very 
limited and thus, conflict-prevention measures and democracy promotion are 
primary goals of the organization.  
The basis of the OSCE’s operations is formed by various declarations 
pertaining to minority rights, ranging from the founding Helsinki Final Act in 
1975 to the more advanced normative prescriptions found in the Copenhagen 
Document of 1990 (CSCE 1990). The centrality of preserving a state’s authority 
and at the same time, reconciling the expectations of a collective identity group is 
the single most important post-cold War development occupying the 
organization. To this end, the main OSCE strategies in pursuing the goals of 
conflict prevention and the improvement of human and societal security are 
coordinated by two central institutions within the organization: the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities. Both institutions were added long after 
the coming into existence of the CSCE/OSCE, in 1990 and 1992, respectively, 
representing an improved organizational adaptation to the post cold-war 
environment in Europe.  
As the name ODIHR expresses, its main functions are the establishment of 
democratic institutions and as a more recent focus, the upholding of Human 
Rights. In the past, ODIHR assistance aimed at strengthening the organizational 
capacity of political minority groups, training of these groups in relations to the 
government or the media, and the fostering of participation in public life as well 
as legislative reform to enable civil rights for all citizens of the member states 
irrespective of ethnic belonging (George and McGee 2006).  It is there that policy 
recommendations aimed at the state governments and monitoring of societal 
issues within member states become relevant.  
The ODIHR’s two-fold approach of establishing democratic governance 
institutions observing the law while at the same time recognizing the need for the 
protection of minorities makes sense because in many cases, law enforcement- or 
legal institutions are contributing to the discrimination of the above mentioned Cultural Identity 
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populations. While these groups remain an important focus of the OSCE’s 
institutions, in this paper they will be subordinate to the national minorities that 
continue to have significant issues with the majorities and/or governments in 
their states. The Roma population of the various OSCE member states in CEECs 
continues to be such an ethnic minority group which is regularly discriminated 
against, even by state’s police-forces (USCSE 2002:63).  
In the 1990s, the main procedure in the human dimension area was a step-by-
step approach in which the participating states could bring forth a matter or 
complaint which then would be resolved by holding bilateral meetings and/or 
establishing an expert mission in the region to gain local expertise and promote 
dialogue and cooperation. These missions would submit then a report to the 
OSCE, which in turn would decide on further actions. As of 2006, there are 17 
active missions or offices working predominantly in CEECs. This standard 
mechanism exists in addition to the annual implementation review conferences, 
which posteriori exerted supervisory functions over the most pressing issues in 
the member states (Preece 1998). 
Conflict prevention via OSCE field operations and the High Commissioner 
on National Minorities (HCNM) will remain an important OSCE task in the 
future. The current HCNM, Rolf Ekeus, a Swedish diplomat, was elected at the 
8
th OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in 2000. The High Commissioner 
exemplifies the work related to societal security in the CEECs. As such, the 
HCNM develops and oversees the monitoring of policy strategies in the member 
states relating to minority protection, such as, for example, guidelines for the 
participation of national minorities in elections or freedom from discrimination. 
Similarly important for minority rights are educational rights and the use of 
language and media, as they are part of the OSCE’s strategy to implement 
Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) which increase trust in the governmental 
authorities and channel the activities of national minorities. In addition, he is 
authorized to attend crises regions at his will and directly communicate with the 
affected populations, in order to find a suitable solution or relay a warning back 
to the OSCE Council, often with the recommendation to set up an OSCE mission 
or office. These generally work complementarily in that the office provides the 
needed country expertise and the HCNM the political clout to convince minority 
and governmental elites to cooperate on societal security issues.  
The nature of the work of the HCNM, his confidentiality and freedom in 
using the appropriate steps of action, makes an analysis of his work more 
difficult, particularly since he, as representative of an intergovernmental 
institution, has to be aware of his neutral stance vis-à-vis governments and 
national minorities. At least on paper, there is an evolution in the adding of tasks 
throughout the annual OSCE summits recognizable, e.g. through the recently 
advocated establishment of a code-of-conduct for law enforcement agencies with 
regards to ethnic profiling and the emphasis on multi-ethnic broadcasting 
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same report spells out theoretical declaration after declaration about the various 
rights that national minorities are entitled to, with no reference as to how these 
commitments can be achieved or even measured. 
In an illustration of this disconnect, the Moldovan experience of the OSCE 
over the separatist Eastern region of Transdniestria causes ongoing tensions. In 
1992, the unilateral secession of Transdniestria caused violent conflicts between 
both nations, and the establishment of an OSCE mission in 1993 in Chisinau (and 
subsequently in Tiraspol, the capital of the self-proclaimed Transdniestrian 
Republic) resulted in little more than keeping the status quo of a delicate 
ceasefire. While Moldova is part of the European Neighborhood Policy 
framework of the EU, there is currently no realistic membership perspective. 
This would certainly be the optimal outcome, however, the Transdniestrian 
conflict may well stand in-between the EU’s expectations for improvement and 
the Moldovan government’s insistence on the territorial integrity of its country 
with Russia supporting the breakaway region, thereby precluding any kind of 
final settlement.  
In sum, the OSCE is certainly the organization with the best functional 
expertise in societal security issues, albeit with limited means to enforce it or 
pressure for actions that would support its stance. In relation to the other two 
aspects of the OSCE’s work, the human rights dimension certainly seems to have 
become more significant in the post-cold war period, as the quote by the Russian 
Foreign Minister Lavrov at the 2006 OSCE Council meeting shows: “Against the 
background of the situation in the first and second baskets, the lack of balance in 
the work of the OSCE is showing clearly. Its absolute ‘center of gravity’ has 
been shifted towards the humanitarian and human rights sphere” (Lavrov 2006: 
3). 
 
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 
 
As the most important traditional security provider in Europe, NATO does not 
directly deal with the promotion of societal security issues. Its strength lies in its 
military capability and, under U.S. leadership, efficacy and application of force 
to achieve regional security. The NATO actions against the nationalist 
government of Serbia in the 1995 and then again, in 1998/99 during the Kosovo 
crisis, come to mind as prime examples of its securitizing potential.  
The organization still acknowledges the precariousness of minority conflicts 
but sees the cooperation with and support of more relevant IGO’s such as the EU, 
the OSCE or the COE to be the most effective way of approaching such matters. 
Generally, NATO is the organization ‘of last resort’, when all previous efforts by 
the other players have failed. This implies that NATO is a delimiting factor in the 
development of peace-enforcing activities for all other IGO’s in the field, be it 
the EU or the OSCE. There have been plenty of suggestions in the past by U.S. Cultural Identity 
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leaders confirming the required primacy of NATO in the area of European 
(military) security.  
The organization’s focus on military enforcement makes it also less useful 
for the solution of political and societal tensions that might not necessarily be 
violent or militarily expressed. In that regard, NATO lacks basic treaty 
provisions as well as functional agencies to maintain and promote societal 
security. Its security focus remains largely on interstate relationships and hard 
security solutions, and even the case of Bosnia was, while analytically stemming 
from a societal security crisis, reacted upon through a military mission that 
emphasized traditional military security aspects. 
NATO is frequently invoked as a security provider for the CEECs, but in the 
initial period after the end of communist rule, these states turned to the OSCE 
and the EU, particularly since many of them they were already OSCE members 
during the Cold War. Because of its organizational structure, NATO is also 
branded as an U.S.-led collective security alliance that is still considered with 
significant scepticism and distrust by Russia, a major regional intervening power 
in Eastern Europe. Here, the OSCE seems to possess a comparative advantage 
due to the universal participation of all states in the region, including Russia 
(Hopman 2003). At the same time, Russia’s participation in the OSCE has led to 
some unresolved conflicts that reflect the East-West disparity in the organization 
such as the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict. NATO, while an important regional 
military security provider, does neither contain normative prescriptions for 
societal concerns in its declarations and publications, nor specific strategies for 
their attainment and/or promotion. 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE) 
 
The CoE, the oldest pan-European civil rights organization founded in 1946, has 
only limited impact on the satisfactory securitization of minority issues in 
Central- and Eastern Europe. During the Cold War, the CoE issued largely 
cautious statements, referring to the anti-discrimination clause spelled out by the 
European Court of Human Rights and so exemplified the negligent attitude of 
many IGO’s during the Cold War (Preece 1998). After 1991, its member states 
became signatories of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the organization’s major human rights treaty besides the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which spells 
out wide-ranging minority rights but fails to define what a ‘national minority’ 
constitutes (Council of Europe 2005). With 27 of its 46 members now also part 
of the more influential EU, the Council has lost much of its clout and struggles to 
redefine its role.  
The Council's main tasks are the promotion of democracy and human rights, 
particularly as they relate to cultural expression such as language and native 
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limited impact. In fact, the CoE cooperates closely with the Union in areas where 
there is some overlap, e.g. in the development of the Stability Pact for the Balkan 
countries.  
As far as strategies and institutional accountability are concerned, in 
comparison to the OSCE, the Council is less institutionalized and offers solely 
framework recommendations for the upholding of minority rights which are left 
open to the participating states to implement. In addition, the CoE has the 
individual states reporting on their performance on the organization’s Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, which will then be relayed to the 
Secretary General of the CoE. Once a country is admitted and adopted the 
Framework Conventions, it is left unsupervised by the organization, i.e. without 
regular monitoring reports (Preece 1998: 154). An independent monitoring body 
supervising the implementation of these regulations is also not in place exempt 
provisions for a ‘follow-up’ with the member states, thus making the CoE rather 
ineffective in the societal securitization of these countries. 
 
Conclusion and Synopsis 
 
The opinions about the effectiveness of the IGO’s examined above vary 
significantly. While some may emphasize the actual performance and evaluate 
the organizations upon their factual record and achievements, others might point 
out that the existence and cooperation of the EU, the OSCE and the CoE already 
signifies an important step in the encouragement and attainment of societal 
security in Europe. I acknowledge the latter but believe that these organizations 
need to not only be measured by their normative concern for societal security, but 
also by their institutional strategic responses. Should we then take the absence of 
more violent conflict – if one takes into account the many national minorities in 
CEECs - as evidence of the performance of these organizations?  
In a larger theoretical IR context, NATO’s approach of securing minorities 
through traditional military intervention signifies a classic neo-realist approach. 
The EU, in its emphasis on linking economic and political integration with the 
reinforcement of democratic institutions and procedures falls into the liberal 
category, while the OSCE and CoE primarily act according to a constructivist 
outlook by creating norms and standards for the desecuritization of minority 
conflicts in the member states. This is where the OSCE can be most effective, as 
its preventive engagement with minorities and state governments works 
according to constructivist notions of redefining societal threats and 
desecuritizing potential threats, and the EU as the most powerful supplier of 
membership incentives and behavioral norms on a wide range of issues can be 
considered the most comprehensive ‘soft’ security provider. 
Societal security in Europe can best be achieved when these interlocking 
institutions cooperate closely and thereby create a transnational system of checks 
and balances. To mention a negative example, it is evident that some state Cultural Identity 
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leaders, particularly if not bound to EU or CoE obligations, simply pay lip 
service to the human and minority rights provisions stated in the OSCE while 
maintaining a ultranationalist or autocratic regime, e.g. in Serbia, Russia and 
many Central Asian member states.  
One possible option for all the organizations is to lower the admittedly high 
standards for membership, as has been shown in the Slovakian EU membership, 
and therefore conform to the reality of ethnic and cultural discrimination in the 
face of the often slow improvements in intersocietal relations (Meijknecht 2004: 
185), thus integrating member states in the hope of ‘socializing’ them over time 
into the adequate standards instead of pretending that these governments fulfill 
their expectations. While this option could be beneficial and certainly a more 
realistic adjustment to the realities of societal securitization, it also goes against 
the norm-building standards that IGO’s and international law aim to promote. It 
is hardly justifiable that societal security can be achieved or even maintained 
with the adoption or pursuit of lower minority rights standards. 
A comprehensive overview of these organizations needs to include the 
constraints set by historical developments as well as by external powers. As 
much as the EU, the CoE and the OSCE work towards developing common 
norms of toleration, democratic governance and civil rights, religious-historical 
grievances, as in the Serbian-Croat-Bosnian case or intrinsic pressures for 
secession, as in the Kosovo case, overpower the institutional influence these 
organizations have. In addition, regional powers, i.e. countries such as Russia, 
often externally intervene in already conflict-laden areas to tip the balance in the 
minority-majority relationship, as happened in the Transdniestrian case where 
Russia continuously manipulated the Moldovan government and thereby made 
any resolution impossibly (Socor 2003). While NATO and the EU have 
practically no influence over Russia’s actions, the latter continues to be the 900-
pound gorilla in the OSCEs negotiation chamber in Vienna. 
What conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of IGOs in the field of 
societal security? Would it be preferable to reform and strengthen the OSCE as 
the functional organization with the most expertise and strategies in the field, or 
would an enhancement of effectiveness consist in an improved coordination 
between the major agencies, each one sticking to their traditional pursuit of ‘soft’ 
and ‘hard’ security issues? It appears that there exists already a well-working 
cooperation between most of the organizations in the field, particularly between 
the CoE, the EU and the OSCE. The CoE and the EU and their member states 
contribute financially and with personnel to the OSCE, the OSCE delivers the 
much-needed expertise through the HCNM and political reach through its 
extensive membership. Regional integration, if broadly understood as the 
development of common policies by various actors, i.e. the IGOs in the region, 
serves the cause of societal security promotion the best. However, a narrow 
concept of regional integration, with each organization focusing on its own 
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Finally, it is important to note that the short time frame since the end of the 
Cold War resulted in a big challenge for these organizations to internally adapt to 
the new world order, whereas national minorities found it easier to mobilize since 
they saw this as ‘their’ moment to push for autonomy and in few cases, 
secession. Over the course of this analysis it has become evident that there is still 
much to be improved in the effectiveness of these organizations, but 
simultaneously the potential for societal security might best be maximized by the 
concurring achievements of democratization and the upholding of the rule of law 
by the various organizations in the region. 
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Introduction 
 
On July 9 2002, 53 Heads of State from across the African continent gathered at 
a memorable session of the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 
Durban, the Republic of South Africa (RSA) to bid farewell to the organization 
and to welcome the new African Union (AU). Amidst the attendant fanfare and 
pageantry, African leaders, one after another, not only took stock of the OAU’s 
accomplishments, but also heralded the new Union as the dawn of a new era for 
the continent and its peoples. The host President and the AU’s first president, 
Thabo Mbeki, even promised that the Union would liberate the African people 
from their misery, abject poverty and perennial underdevelopment. Other dele-
gates in Durban also hoped that the new pan-African construct would intensify 
intra-African economic activities, resolve socio-political crises, foster continental 
unity, and improve the region’s visibility and profile on the global stage. 
While the optimism among African leaders and delegates about the AU at the 
inaugural meeting was conspicuous and contagious, it took the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations (U.N.), Kofi Annan, to caution the gathering ‘not to mis-
take hope for achievement.’ It was an apt and timely reminder of Africa’s poor 
record on following through on intra-continental agreements/treaties, where it 
seems they are more content with launching new initiatives than delivering on 
results. After all, had the OAU lived up to its 1963 billings, it probably would not 
have been replaced with a new pan-African edifice in 2002. By most accounts, 
the OAU simply failed to deliver on many fronts, save a few areas, such as over-
seeing the end of white minority rule in southern Africa and the liberation of all 
African countries from colonial subjugation, and containing some border dis-
putes.
1 For the most part, however, the OAU’s record of achievements was terse 
at best. The characterizations of the OAU’s accomplishments during its almost 
40-year history by commentators have ranged from mild criticisms, such as “did 
not bring nations of the continent together,” to scathing assessments, such as “did 
not achieve anything” (El-Ayouty and Zartman).  Poignantly, the OAU could 
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not prevent many of Africa’s civil wars, among them, in Angola, Congo-Kin-
shasa, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Sudan in which millions of 
innocent lives perished, under the guise of the OAU’s infamous and loathed prin-
ciple of “non-interference.” Also in the name of “non-interference, the OAU 
stood idly by during the reigns of terror of the Idi Amin regime (Uganda), Jean-
Bedel Bokassa (Central African Republic), and Sanni Abacha (Nigeria). In a 
similar vein, the defunct pan-African organization could not resolve the row over 
Western Sahara to the satisfaction of its protagonists, viz., Algeria, Morocco, and 
Mauritania (Zoubir, and El-Ayouty and Zartman). In fact, Morocco withdrew 
from the OAU in 1986, and has the dubious distinction of being the lone sove-
reign African country to remain outside of the AU over the dispute— for 
admitting Western Sahara, first to the OAU, and then to the AU. 
There is no doubt that the inception of the AU constituted an important epoch 
in the unfolding history of post-colonial Africa. However, in view of the fore-
going grim assessment, how is the AU different, or plans to be different, and is it 
likely to deliver where its precursor, the OAU, had not? To begin with, the AU, 
at least in its institutional set up, strikes a remarkable resemblance to that of the 
European Union (EU). Moreover, many observers have, correctly or otherwise, 
compared the AU to the EU. Is this a fair comparison? The purpose of this paper, 
therefore, is to analyze the AU and its Constitutive Act, and to discuss the limits 
of the comparison between the AU and its European counterpart. This paper will 
argue that whereas the architects of the AU undoubtedly relied on the EU tem-
plate, the two entities are not only spatially apart, but temporally (fifty years) 
apart. Hence, while it can be useful to employ tools and lessons from the expe-
rience of the EU to critically examine the AU, as we will do here, there are, 
nonetheless, limits to the comparison of the AU and the EU. The AU will have to 
chart its own course, travel at its own pace, find its own rhythm, and write its 
own history. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into five parts. The ensuing section 
two provides the context of the discourse by establishing the justification for re-
gional integration as a panacea for Africa’s unenviable deplorable economic and 
political condition. The section that follows then provides an overview of the 
African continent’s experiences with regional integration initiatives. Afterward, 
the discourse shifts in section four to an examination of the main provisions of 
the AU’s Constitutive Act, particularly the new Union’s institutions and aspira-
tions. Relying on relevant theories of integration, section five is devoted to an 
analysis of the AU’s challenges and opportunities, as well as performance to 
date. The last section concludes with some remarks. 
 
The Context: Impulses for Change 
 
The advent of the AU had been in the making arguably since 1977, when African 
leaders acknowledged that aspects of the OAU Charter had become outdated and African Union 
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needed to be reformed, and unmistakably since September 9 1999 at the organi-
zation’s fourth extraordinary session in Sirte, Libya, where African Heads of 
State agreed to create an African Union. At the OAU’s 36
th ordinary session in 
Lomé, Togo on July 11 2000, African leaders adopted the Constitutive Act of the 
AU. Soon afterwards, at its fifth extraordinary summit in March 1-2, 2001, again 
in Sirte, Libya, African leaders unanimously declared the formation of the AU. 
They further agreed that the Act would become effective one month after its rati-
fication by two-thirds of its member states, that is, 36 countries. Whereas they 
expected the process to last longer than a year, on April 26 2001, Nigeria became 
the 36
th member state to ratify the Constitutive Act, thus enabling the new pan-
African agreement to enter into force on May 26, 2001. Shortly thereafter, at the 
37
th summit of the OAU on July 9 2001, African Heads of State agreed to a one-
year transition plan for the transformation of the OAU to the AU. At the same 
meeting, President Mbeki of South Africa was elected the AU’s first president 
for one year, and the newly elected Secretary-General of the OAU, Amara Essy, 
was assigned the important task of overseeing the transition process. 
The OAU, which was founded on May 25 1963, had become a relic of itself 
and the post-colonial era, because by the end of the 20
th century, virtually every 
African country, whose cause for self-rule it championed had gained indepen-
dence. Indeed, the accession of the RSA to the OAU in 1994 meant that an 
important mission of the OAU— ending colonial subjugation of the African 
people— had been accomplished. It was, therefore, no longer necessary for the 
OAU Charter to include “self-rule” as a moral imperative. Another imperative of 
the august organization was to coordinate and intensify the cooperation and ef-
forts of member states to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa. Yet, the 
evidence, after almost four decades of existence, was that the African condition 
was more dreadful than at the inception of the OAU. At the dawn of the 21
st 
century, for example, the gross national product (GNP) for sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) was roughly $437 billion and $700 billion for Africa in current terms.
2 In 
other words, in 2004, the estimated 800 million population of Africa generated 
only 6% of the national output produced by the 294 million people of the United 
States, or less than the much smaller populations of say, Canada ($905 billion), 
Mexico ($705 billion), and Spain ($919 billion). Put differently, Africa’s share in 
world total output declined from an already abysmally low of 3% (1975) to 2% 
(2005), while its share of global exports declined from almost 6% (1975) to a 
dismal 1.7% (2005), and its share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) dropped 
from almost 10% (1975) to a paltry 2% (2005).  Even intra-African trade in 2005 
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remained at a dreadful 10% of the continent’s total trade volume (imports at 
11.3% and exports at 8.7%). 
It is, therefore, not surprising that roughly 63% of the countries in the World 
Bank’s group of low-income countries were Africans.  As well, all the welfare 
indices—Human Poverty Index, Human Development Index, and Physical Qual-
ity of Life Index—are generally low for the African people. For example, 
according to the UN’s 2005 Human Poverty Index for Least-Developed coun-
tries, 31 of the 39 ranked countries were African.  Similarly, in the 2006 Human 
Development Report, 29 of the 31 lowest ranked countries were from SSA. In 
short, the African continent was not as integrated as it should, and it continued to 
exist on the fringe of the global economy. For instance, many African countries 
are still better connected to the outside world than to countries on the continent. 
Put differently, it is easier for most Africans to travel to countries outside of the 
continent than to countries on the continent. 
Additionally, the ostensibly perpetual conflagrations of the continent, as well 
as the worsening economic and social climate for its people are sad reminders of 
the inadequacies of the OAU and its organs. Not only have conflicts within Afri-
can states become nastier and bloodier, but they have also sometimes spilled 
across national frontiers, thereby quickly turning what are initially civil wars into 
inter-state conflicts. Worse, the carnage and chaos that such conflicts have left in 
their wake have exposed the gross ineptitude of the OAU in achieving one of its 
primary aims—enhancing the unity and solidarity of African States. In an age of 
instantaneous dissemination of (bad) news, these flashpoints across the African 
continent embarrassingly illuminate the inadequacy of the OAU, having to wait 
for external assistance/intervention to resolve the continent’s myriad, mostly in-
tra-state, skirmishes.
3 The emerging consensus was thus that the OAU was 
obsolete and incapable of tackling the problems of the new millennium. As indi-
cated above, the OAU had not successfully facilitated the development of the 
African people or integrated its economies. To that end, Africa needed a new 
pact to re-invigorate its stagnant and underperforming economy. 
 
The Road to Togo 
 
Africa’s flirtation with the concept of an African Union in the form of a pan-
African economic and political integration as an emotive and viable response to 
the African malaise is not recent. It has long existed as a conceptual theoretical 
construct, as well as in reality. Certainly, regional integration schemes are not a 
post-colonial phenomenon in Africa at both the continental and sub-continental 
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Annan as the chief scribe of the UN, he appointed former Secretary of State James Baker to help 
broker an agreement between the protagonists of the disputed territory. African Union 
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levels.
4 To be sure, Africa’s flirtation with regional integration can be traced to 
the pre-independence period, and as far back as the turn of the 20
th century. The 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which was established in 1910, re-
mains the oldest functioning manifestation of regional integration in the world. 
Other sub-continental regional integration endeavors across Africa since the in-
dependence decade of the 1960s have included the short-lived 1959 Union 
Douanière de l’Afrique de l’Ouest and the 1981 Sene-Gambia confederation, as 
well as the stillborn 1965 Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee. Among 
the most notable more contemporary examples is the dormant Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU) in 1989. The on again-off-again three-member East African 
Community (EAC), which was initially founded in 1967 and disbanded in 1977, 
was revived in 1994. The Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS) that links 11 countries was set up in 1983, while a Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) that encompasses 19 African countries 
was founded in 1993. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
5 
that links 13 countries was established in 1993, while the 15-member Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975.
6 
Meanwhile, the ideal of pan-African cooperation cum unity dates back to the 
eve of Africa’s independence, when, for example, a group gathered in Manches-
ter, the United Kingdom, to promote freedom, justice, equality, and economic 
welfare for all African peoples.
7 This aspiration culminated in the founding of the 
OAU on May 25, 1963, although the provisions of the OAU Charter clearly fell 
short of what the pan-Africanists had longed for. Pan-Africanists like Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania had respectively called for 
Africa to unite (Nkrumah, 1963) and to create a United States of America (Nye-
rere, 1963), when the OAU was founded. The two leaders, who led their 
respective countries into independence and became their countries’ first post-
colonial presidents, called for the formation of a supranational pan-African gov-
ernment as an expression of continental solidarity and policy coherence. In 
essence, they could be described as African federalists, who subscribed to a “big 
bang” approach to African integration, even if it meant that the newly indepen-
dent states of Africa had to cede part of their sovereignty to pan-African 
supranational structures, including a pan-African parliament, a pan-African court, 
and an African government. These “federalist school” proponents essentially 
                                                 
4 One of the earliest regional integration arrangements in Africa was the customs union 
between Kenya and Uganda in 1900. Prior to the independence period, indigenous movements in 
favor of African regionalism existed, some of which evolved into pan-African arrangements.  
5. The SADC was previously known as the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC).  
6 The Communauté Economique de l'Ouest (CEAO) links the Francophone members of 
ECOWAS, partly at the urging of the French government in the early 1970s. 
7 For a detailed description of the institution, see the Organization of African Unity 
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wanted a big bang transformation of post-colonial Africa in order to optimize its 
potential benefits of a unified Africa, including the tapping of the continent’s 
abundant resources. (Lodge:  6-23) 
Some of their contemporaries, however, did not share the enthusiasm for the 
seemingly hasty federalist strategy, even though they believed in African cooper-
ation, unity, and development. In this category of African leaders were the 
erudite Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Houphet Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, who 
felt that it was too soon after independence to speak of a supranational pan-Afri-
can government, let alone share their national political autonomy with it. Rather, 
these leaders called for functional cooperation on sundry issues among the sove-
reign states of Africa. They argued that the pursuit of a pan-African government 
was ill-advised, because it was like putting the cart before the horse. For them, 
economic integration must precede political integration, and strengthening the 
national order must precede any pan-African construct. In general, proponents of 
this school of thought associated a pan-African government, for which they had 
no appetite, with the final and highest level of regional integration. To get to that 
stage of regionalism, they argued, relevant sectors of the economy must first be 
integrated. Thus, they subscribed to a “gradualist” strategy  and, more impor-
tantly, espoused a relatively loose inter-governmentalist association. (Lodge; 
Lindberg and Scheingold). 
Notwithstanding their philosophical differences, African leaders kept the 
dream of continental regional integration alive. First in July 1977, the OAU 
backed an earlier resolution to create an economic community in gradual stages. 
Then, in April 1980, it reiterated the gradualist strategy in the Lagos Plan of Ac-
tion and the Final Act of Lagos (LPA) in calling for the creation of an African 
economic community by 2000, purposely for stimulating the development of 
African economies. Third, in June 1991, the OAU signed the Treaty of Abuja, 
which would, in six phases, gradually create an African Economic Community 
within 34-40 years. The treaty, which entered to force in May 1994, was de-
signed to coordinate, harmonize, and progressively integrate existing and future 
sub-continental regional economic groups (REGs), particularly via the conti-
nent’s five main REGs, viz., AMU (northern Africa), COMESA 
(northern/eastern/southern Africa), ECCAS (central Africa), ECOWAS (western 
Africa), and SADC (southern Africa). The ultimate goal of the AEC was to 
achieve a common market that would enable unencumbered movement of goods 
and services across the continent. Thereafter, the OAU operated under two legal 
instruments, viz., the OAU Charter and the Treaty of Abuja. It was thus known as 
the OAU/AEC until the AU supplanted it in July 2002 at the 38
th summit of the 
OAU. 
Against the backdrop of the foregoing, therefore, when Muammar Gaddafi 
proposed a United States of Africa at an OAU summit in Sitre, Libya in 1999, for 
instance, the idea was by no means novel. He was essentially resurrecting and 
echoing an idea that the forerunners of pan-Africanism, inter-alia, Nkrumah and African Union 
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Nyerere, had floated four decades earlier. However, like his forerunners, Gaddafi 
has been greeted with skepticism, not so much from within Africa as from out-
side the continent. Critics wondered if he has an ulterior motive, as they did 
about Nkrumah and Nyerere back in the 1960s. In the same vein, when Thabo 
Mbeki suggested an alternative ‘easy does it,’ gradualist approach at the Durban 
summit, he was echoing sentiments that had been espoused by the likes of 
Boigny and Senghor forty years earlier. 
 
The Constitutive Act of the AU 
 
To recapitulate, in the 1999 Sirte Declaration, African leaders agreed to trans-
form the OAU to the AU. Shortly, thereafter, in July 2000, African leaders 
adopted the African Union Constitutive Act in Togo, which entered to force in 
May 2001. So, what is in the Constitutive Act? Broadly, it comprises 33 articles. 
Respectively, Articles 3 and 4 deal with the objectives and principles of the 
Union. Specifically, Article 3(a-n) include, inter-alia, achieving greater unity and 
solidarity between the peoples of Africa and the continent’s countries, defending 
the territorial integrity and independence of member states, and accelerating the 
political, social, and economic integration of the continent.  Furthermore, the AU 
aims to defend and advance Africa’s common position on issues of interest to it 
and its people, support international cooperation with a view to relevant interna-
tional treaties, and promote peace, security, and stability. The AU also aims to 
promote democracy, human rights, sustainable development, policy coordination 
and harmonization between Africa’s regional communities, and research and 
development. 
Similarly, the Constitutive Act outlines 16 principles in Article 4(a-p) that 
shall guide the activities of the Union, including sovereign equality and interde-
pendence among member states, the participation of the African peoples in the 
Union’s activities, the establishment of a common African defense policy, the 
prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among its members, and non-
interference by any member state in the internal matters of another. The prin-
ciples also include the right of any member state to request intervention from the 
Union so as to restore peace and security, as well as the right of the AU to inter-
vene in a member state as regards war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity. Other guiding principles include the promotion of gender equality, 
self-reliance, and social justice, respect for democracy, human rights, the rule of 
law, and good governance, as well as condemnation and rejection of unconstitu-
tional changes of government. 
Articles 5 through 22 of the Constitutive Act cover the inclusive nine insti-
tutions of the Union, viz., the Assembly, the Executive Council, Specialized 
Technical Committees, the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice, three 
financial institutions, the Commission, the Permanent Representatives Commit-
tee, and the Economic and Cultural Council.  60                                                                                       Babarinde 
 
The Assembly of Heads of States and Government, whose composition and 
operating rules are spelled out in Articles 6 through 9, is the Union’s supreme 
organ. It shall meet at least once annually in ordinary session, and may meet in 
extraordinary session at the request of any member state, subject to approval by 
two-thirds of the member states. Furthermore, Article 6 (4) of the Constitutive 
Act stipulates that the Office of the Chair of the Assembly shall be held by a 
Head of State or Government for one year. According to Article 7, the Assembly 
shall take its decisions by consensus, by a two-thirds majority, and by a simple 
majority (on procedural maters). While Article 8 deals with the rules and proce-
dures of the Assembly, Article 9 spells out the functions of the Assembly, 
including, inter-alia, setting the policies of the Union, adopting the Union’s 
budget, review applications for membership, establishing any institutions of the 
Union, appointing and terminating the judges of the Court of Justice, and 
appointing the Chairman of the Commission and other Commissioners. 
The Executive Council comprises the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or other 
ministers, and meets at least twice a year in ordinary session. It may also meet in 
an extraordinary session upon request by a member state, subject to approval by 
two-thirds of the Union’s members. Like the Assembly, voting in the Executive 
Council is by consensus, two-thirds majority, or a simple majority. Article 13 of 
the Constitutive Act outlines the functions of the Council, which include the 
coordination and formulation of policies in areas of common interests, such as 
foreign trade, agriculture, environment, science and technology, nationality and 
immigration issues, and setting up an African awards mechanism. The Executive 
Council is responsible to the Assembly. 
The Specialized Technical Committees (STCs) are responsible to the Execu-
tive Committee, and Article 14 of the Act provides for seven of them. They deal 
with (a) rural economy and agricultural matters, (b) monetary and financial af-
fairs, (c) trade, customs and immigration matters, (d) industry, science, and 
technology, (e) transport, communications, and tourism, (f) health, labor, and 
social affairs, and (g) education, culture, and human resources. The Committees 
shall be composed of relevant Ministers or senior officials, and meet as often as 
necessary. They are also responsible for supervising, following up, and evaluat-
ing the implementation of decisions by the other organs of the AU. 
The Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Article 17 of the Constitutive Act pro-
vides for the creation of a pan-African parliament, purposely to enable the 
African peoples to participate in the development and economic integration of 
the continent. Its composition, powers, functions, and structure are to be defined 
at launch time. 
The Court of Justice. Article 18 of the Act makes allowance for the estab-
lishment of an African Court of Justice (ACJ). As noted earlier, its justices will 
be appointed by the Assembly. Its statute, composition, and functions are to be 
defined later, presumably by the time it is inaugurated. Once the ACJ is estab-African Union 
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lished, it shall be responsible for, inter-alia, interpreting the provisions of this Act 
(Article 26). 
The Financial Institutions. The Act calls for the creation of an African Cen-
tral Bank, an African Monetary Fund, and an African Investment Bank. Their 
rules and regulations are to be defined later, most probably at inception. 
The Commission of the AU is the de jure secretariat of the Union, and is 
based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the headquarters of the Union (Article 24). The 
Commission is headed by a Chairman, who, along with his or her 
deputy/deputies, and other Commissioners, is appointed by the Assembly. The 
Chairman and his/her colleagues are supported by a bureaucracy. The structure, 
functions, and regulations of the Commission are also to be determined by the 
Assembly. 
The Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) composed of Permanent 
Representatives (ambassadors) of member states to the AU. It is responsible for 
preparing the work of the Executive Council, and for acting on Council’s in-
structions. The Act empowers it to set up sub-committees or working groups as it 
deems necessary. 
The Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) comprises differ-
ent social and professional groups of the member states, and functions as an 
advisory body of the AU. Its powers, functions, and ancillary matters relating to 
the body are to be determined by the Assembly. 
The two paragraphs of Article 23 of the Act address the imposition of appro-
priate sanctions on member states that default on their financial obligations to the 
AU, and that fail to comply with the Union’s decisions and policies. Appropriate 
sanctions are defined as the denial of the right to be heard at AU meetings for 
payment defaults, and the denial of communication links with other member 
states for the latter infractions. The remaining provisions of the Consultative Act 
address a range of pertinent issues, such as working languages— African lan-
guages, Arabic, English, French, and Portuguese (Article 25), signature, 
ratification, and accession (Article 27), entry to force of the Act (Article 28), ad-
mission to membership process (Article 29), suspension of governments that 
come to power through unconstitutional means (Article 30), the process for with-
drawing from the AU (Article 31), the process for amending and revising the Act 
(Article 32), and transitioning from the OAU to the AU, and ancillary issues 
(Article 33).  
 
Praxis and Analysis  
 
In this section, we will analyze the AU enterprise in practice, focusing on, inter-
alia, the similarities between the AU and the EU, and some of the challenges the 
AU faces in its pan-African integration journey ahead. 
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(A) Comparative Analysis 
 
Foremost, it is instructive to note that many of the articles of the Consti-
tutive Act were transferred from the 1991 Abuja Treaty that launched the AEC. 
This should not be surprising, because the Act incorporated and replaced the 
AEC. Institutions, such as the Assembly, the PAP, and the ACJ were previously 
mooted in the defunct AEC. It is further instructive to note the striking similari-
ties between the institutional structures of the AU and of the European Union, at 
least on paper. Indeed, the architects of the AU have not hidden the fact that the 
AU was modeled on the EU. President Gaddafi admitted as much in an interview 
that he drew his inspiration from the EU experience (Nevin 2001).   Likewise, at 
the July 2001 OAU summit in Zambia that dealt with the transition from the 
OAU to the AU, “several references were made to the African Union being 
loosely based on the European Union model. To underscore the point, following, 
in Table 1, is a quick snapshot comparison of the institutional structures of the 
AU and the EU. 
 
Table 1: Overview of AU & EU Institutions 
Role/Function of in-
stitution 
African Union  European Union 
Provides overall strat-
egy and political 
direction 
The Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government 
The European Council (of 
Heads of Govern-
ment/State) & Commission 
President 
Coordination and for-
mulation of policies 
The Executive Council of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
or other ministers 
The General Affairs Coun-
cil, or The Council of the 
EU 
The secretariat— the 
cabinet and the bu-
reaucracy 
The Commission of the AU; 
headed by an appointed 
Chairman 
The Commission of the 
EU; headed by an 
appointed President 
Legislature  Pan-African Parliament (PAP); 
presently an advisory body 
European Parliament (EP); 
power is a function of the 
legislative procedure being 
employed; assent power 
Judicial review  African Court of Justice (ACJ)  European Court of Justice 
(ECJ); apex court of the 
EU 
Ambassadors Permanent  Representatives 
Committee (PRC) of member 
states to the AU 
Committee of Permanent 
Representatives 
(COREPER II) of member 
states to the EU 
Expert committees  Specialized Technical Com-
mittees (STCs) 
COREPER I 
Advisory corporatist 
structure 
The Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) 
Economic and Social 
Committee (ECOSOC) African Union 
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According to Table 1, the AU’s “Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
ment” is comparable to the EU’s European Council, because both are their 
respective Union’s supreme organ. However, unlike the European Council, 
whose presidency is rotated every six months among its constituent member 
countries, the AU’s Assembly is chaired annually by one of the Heads of State or 
Government of its members. In other words, whereas the European Council is led 
every six months by a member country, the AU Assembly is led by an individual 
who is elected for a period of one year. Further on the similarities of the institu-
tions of the two Unions, the “Executive Council” of the AU is analogous to the 
Council of Ministers, especially the General Affairs Council, or the Executive 
Council (for other ministers) is comparable to the Council of the EU. The analog 
of the EU’s Committee of Permanent Representatives/ambassadors (COREPER 
II) is the AU’s Permanent Representatives Committee (of ambassadors), and the 
AU’s Specialized Technical Committees is analogous to only the EU’s 
COREPER I (of technical experts). Obviously, the ECOSOCC of the AU is com-
parable to the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) of the EU, especially 
given their advisory functions to their respective Unions. 
Other key institutions of the AU and the EU that share similar names are the 
Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Parliament. While the three aforemen-
tioned institutions are firmly established in the decision-making structures of the 
EU, respectively as the cabinet/bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the de facto lower 
legislative chamber of the EU, the AU’s institutions are still evolving. The func-
tions of the AU organs, while stated in the Constitutive Act, have yet to be 
fleshed out. There is a lot that the Constitutive Act has left to the AU Assembly 
to decide regarding the functions and powers of the three institutions. These are 
to be accomplished in special protocols for each institution. For example, whe-
reas the AU’s Commission and PAP are taking shape, the ACJ exists only in the 
abstract at this point. So far, it has no address, no judges, no staff, and no implied 
or explicit powers. Even for the other two institutions, which are already being 
metamorphosed, there is still a long way to go before they can genuinely stack up 
to their EU counterparts with regard to the breadth and scope of their powers. For 
instance, the initial role of the PAP is advisory and consultative, and is expected 
to convene at least twice per annum. The PAP is expected to ultimately evolve 
into a bona fide legislative body as a conduit for the full participation of the Afri-
can peoples in the development of the continent.  There is no doubt from the 
foregoing about the similarities of the names and functions of the major institu-
tions of the AU and the EU’s, what is yet unknown is whether the AU’s 
institutions will eventually develop the sophistication, the reputation, and the 
expertise with which their EU counterparts are associated. For example, will the 
PRC evolve into a powerful decision-making body that its EU counterpart, the 
COREPER, has become? Only time will tell. 
Another area where we can draw parallels between the EU and the AU is 
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different experiences, the aspirations are similar. Both Unions, for example, hope 
to use regional integration to promote peace, stimulate economic growth, achieve 
solidarity for their peoples, and strengthen their international profile/stature. To 
be sure, the experiences of two world wars in the 20
th century in particular neces-
sitated the EU, in the hopes that rapprochement between France and Germany 
would help to establish everlasting tranquility in Europe, following which eco-
nomic integration would be possible. With regard to the AU, Africa has had its 
share of violent civil and inter-state wars. Many observers have also pointed out 
that the frequency of wars in Africa compromises economic strategies on the 
continent, because the resultant instability scares away potential capital and risk-
averse investors. That, in turn, reduces domestic capital formation. So, just as the 
EU has used regional integration to foster and promote peace via an increasingly 
interdependent economic structure, the AU also needs regional integration as a 
vehicle for promoting pan-African peace, in order to enhance the prospects for 
positive economic results. In short, the AU needs to make Africa’s economies 
more mutually interdependent among its constituent members. That can only 
happen if they trade more with one another than they currently do in a South-
South context. Indeed, as we have learned from the experience of the EU, per-
haps the single most remarkable achievement of the EU is the assurance that war 
is an unthinkable option for conflict resolution within the EU, which makes long 
term strategic decisions/planning by economic actors possible. In turn, that leads 
to economic benefits, which further reinforce political stability. After all, and 
according to a maxim, “borders frequented by trade seldom need soldiers.”
8 
 
(B) Challenges 
 
Size and Decision-Making: One of the major challenges that the AU faces is 
its sheer membership size. At over 50 member states, potential pitfalls that could 
stall and even reverse the progress of the AU are manifold. They include, but are 
not limited to, decision-making moving at the pace of a snail (at the speed of the 
slowest member), or even grinding to a halt. Unlike the EU which had the luxury 
of starting its regional integration journey with only six countries, although it was 
unintentional, it was relatively easier to forge consensus on many issues. Ac-
cording to neo-realist theory, given that nation-states are rational actors and 
behave in self-interested manners, and are influenced by domestic actors (Waltz 
and Keohane), achieving consensus on sundry issues at the supranational (inter-
national) level may be painstakingly difficult. This will particularly be daunting 
for a Union of 53 member states, each with its own interests, and from which the 
AU will have to forge consensus or mobilize two-thirds votes on substantive is-
sues, in order not to become paralyzed by virtual inaction and become adrift. 
                                                 
8 A slogan of Thunderbird School of Global Management (in Glendale, Arizona, USA) 
(http://www.thunderbird.edu/about_thunderbird/inside_tbird/mission_statement.htm). African Union 
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The 1965 Empty Chair crisis is a vivid reminder of how decision-making can 
grind to a halt, even in a supranational structure that comprises as few as six 
member states.  The EU is also instructive in how increasingly difficult decision-
making has become as it widens its membership. The AU does not want to create 
the impression in the minds of member states and the African people that it is just 
like its predecessor, the OAU, renowned for its diplomatic niceties and rhetoric, 
but no action. If the AU turns out to be a talk shop, it could prompt calls within 
democratic African societies for their countries to withdraw. Indeed, even if 
member states contemplate withdrawing from the Union, especially because of 
frustration with inaction, the perception could be damaging to the credibility of 
the AU. Although from a decision-making standpoint, the fewer the member 
states, the better, any withdrawal of membership from the AU will likely be 
viewed negatively. Other things being equal, it is typically preferred to gain 
members than to lose members in regional integration schemes, because the for-
mer signals progress and could result in the possibility of assuming more 
responsibilities at the supranational level (spillover effect), while the latter por-
tends that all is not well, and increases the probability of postponing/suspending 
(new) integration initiatives, or abandoning them altogether (spillback effect). 
(Lindberg and Scheingold: 135-140). 
Although the AU stipulates that decisions shall be by consensus or by two-
thirds majority that could still be difficult to achieve on even ostensibly inno-
cuous issues. Therefore, what the AU ought to consider as quickly as possible is 
streamlining how it makes decisions, for instance, by identifying those areas of 
its enterprise where perhaps a simple majority of its membership should suffice. 
Waiting for every/most AU members to get on board on all/most issues could be 
costly (and slow down the integration momentum), because odds are that deci-
sion-making in a 53-member AU will move at the speed of its slowest 
member(s). The AU could thus develop a framework that is similar to the EU’s 
“constructive abstention” mechanism that would allow some of its more progres-
sive members to press ahead on some policy areas.
9 
Disparate Economies
10: Similar to the observation above about the sheer nu-
merical size of the AU membership, whereas the EU that started with six 
relatively equal and cohesive economies, measured in per capita income, the 53 
AU members’ economies manifest wide development dispersions, measured in 
both GNP (capacity to support economic ventures) and GNP per capita (pur-
chasing power). The continent’s economic sizes ranged from a high of $165 
billion (Republic of South Africa) to a low of $0.3 billion (Guinea-Bissau) in 
2004. Similarly, the continent’s GNP per capita ranged from a low of $90 (Bu-
rundi) to a high of $4,640 (Mauritius) in 2004. The challenge from the foregoing 
                                                 
9 This is akin to a multiple-speed differentiated integration. For a good discussion of the 
concept, see, for example, Laffan (1992). 
10 The discussion here relies on statistics from World Development Indicators 2006 
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is how to get all the countries to work together, such that they are able to pool 
their diverse economic capacities and diversify their economies for the benefit of 
all. What’s more, given that sovereign states sign on to regional integration 
schemes because they expect the resultant trade creation to exceed the associated 
trade diversion, or they expect a net economic benefit, the challenge is for the 
AU to come up with mechanisms that will help distribute the attendant benefits 
of pan-African integration proportionately and fairly between landlocked and 
littoral states, and between large and small countries, such that the undertaking 
yields a win-win outcome for all participants. Otherwise, dissatisfied and impa-
tient members may pull out of the AU, especially if they believe that they are not 
getting maximum benefits of integration. Such was the case with the East African 
Community, when it was dissolved in 1977, ten years after it was launched, be-
cause acrimonious charges and counter-charges  among its three members about 
the uneven distribution of the gains of integration.’ 
Following through on commitments: In view of the record of the OAU and 
the history of African countries with regional integration, a relevant question to 
pose is will the AU follow through on its commitments in the Constitutive Act? 
For example, although the Constitutive Act included the right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances (Article 4.h), the 
AU quietly amended the provision in 2003 by watering down the grounds for 
intervention. Apparently the provision, along with Article 3 (2) of the Constitu-
tive Act, which had been widely hailed as one of the boldest statements by 
African leaders, and a profound improvement on the defunct OAU, was amended 
apparently because of the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 
2003.
11 Irrespective of the justification, the amendment is a chilling reminder of 
how African leaders tend to put their own personal interests above their na-
tions’— clinging on to power by all means, even if it means that their people 
continue to subsist on the fringe of the economy. One unintended terrible conse-
quence of the amendment that perhaps serves the interest of a few despots is the 
on-going atrocities in Sudan, a signatory member of the AU. At the height of the 
genocide in western Sudan, which has already claimed at least 300,000 lives and 
has resulted in the internal displacement of another 2.5 million Dafurians in refu-
gee camps in Sudan and in neighboring Chad, the AU has been incapable of a 
strong and decisive response. Instead, all it has been able to muster is, at best, an 
incoherent, feeble, and tentative response, while over thousands of lives continue 
to perish.
12 For instance, the AU initially dispatched a 60-member AU Mission in 
                                                 
11  The logic was that the Bush administration could use the original provision of Article 4 (h) 
as a pretext for removing unfriendly governments in Africa (“What price intervention,” Evarist 
Baimu and Kathryn Sturman, AfricaWeek, February 2006: 30-31). 
12 See, among others, “AU accused of inaction in face of Sudan strife,” William Wallis, 
Financial Times, January 31, 2007: 2, “AU struggles to find coherent response to war,” Andrew 
England, Financial Times, December 29, 2006: 5; and “Symbolic blow to African unity,” Mark 
Sorbara, AfricaWeek African Union 
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the Sudan (AMIS) observer team in spring 2004, which the AU Assembly re-
vised upward to 80 a couple of months later. By October 2004, the Executive 
Council for Peace and Security decided to expand AMIS into a full-fledge peace-
keeping undertaking, and as a result of which it eventually deployed up to 7,000 
military personnel in Western Sudan by 2006, most of whom were from Nigeria 
and Rwanda. 
Another eyesore in the AU’s docket is the deteriorating economic, social, and 
political situation in Zimbabwe. Here again, both at the continental level (i.e, the 
AU) and at the sub-continental level (i.e., the SADC), African leaders closed 
ranks with President Robert Mugabe in the face of widespread international criti-
cisms of his tenacious and brutal hold on to power, as he even boasted after a 
hastily called meeting of the SADC in Tanzania that “not even one (SADC 
leader) criticized our actions.”
13 
Functioning Supranational Organs: The AU also needs to expedite the crea-
tion of certain supranational institutions, most notably, the Court of Justice. The 
Court is vital for adjudicating disputes and interpreting the provisions of the Act. 
Although the Assembly is expected to stand in for the ACJ until it debuts, ac-
cording to Article 26 of the Act, the arrangement is nonetheless fraught with 
potential problems. First, having a group of Heads of State and Government ad-
judicate cases that could well involve them smacks of the old ways of doing 
business in many African countries— the absence of a bona fide separation of 
powers. What if the dispute is between the Assembly and another institution of 
the AU? How would the Assembly be able to recuse/disqualify itself from the 
case, even if it wanted to? It reeks of a potential conflict of interest. Second, 
could cases that were previously decided by the Assembly be appealed to the 
ACJ after the debut of the apex court? In short, one of the lessons learned from 
the experience of the EU is that functioning supranational institutions have been 
helpful to its successful evolution. 
Moreover, the challenge for the ACJ is to quickly establish its authority and 
autonomy through both implied and explicit powers granted it once it debuts. The 
ACJ will have an important role to play in the pursuit of pan-African integration, 
not only in establishing the importance of the concept of rule of law in the AU, 
but also in ensuring that the Consultative Act and the Treaty of Abuja are de-
signed to create more than a giant free trade area. If the AU wishes to replicate 
the success of the EU, it must be borne in mind that  
 
During long years in which the political development of the 
Community seemed to have ground to a halt, it was the Court 
that kept alive the vision of the Community as something more 
                                                 
13 See, for example, “Mugabe’s enablers,” Arnold Tsunga, The Washington Post , April 5, 
2007: A17, and “Zimbabwe's neighbours duck confrontation with Mugabe,” Tony Hawkins and 
Alec Russell, Financial Times, March 30, 2007: 6. 68                                                                                       Babarinde 
 
than a trade alliance. In a sense, the Court created the present-
day Community; it declared the Treaty of Rome to be not just a 
treaty but a constitutional instrument that obliged individual citi-
zens and national government officials to abide by those 
provisions that were enforceable through their normal judicial 
processes. (Shapiro, 1992: 123) 
 
Financing the AU: Another potential challenge for the AU is how it finances 
its obligations and commitments in the Constitutive Act. On the one hand, given 
the history of African countries with the REGs, and the penchant to fall behind 
on the payment of their dues, especially when faced with equally important, but 
competing obligations/commitments, how will the AU fund its expenditures? 
This challenge is particularly daunting because of widespread poverty and un-
even levels of development within and between African countries. This raises an 
important issue about the readiness of member countries to assume the obliga-
tions of membership, which includes the ability to routinely pay annual dues to 
the coffers of the Union. On the other hand, the best we can discern from the Act 
is that the budget will rely on member states’ annual dues and fines that are im-
posed on recalcitrant members. Whereas annual dues are more predictable, 
sanctions are too unreliable as a major source of revenues, particularly if en-
forcement is lax. Hence, how the AU finances its ambitious programs and 
institutions is worrisome. 
A helpful and vivid illustration of the implications of the budget challenge is 
the AU’s tepid response to the crisis in Dafur. It has had to rely on external 
sources, primarily the EU ($100 million) and the US ($45 million) to fund the 
$220 million deployment of its AMIS military personnel in Dafur. Another illu-
stration is the funding of what has evolved as the economic pillar of the AU’s 
AEC strategy— the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (for a 
discussion see Taylor).  Touted by its chief architects as an African solution to 
African problems, it is ironic that a handful of African Presidents have had to 
travel almost annually to G-8 meetings, first to get the approval of the group of 
affluent countries, and second, to solicit aid for the initiative’s myriad ideas.
14 
Perhaps what the AU needs, is a country or a few countries that would func-
tion as its paymaster, much like Germany bankrolled European integration as a 
net contributor virtually since the inception of the EU. Simultaneously, the AU 
needs a country or a group of anchor countries to provide much-needed leader-
ship, something akin to the Paris-Berlin axis of the EU. The AU needs its own 
paymaster and economic locomotive engine. Perhaps only South Africa has the 
                                                 
14 “Gleneagles What was all the hype about?” Cameron Duodu, New African, 
August/September 2005: 34-37, Africa Analysis, No. 424, June 13, 2003: 1-2, and “Hope for a New 
Africa,” George Ogola, NewAfrica, July 29, 2002: 10-14. African Union 
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economic diversity and financial wherewithal to support the AU, but the question 
is if South Africa has the desire to play the role. 
Popular Participation: Conspicuously absent from the discourse about both 
the AU and the NEPAD in most African countries are the ordinary African 
people. Save a few countries, the issue of establishing an African Union or the 
NEPAD was not widely discussed, if at all, in most African countries. For two 
initiatives that their architects argue will transform the African society, it is wor-
risome that the growing African civil society was nowhere to be seen or heard 
from during their edifications. Indeed, even years after both initiatives were 
launched, most Africans know very little, if anything, about them. What is par-
ticularly troubling about this is that even among academics of African descent, 
most of those whose disciplines are outside of the social science know very little 
about both the AU and the NEPAD. If African academics have a very fuzzy un-
derstanding of the AU and the NEPAD, what then can we expect of average 
Africans? How could we then expect the masses to appreciate the two ostensibly 
“home-grown” constructs that supposedly will springboard African renaissance? 
The challenge for the AU, its Commission and its constituent members, 
therefore, is to devise effective ways of disseminating information about the AU, 
NEPAD, the PAP, etc. to the public, and engaging the African people. The rela-
tionship with the African public has to be both top-down and bottom-up, and not 
merely top-down and elitist. Additionally, the AU Commission and member gov-
ernment need to devise ways to properly and adequately train the bureaucrats at 
the frontline (e.g., border posts, embassies, etc.) of the regional integration enter-
prise. Customs and Immigration officers need to realize that they are vital to a 
successful implementation of the AU and the NEPAD in terms of facilitating 
increased intra-African trade and investment— two critical engines of growth 
and development— by not turning off and turning back would-be inves-
tors/businesses from other African countries. They need to understand that 
legitimate investors need not always come from the North or from outside the 
continent. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that regional integration is a potential 
panacea for Africa’s deplorable condition, and the AU is a positive development 
in that direction. However, as the discussion also shows, sharing the same names 
with EU institutions does not mean that the AU will have a similar experience as 
the EU. For starters, their historical circumstances are different. Moreover, the 
EU started with a group of only six, affluent countries, while the AU started with 
53, mostly impoverished, countries that vary widely in population, economic 
size, per capita income, and so forth. Similarly, as Kofi Annan reminded African 70                                                                                       Babarinde 
 
leaders in 2002, the AU’s task is daunting indeed, because, unlike the EU, it has 
“a larger geographical space to cover with far fewer resources.”
15 
Nonetheless, there are glimmers of hope. For example, one of the major 
achievements of the AU thus far is how quickly its member states ratified the 
Constitutive Act almost one year ahead of schedule. Given the continent’s unen-
viable history of dragging its feet on important issues, the Act was ratified by the 
required two-thirds of the OAU members within a year. It might be a sign of 
positive/great developments in the future of the continent. It might also be a tes-
timony to an appreciation of the sense of urgency by Africa’s new leaders. 
Another major landmark in the young Union is the launching of the pan-African 
Parliament in March 2004, when the body held its first meeting at its Midrand, 
South Africa home. Again, member states ratified the protocol setting up the par-
liament in record time.
16 The establishing protocol of the PAP provides for five 
members (including at least one woman) per AU member state.  The PAP, which 
convenes at least twice a year and merely functions as an advisory and a consul-
tative body, is headed by an elected President and four Vice Presidents. 
A third encouraging development is the adoption of the NEPAD initiative at 
the 2001 Lusaka summit as the AU’s economic blueprint/policy, arguably, the 
closest example of sectoral emphases and perhaps of functional spillover in the 
Union. Another closely related positive development is the Peer Review me-
chanism, which encourages member states to submit their macroeconomic 
strategies for review by independent experts in Africa.
17 A final glimmer of hope 
is the immediate reaction of the AU, led by its then Chairman of the Assembly, 
President Obasanjo of Nigeria to reverse a 2003 coup d’etat in Sao Tome and 
Principe, in accordance with Article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act, which calls 
for the suspension of any member state whose administration/regime comes to 
power through unconstitutional means.
18 
In order for the AU to succeed, each of its institutions must function accord-
ing to the provisions of the Act. The Union must enhance its financial 
mechanism. That is, in typical EU lingo, develop its “own resources.” The Com-
mission must work effectively with other institutions at the supranational level, 
while simultaneously working with member states’ functionaries. The provisions 
of the Act must be actualized, including allowing civil societies access to the 
arena for policy initiation, policy formulation, policy implementation, and policy 
adjudication. The AU should be about the African peoples, and as such should 
have relevance at the grassroots level. It seems that the peoples of Africa have 
been largely left out of the process, because they seem to know very little about 
the AU, or policies such as NEPAD and the Peer Review process. This has to 
change by being more relevant in the streets of Africa, and by bringing decision-
                                                 
15 African Busines, September 2002. 
16 “Pan Africa Parliament alive and kicking,” New African, July, 2004: 16. 
17 “NEPAD: the African magic formula?” Denis Venter, Africa Week, August 2004: 26. 
18 Africa Analysis, No. 428, August 8, 2003: 3. African Union 
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making closer to the people if the AU hopes to deliver. Otherwise, Africans will 
react as they did with respect to the predecessors of the AU— yawn, cynicism, 
and skepticism. The AU and the regional integration undertaking must be a 
people’s enterprise, and not elitist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
European Security Integration: Lessons for East Asia? 
 
 
 
Katja Weber 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relevance of the European integration 
experience for East Asia's future security architecture.  Or, put differently, the 
study asks what the European experience can tell us about future East Asian 
security institutions.  Tracing European cooperative efforts from the early post-
World War II days to recent attempts of stabilizing the neighborhood via a 
European Neighborhood Policy, the paper argues that the process of European 
security integration provides useful lessons that can inform a similar process in 
East Asia.  
Given that there are significant differences between post-1945 Europe and 
21st century East Asia--including the U.S.'s promotion of regional institutions in 
Europe versus bilateral alliances in East Asia (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002); 
more or less equal power capabilities in Europe versus the huge power 
asymmetry with respect to China in Asia; a fairly homogeneous European culture 
versus a heterogeneous Asian culture; largely traditional security threats in Cold 
War Europe versus a whole range of non-traditional security threats in East Asia, 
etc.--the East Asians are unlikely to copy the exact same steps taken by the 
Europeans to improve their security, i.e., one model does not fit all.  Nor does the 
promotion of stability/peace-building have to be unidirectional--economic 
cooperation, for instance, does not necessarily have to precede security co-
operation.   
Since history--due to Japan's troubled past with its neighbors, and the 
creation of two Koreas and two Chinas--is still a "neuralgic point in East Asia" 
(Berger, 2006: 3), it is argued that Japanese, Koreans and Chinese can be 
expected to develop a distinct path to stabilize the region.  And yet, considering 
the multi-faceted nature of security threats, the main ingredient of the European 
success strategy, namely the institutionalization of trust on multiple levels, and 
hence the creation of a complex web of governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003), is 
likely to be emulated in the long run. 
Although many Taiwanese, as well as some Japanese and Koreans, would 
disagree, the paper assumes that the main enemy is strategic instability, and that 
institutional structures therefore are not created against anyone, but to reduce the Weber 
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high uncertainty East Asians confront regarding each others' actions and 
intensions.   Institutions are to provide fora to air opinions, establish rules (non-
intervention in others' domestic affairs), access information, and reduce 
transaction costs.  Moreover, it is understood that institution-building on multiple 
levels (local, national, sub-regional, regional) and across issue areas (economy, 
environment, security, energy, etc.) takes time and various forms (bottom-up 
versus top-down). 
While institutions are being created to enhance transparency, efficiency and 
trust, the chapter argues, the East Asians need to address their historical legacies 
to promote security.  Japan, in particular, more effectively and credibly needs to 
deal with its war guilt, while Chinese and Koreans are receptive to apologies 
from Japan.  As Berger (2006) and Kaiser (2006) convincingly demonstrate in 
the German case, the dynamics of historical memory are quite complex.   
Germany has spent decades trying to come to terms with its war guilt by 
engaging in reeducation efforts, begging forgiveness, providing monetary 
compensation, building museums, etc.  It is conceivable that this European 
experience may inform East Asia, i.e., that Japan may emulate the German 
model--rewrite its text books, extend heartfelt apologies to its neighbors (which 
some argue it has already done), stop its visits to the Yasukuni shrine, etc.   
However, it is also plausible that Japan may prefer to take a different path and 
rely on different types of restitution.  In any event, it is hypothesized that, 
addressing this divisive issue, at a minimum, will help bring about greater co-
operation, but may in fact be a necessary condition for the creation of a 
structurally sophisticated security arrangement.  
Here the literature on reconciliation is pertinent.  As Long and Brecke (2003: 
124), for instance, make clear, "[e]motions and reason are not generally 
antagonistic; they are complementary. … Emotions recognize challenges and 
opportunities in our environment, and they identify our preferences."  This then 
suggests that governance structures may be determined by much more than 
cost/benefit analyses of rational actors, namely also actors' emotions.  Since 
Japan’s apologies thus far have appeared “ad hoc and made grudgingly under 
international/regional pressure” (Suzuki 2007: 9), it can be hypothesized that 
resurfacing history problems, and emotional needs stemming from them, may 
have to be taken care of before institutional structures requiring a significant 
degree of commitment can be built.  Or, put differently, the settlement of 
historical disputes may be a necessary prerequisite before further security 
cooperation can be achieved, but is unlikely to be sufficient.   
In sum, the paper argues for a two-pronged strategy to enhance East Asian 
security: (1) dealing with historical legacies and war guilt; and (2) building trust 
via institutions.  Since confidence-building, as the European case makes 
abundantly clear, does not happen over night, the goal is to remove outstanding 
obstacles to cooperation and create institutional structures that promote mutual 
respect, trust and tolerance.  Over time, and commensurate with their threat per-Asian Security 
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ception(s), East Asians may graduate to more sophisticated security arrangements 
to dilute, absorb and/or contain conflict and to reduce the likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior.  Thus, in the long run, East Asia may also end up with a 
complex web of governance and “thick alphabet soup of international agencies” 
(Ullman 1991: 145) to promote peace, but, due to the differences between post-
1945 Europe and 21st century East Asia mentioned above, unique indigenous 
developments, and significant changes in the international environment since the 
Europeans began their institution-building, this web/soup is unlikely to be a 
carbon copy of the European one. 
 
Conceptual Frameworks on East Asian Security 
 
Examining East Asian security provisions from the perspective of a Europeanist, 
one is struck by the fact that there are much fewer theoretical writings on the 
subject.  What one mainly finds are assessments of the likelihood of stability in 
the region with prognoses ranging from severe pessimism to cautious optimism.   
(Neo)realists, as expected, focus on the security dilemma, the zero-sum 
international environment, power politics, and relative capabilities and, 
consequently, are pessimistic about the prospects of peace.  Due to the anarchic 
nature of international politics, a regional arms race (Glaser 1993: 6), great power 
conflict (Betts 1993/94: 9), strategic rivalries (Hwang 2006: 5), and nuclear 
proliferation (Friedberg 1993/94: 29) seem to be where China, Japan and the two 
Koreas are headed.  
Hegemonic stability theorists, similarly, predict a bleak future for the region.  
A rising China, Roy (1994: 149-150) for instance argues, will be able to 
challenge Japan which in turn will feel threatened and remilitarize.  Or, in other 
words, dissatisfied with the status quo, China will become increasingly assertive 
(Jansen 2002: 763) and plunge the region into a hegemonic war (Roy 1994: 165).  
Alternatively, Japan may revise its Peace Constitution, and once this 
“demarcation line is broken through,” there will be concern about a rising, 
remilitarized Japan (Garrett and Glaser 1997: 391).  In this scenario, China and, 
very likely, South Korea are expected to increase their capabilities to deal with 
this Japanese challenge.    
Neoliberals/institutionalists are more upbeat about the prospects of 
cooperation in East Asia.  Shambaugh (2004/05: 64), for example, points out that 
“most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbor,” rather than a 
threatening regional power.  Absent imminent threat, yet still concerned about 
“the lack of transparency in the intentions and strategic thinking of Beijing” (Lee 
1997: 252), Funabashi (1993), McVadon (1999), Wu (2000), Acharya (2003), to 
name but a few scholars, suggest to engage China in a variety of institutions.  
Similarly, Vaeyrynen (2001), Cha (2003), Katzenstein (2004), and many others, 
advocate incorporating Japan in a host of institutional arrangements ranging from 
bi- to multilateral.  Although not a “cure-all,” cooperative security arrangements, Weber 
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these scholars argue, are a step in the right direction in that they reduce uncer-
tainty, lower transaction costs, and promote trust.  
In addition to regional stability assessments, with few exceptions (Acharya 
2003; Buzan and Waever 2003; Suh et.al. 2004; Katzenstein 2005) one largely 
finds descriptive accounts of East Asian security arrangements where scholars 
compare countries’ GDP, military hardware, military strategies, etc., to calculate 
who is likely to win a war in which scenarios.
1     
 
Conceptual Frameworks on European Security 
 
Aside from studies investigating security threats and the prospects for peace both 
during and since the end of the Cold War (Deutsch and Singer 1969; Waltz 1979; 
Mearsheimer 1991; Grieco 1993; Kupchan 1994; Lebow and Risse-Kappen 
1995; Van Evera 1996), there is a sizeable literature on alternative modes of 
organizing cooperation among states that ranges from public goods discussions, 
strategic interaction and quid pro quo bargaining (Axelrod 1984; Oye 1986; Stein 
1990), to regime theory (Krasner, ed. 1983; Keohane 1984) and studies of global 
norm-creation, diffusion and internalization (Axelrod 1986; Kratochwil 1989; 
Nadelmann 1990; Klotz 1995; Katzenstein, ed. 1996; Cortell and Davis 1996).   
Particularly useful in the context of European integration, however, has been 
the large literature on multi-level governance.  Spanning several disciplines,
2 this 
literature identifies a host of factors that are important to understand why the 
Europeans chose the types of cooperative arrangements they did.  Adopting a 
governance approach,
3 one, for instance, learns that governance does not always 
entail one-way control.  Two-way or multi-dimensional designs are found fre-
quently and there is a vast literature on increasingly complex types of 
organization.  One common feature of these frameworks involves the relationship 
between vertical and horizontal loci of activity: “multilevels” and “networks.”  
For example, according to Marks et al (1998: 273), “EU policy is produced by a 
complex web of interconnected institutions at the supranational, national, and 
subnational levels of government comprising a system of ‘multi-level 
governance.’”  Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) also differentiate levels of 
jurisdiction spanning from the local to the supranational level, while Scharpf 
(2001) distinguishes between intergovernmental, joint, and supranational 
decision-making.  Similarly, Gstoehl (1995: 13) speaks of “variable geometry,” 
                                                 
1 See Bracken (2001: 71) who refers to this type of scholarship as a “cottage industry.” 
2 For a recent review of this literature see Hooghe and Marks 2003. 
3 For a recent example, see Katja Weber, Michael E. Smith, and Michael Baun, eds. 
Governing Europe’s Neighborhood: Partners or Periphery? Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, forthcoming.  The following section draws on chapter 1 of this edited volume co-authored by 
Michael E. Smith and Katja Weber, “Governance Theories, Regional Integration, and European 
Foreign Policy.”   
  Asian Security 
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Eising and Kohler-Koch (1999) of “overlapping policy networks,” Johannson-
Nogués (2003) of “network governance,” Lavanex (2004) of “external 
governance,” and Emerson (2003: 4) of “hub-and-spoke, cobweb, matrix and 
Rubik cube arrangements.” 
Other scholars highlight factors such as the formality of rules and the 
inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the governance arrangements.  Abbott and 
Snidal (2000) conceptualize institutional arrangements in terms of degree of 
legalization, i.e., hard versus soft law, while Dunsire (1993) differentiates 
between regulation and self-regulation.  And more recently, Hooghe and Marks 
(2003: 236) proposed to differentiate two types of multi-level governance design: 
“Type I,” they explain, entails “general-purpose jurisdictions, non-intersecting 
memberships, jurisdictions at a limited number of levels, and a system-wide 
architecture.”  Type II  is characterized by “task-specific jurisdictions, 
intersecting memberships, no limit to the number of jurisdictional levels, and 
flexible design” (ibid). 
Clearly, a great variety of institutional structures can be found in the 
international environment and actors who have decided to cooperate to promote 
security - rather than to rely on self-help - have some degree of choice between 
different governance structures that entail varying degrees of institutionalization.
4  
Assuming that actors pursue governance to solve collective action problems, one 
might propose a  classification scheme ranging from hierarchical to non-hier-
archical modes of governance.  Elsewhere (Weber 1997; 2000; and Weber and 
Hallerberg 2001) a continuum of different institutional arrangements ranging 
from relationships characterized by high autonomy to more structured 
relationships with significantly restricted autonomy has been discussed in some 
detail.   
In the security realm, it has been shown, an (external) threat is instrumental 
in determining the nature and degree of a state’s initial commitment to an 
alliance (Walt 1988).  A related security motivation is the fear of exclusion from 
a cooperative security arrangement, even where a state faces no specific security 
threat.  In other words, there are both “push” and “pull” factors – fears of attacks 
and abandonment - that might encourage states to join cooperative security ar-
rangements (Christensen and Snyder 1990).  If the level of threat is low and the 
actors are viable with respect to the competition they face, there is no need for a 
strong commitment, and, if the actors choose to cooperate, an informal rather 
than a structurally sophisticated arrangement might be chosen.  Such 
arrangements have low exit costs, usually do not require ratification by state 
actors, and can be easily modified or discarded (Lipson 1991).  On the other 
hand, if the level of threat is high, actors are likely to prefer an arrangement that 
                                                 
4 This focus on deliberate, conscious choice conforms to standard micro-foundational 
assumptions about individual rationality and as such provides a useful starting point.   Other 
assumptions about rational motivations at the micro-level, of course, are also possible - rationales 
of hard power, social skill/inclusion, and appropriateness (see Smith 2003: Chapter 1). Weber 
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gives them greater assurance (i.e. one that is more binding, thereby reducing the 
risk of defection).  These incentives for security cooperation might be measured 
in terms of relative military capability and geographic proximity.  Other factors 
such as uncertainty, high asset specificity, and a need for regular transactions 
may increase the desire of actors to institutionalize their commitments 
(Williamson 1979, Williamson 1985, and Weber 1997).  
In sum it has been argued that, both a high level of threat and high 
transaction costs are often necessary to bring about a structurally sophisticated 
institutional arrangement (they are separately necessary), but neither is sufficient.  
One therefore should be sensitive to governance arrangements that arise because 
of other factors in addition to (or even instead of) calculations about power or 
threats, such as normative concerns, collective identity, socialization processes, 
or even symbols, language, and rhetoric.  This open-ended approach may allow 
one to shed light on cases where governance arrangements develop without a 
clear security threat or fail to emerge despite a clear threat. 
In the following, this study reexamines the governance literature scholars 
draw on so heavily in the European context and evaluates its explanatory power 
in the Asian case.  It, moreover, demonstrates that a better understanding of the 
complex security relations in East Asia is contingent on the "cross-fertilization" 
of multi-level governance approaches with ideational and psychological 
conceptual frameworks.  In doing so, it affirms the need for "eclectic theorizing" 
(Katzenstein and Sil 2004) to make sense of East Asian security affairs, or, as 
Buzan and Waever (2003: 14) put it, the need to "mix" materialist and 
constructivist approaches. 
After addressing an important caveat, the paper investigates Europe's 
complex institutional history, where different cooperative arrangements with 
varying memberships coexist and work alongside each other.  Next, a mini case 
study of Japan will be conducted.  Specifically, the paper examines historical 
legacies that still stand in the way of closer cooperation and, comparing Japan’s 
attempts at reconciliation with those of Germany, aims to make a number of 
policy recommendations.  Then the paper scrutinizes presently existing security 
arrangements (bilateral relations between the US and Japan, US and China, US 
and South Korea, ASEAN Regional Forum, North-East Asia Cooperation 
Dialogue, etc.) and, assuming voluntary cooperation rather than coercion,
5 i.e., 
that the actors are free to choose the degree of institutionalization and 
commitment they desire, seeks to ascertain which European solutions to 
cooperation problems and which institutional structures, if any, may be copied or 
adapted.  Based on previous research of European institutional developments 
(both by the author and others), the study postulates that there will be package 
deals on a case-by-case basis and that, in the long run, East Asians will "embed" 
existing institutions into regional, sub-regional, and maybe even trans-regional 
                                                 
5 China, of course, has refused to rule out the use of force to subordinate Taiwan. Asian Security 
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ones to avoid sole dependence on the "American hub and spokes network of 
bilateral alliances in Asia" (Cha 2003: 108).  It is also conceivable that the U.S. 
might play the role of guarantor in a multilateral non-aggression structure, at 
least in the short to medium term.   
 
Caveat: Asia is NOT Europe 
 
As Friedberg (1993/94: 7) correctly emphasizes, “what is true of Europe may not 
be true for other parts of the world.”  In Europe, he insists, there are various 
factors (democratic governments; equality; dense web of institutions, etc.) that 
mitigate instability, whereas in Asia, “many of these same soothing forces are 
either absent or of dubious strength and permanence” (ibid).  France and 
Germany used to care about Alsace/Lorraine but, we are told (Friedberg 1993/94: 
16-18), have long since moved beyond these differences.  Not so in East Asia.  
Rather than to “converg[e] on a single, shared interpretation of their recent past, 
the Asian powers show signs of divergence, each constructing a history that 
serves its own national purposes (ibid, p. 18).  And, to make matters worse, there 
is the timing of institutionalization.  In Europe this process occurred soon after 
World War II and continues to this day, whereas the East Asians got a much later 
start (ibid. p. 22). 
Kang (2003) could not agree more with Friedberg’s assessment.  “Because 
Europe was so important for so long a period, in seeking to understand 
international relations,” Kang (2003: 58) laments, “scholars have often simply 
deployed concepts, theories, and experiences derived from the European 
experience to project onto and explain Asia,” a practice he finds “problematic at 
best.”  “Eurocentric ideas,” in his mind seem to have obfuscated rather than aided 
our understanding of Asian alliance behavior in that they have “yielded several 
mistaken conclusions and predictions.” 
And yet, there are parallels between Europe and Asia.  Case in point the 
Franco/German versus the Sino/Japanese axis.  Just because China and Japan 
have not “begun to deal with their poisoned historical relations” (Kaiser 2006: 
90), this does not imply that they could not learn from France and Germany’s 
behavior in the aftermath of World War II.  In fact, it is nonsensical to assume 
that Asia would discount valuable insights to be gained from the European 
experience, begin from scratch when it comes to institution-building and, so to 
speak, “reinvent the wheel.” 
As Kaiser (2006: 90) makes clear, European history does provide important 
lessons for Sino-Japanese relations, particularly when it comes to “dealing with 
the past and the question of guilt, nationalism, integration and political 
leadership.”  He, for instance, explains that, although Japanese officials 
repeatedly have asked their neighbors for forgiveness for Japanese atrocities, 
these acts did not achieve the desired results, “because they were not fully 
internalized by Japanese society as a whole” (ibid, p. 91-2).  Kaiser then outlines Weber 
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a number of steps (issuance of formal apology, monetary compensation, 
preservation of memory, creation of trust, etc.) that were essential in bringing 
about reconciliation between Germany and its neighbors and, in his mind, are 
applicable to Sino-Japanese relations.  These steps, along with other literatures 
on reconciliation, will be scrutinized in greater detail below, following a brief 
discussion of European institution-building. 
 
Europe’s Institutional History in a Nutshell
6  
 
The defeat of Germany and Japan at the end of World War II left a tremendous 
vacuum to the west and east of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States were not at all sure how the USSR would react to 
this change.  Would the Soviet Union cooperate with the United States and allow 
for free elections in Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe as indicated at Yalta, 
or would it pursue an expansionist policy and thereby pose a threat to the security 
of independent countries? 
As history texts (Black et. al. 1992; Ray 1992; Keylor 1992; Kaplan 1999) 
make abundantly clear, due to the imposition of Soviet puppet governments in 
some of the East European countries, as well as the immense military imbalance 
between the Soviet Union and the western world, by 1946, the West Europeans 
already felt threatened by the Soviet Union and some, foremost among them 
France, additionally feared a resurgent Germany.  To enhance their security these 
countries solicited U.S. support, promoted greater cooperation among themselves 
and, very importantly, sought to integrate Germany in international institutions to 
contain its power once and for all.  Thus, over the course of more than half a 
century, the West Europeans gave rise to numerous cooperative arrangements 
with varying memberships and varying degrees of structural commitment which, 
since the end of the Cold War, many East European countries joined.  Or, in 
other words, the Europeans, gradually, built a complex web of governance to 
enhance their security and promote stability and prosperity. 
 Perceiving a dual threat, the West Europeans had different security needs in 
the early post-1945 period than the U.S., which largely viewed the Soviet Union 
as posing a political threat to international peace.  This explains why the former 
acted first to improve their security.  In early 1947 British foreign minister Ernest 
Bevin took a decisive step to coordinate a West European defense system by 
offering a treaty to France.  In his mind such a treaty should not only win French 
support by promising British assistance in the event of renewed German 
aggression, but also decrease the uncertainty regarding French behavior by 
                                                 
6 Over the course of many centuries Europe experienced periods of great upheaval as well as 
prolonged peace.  Throughout, institutions had been created some of which survived and others fell 
by the way side.  For the purposes of this paper it suffices to begin the analysis of Europe’s 
institutional developments in the post-1945 period.  The following section draws on Weber (2000) 
chapters 5 and 6.   Asian Security 
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pulling France away from the USSR.  This two-fold objective required that the 
text of an Anglo-French alliance would be worded carefully so as not to 
antagonize the USSR any further (give it the impression that it could be directed 
against it) or seriously offend Germany (since the latter eventually might have to 
be included in a Western security system).  After drawn-out deliberations, on 
March 4, 1947, a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance was finally signed at 
Dunkirk, in the form of an old-fashioned military alliance. 
Only days after Dunkirk, the American position began to change.  U.S. 
decision-makers started to attribute recent unrest in Greece and Turkey to Soviet 
infiltration attempts and therefore persuaded President Truman to take action to 
stop Soviet influence from spreading.  On March 12, 1947, the American 
president (in what became known as the Truman Doctrine) asked Congress for 
direct financial aid to support free peoples who are susceptible to pressure from 
the Soviets or pressure from domestic Communist movements.  And, as a further 
safeguard against Soviet infiltration, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, on 
June 5, 1947, introduced a plan (Marshall Plan) to aid European economic 
recovery via massive U.S. financial assistance.   
Still viewing the Soviet threat as political in nature, however, the U.S. was 
determined to avoid “entangling alliances” and made clear to the West Europeans 
that they would have to demonstrate their willingness to engage in self-help 
before any further U.S. commitment would be discussed.  Again, Bevin took the 
lead and, on January 22, 1948, called for the creation of a Western union.  A 
series of worrisome incidents in early 1948 (the Communist takeover of the 
government in Prague; a telegram by General Clay from Berlin warning that war 
“could come with dramatic suddenness”; rumors about a Soviet-Norwegian 
nonaggression pact; talk that Denmark feared an armed invasion by the USSR) 
underlined the need for greater security cooperation and, on March 17, 1948, led 
to the signing of the Brussels Treaty in which the United Kingdom, France, and 
the Benelux countries vowed to build a common defense system and to streng-
then economic and cultural ties. 
Since the Europeans now had fulfilled their end of the bargain, Truman gave 
permission to start secret North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) talks with the UK and 
Canada.  While the negotiating parties were discussing several versions of a 
pledge with varying degrees of commitment, the Soviets, feeling provoked by 
western occupation policies in Berlin, responded with a partial, and soon 
thereafter full, blockade of the city.  The United Kingdom initiated an airlift 
(which the U.S. later joined) and, on September 27, the defense ministers of the 
Brussels Treaty powers decided to create a Western Union Defense Organization 
as a first step to a larger association that the United States should join.  At the 
same time, NAT talks were progressing and, on April 4, 1949, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Por-
tugal, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. signed the North Atlantic Treaty.   
Within a year of its creation, NATO became much superior to traditional military Weber 
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coalitions and, through a high level of integration, a unified command, joint 
planning, and combined military training, set itself apart from most previous 
military arrangements. 
Although, on May 9, 1949, the USSR lifted its blockade on Berlin, improved 
East-West relations did not follow.  On the contrary, on September 23, President 
Truman announced the detection of an atomic explosion in the Soviet Union and 
responded by signing a Mutual Defense Assistance Act to facilitate cooperation 
among the Western allies.  Then, on June 25, 1950, North Korea attacked South 
Korea.  Convinced that the Korean War was initiated by the USSR, and that it 
might even be a “dress-rehearsal” for Europe, the Western powers grew anxious 
about their serious military inferiority vis-à-vis the USSR and began to discuss 
German rearmament.   
Terrified by the increase in Soviet belligerence and deeply troubled by the 
prospect of a remilitarized Germany, in the fall of 1950 France called for the 
founding of a European army in which the contingents of the members (including 
Germany) “would be incorporated…on the level of the smallest possible unit.”
7  
That is, fearing that Germany could become militant again and act 
opportunistically, France sought to contain Germany through integration and 
control.  Initially opposed by other countries (the U.S., the UK, and the Benelux 
countries preferred to integrate Germany in NATO), the proposal for a European 
Army--also known as the European Defense Community (EDC)--was eventually 
accepted by them only to be rejected finally by the French themselves.   
Following Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, and the signing of the Korean 
armistice on July 23, 1953, many French perceived a reduction in Soviet threat 
and thus, on August 29, 1954, the French National Assembly voted against the 
ratification of the EDC and made its demise official.  The result of four years of 
security debates was a strengthened NATO, i.e., agreement was reached that the 
Western European Union (WEU) would be restored within NATO, that Germany 
would join the WEU and hence, become a member of NATO. 
At about the same time an EDC was being discussed, two Frenchmen, Jean 
Monnet (a businessman) and Robert Schuman (foreign minister), in consultation 
with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, proposed to bring the coal and 
steel industries of France and Germany under one interstate organization with 
significant supranational characteristics.  Other countries were invited to join and 
on April 18, 1951, France, West-Germany, the Benelux countries, and Italy 
signed the Treaty of Paris, creating the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC).  Although bringing about a Free Trade Area for basic materials such as 
coal, coke, iron, ore and steel would yield economic benefits, the main purpose 
of the ECSC was to tackle the French-German problem and “make war between 
France and Germany ‘not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’” 
(McCormick 1999: 66).  
                                                 
7 C. G. D. Onslow, “West German Rearmament,” p. 467. Asian Security 
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By ratifying the ECSC Treaty in August 1952 each member state declared its 
willingness to curtail its sovereignty voluntarily by delegating some aspects of its 
autonomy to a “High Authority” and, thus, started a long process of institution-
building that led to the creation of a sophisticated structural arrangement which, 
with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, became known as the 
European Union (EU).  Without a doubt, the EU represents one of the most com-
plex experiments in regional integration since the advent of the modern nation 
state in the 17
th century and, over five decades, not only increased its 
competencies significantly, but also expanded its membership from six to 27 
member states.  Since this process is well documented (Lewis 1993; Dinan 1994; 
McCormick 1999; Nugent 1999), it here suffices to draw attention to the main 
developments on the road toward greater integration.  
As has already been seen in the case of the European Army, integration 
efforts suffered setbacks but, each time, proponents of a united Europe 
“relaunched” the European idea (McCormick 1999: 68).  When the failure of the 
EDC, for instance, made clear that greater integration in the security realm could 
not be achieved at the time, the foreign ministers of the ECSC countries met at 
Messina in June 1955 to discuss further economic cooperation.  These 
negotiations culminated in the signing of the Treaties of Rome on March 25, 
1957, in which the ECSC countries brought about a European Economic 
Community (EEC) and a European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).  In 
the coming years the signatories of the EEC sought to bring about a Common 
Market and to harmonize their economic policies.  By 1973 they achieved a 
Customs Union, i.e., removed internal tariffs and set common external tariffs.  
Since non-tariff barriers continued to exist, in April 1985, the Commission 
produced a White Paper identifying roughly 300 measures that would have to be 
taken to get rid off the remaining obstacles to trade.  Moreover, a European 
Council meeting in December 1991 called for economic and monetary union, a 
common foreign and security policy, the abolition of frontier controls, and a 
common immigration policy.  As these Maastricht objectives (so called since 
they were signed by the member states at Maastricht on February 7, 1992), are 
being implemented (adoption of the Euro; creation of a European Rapid Reaction 
Force; signing of the Schengen Agreement, etc.), the EU is moving closer toward 
a “United States of Europe.”  
It is therefore fair to suggest that, since the signing of the Treaty of Paris that 
gave rise to the ECSC, the Europeans have come a long ways with their 
deepening process.  In a little more than 50 years they have moved from a free 
trade area to a customs union to a common market with a common currency, and 
have discussed the further curtailment of their freedom of action in the context of 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy, a European Security and Defense 
Policy, Europol, etc.  It furthermore needs to be stressed that integration took 
place at varying speeds where those EU member states that were ready to move Weber 
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forward did so, while allowing others to exempt themselves from policies that 
they were not yet ready to adopt.
8  
At the same time, through a host of accession treaties, the Europe of Six has 
now grown to an EU of 27.  Since membership is unlikely to be extended much 
further  (Turkey and some of the former Yugoslav Republics may join some time 
in the future) the EU is now also in the process of figuring out what institutional 
arrangements it should seek with its new neighbors—countries like Ukraine, 
Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, but also Southern Mediterranean 
countries like Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine 
Authority, Syria, and Tunisia.
9 
Finally, one needs to keep in mind that the EU does not operate in a vacuum.  
In the security realm, ever since its founding in 1949, NATO has played an 
important role in stabilizing the European continent and continues to do so.  Like 
the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has experienced its ups (new 
members; various partnerships) and downs (France pulling out of SHAPE in the 
1960s; the failure of the Multilateral Force) and has come a long ways in institu-
tionalizing both cooperation among its members and with its partners (PfP; 
EAPC; NATO-Russia Founding Act; NATO-Ukraine Charter; Mediterranean 
Dialogue, etc).  One further international organization that helps promote peace 
in Europe is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE—
formerly known as the CSCE) which, since the signing of the Helsinki Accord in 
1973, has taken a particular interest in human rights issues.  Then there is also the 
Council of Europe (where Heads of State exchange ideas), the United Nations 
(UN), and, until recently, when it became absorbed by the EU, there was the 
Western European Union (WEU).   Thus, what we see in Europe are multiple 
institutional arrangements with varying memberships alongside each other and 
varying degrees of structural commitment collectively comprising a complex 
web of governance to promote stability and prosperity.   
 
Mini Case Study: Japan 
 
Historical Legacies 
 
As Jansen (2002: 512) makes clear, “[t]hroughout history Japan’s stability had 
been related to that of China.”  The problem of China, specifically “China-
centrism,” was of utmost importance.  Since China viewed itself as “the cultural 
center of the universe and …all non-Chinese [as] ‘uncivilized’ barbarians,” and 
insisted on the “preeminence of the Middle Kingdom and a tributary system of 
                                                 
8 See the UK and Denmark who exempted themselves from the Euro zone. 
9 For a closer look at the EU’s relations with its “New Neighborhood,” see Weber, Smith, and 
Baun, eds. (forthcoming). Asian Security 
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foreign relations” (Vohra 2000: 24), Japan-China relations for centuries were 
characterized by the threat of invasion and warfare.  
Particularly damaging for Asian relations was the Sino-Japanese war in 1895.  
For China, according to Vohra (2000: 66), this war meant “[a] crippling defeat at 
the hands of the ‘dwarf’ Asian barbarians, who had historically been looked 
down on as vastly inferior to the [Chinese].”  Not surprisingly, therefore, China a 
year later signed a secret defense treaty with Russia but, ultimately, could not 
prevent its territory from becoming divided into “spheres of influence” by for-
eign powers (Vohra 2000: 81). 
The image of Japan by its neighbors suffered further and, as Jansen (2002: 
515) argues, “lasting damage” as a result of Japan’s actions during World War I 
(which Japan was committed to join to make good on its alliance with the United 
Kingdom) and its aftermath.  Rather than to return bases it had seized from 
Germany to China at the end of the war, Japan elected to keep these holdings in 
its possession for a number of years.  And although the Kellogg-Briand Pact (of 
which Japan was one of the original 15 signatories), by “renounc[ing] war as an 
instrument of national policy,” may have given Japan’s neighbors some hope that 
the country may be turning over a new leaf, all hope was shattered in the early 
1930s when Japan decided to conquer Manchuria to develop a resource base to 
prepare for war with the USSR (Jansen 2002: 527, 580).  Fearing the Soviet 
Union and communism, in November 1936 Japan signed the Anti-Comintern 
Pact with Germany.  Shortly thereafter, Japan began to encroach on China’s 
northern provinces and, in July 1937, was at war with China that lasted until the 
US defeated Japan in 1945.  Korea, which had come under Japanese rule in 1894 
when the Chinese lost their influence over Seoul, likewise, was not liberated until 
1945. 
What needs to be understood is that the atrocities committed by the Japanese 
against the Koreans (discussed elsewhere) and the Chinese, to this day, cause 
hatred and suspicion.  Particularly gruesome—and thus still an issue in Sino-
Japanese relations today--was the fall of Nanking (Nanjing) to Japanese armies in 
December 1937.  In what came to be known as the “Rape of Nanjing,” victorious 
troops committed unspeakable crimes “against a totally unarmed and helpless 
civilian population and disarmed prisoners-of-war.”…[A]t least “20,000 women 
were raped once or repeatedly…and many thousands of men, women and 
children, and POWs were ruthlessly butchered.”…”Within only six weeks after 
the fall of Nanjing the Japanese military apparatus ha[d] slaughtered more than 
340,000 Chinese POWs and civilians” (Vohra 2000: 164).   Prisoners were 
systematically mistreated and the disclosure by Korean and Chinese “comfort 
women” demanding restitution became a big problem for Japan in the 1990s 
(Jansen 2002: 656) and continues to this day. 
Contrary to what happened in Europe where shared history helped to 
promote reconciliation, the steps taken thus far by China and Japan (war crimes 
trials, postwar reparations, peace treaty) have been “flawed and incomplete” Weber 
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(Rose 2005, 11).  Hence the history problem resurfaces and, as Vohra (2000: 
299) points out, in practically every top-level meeting the Chinese admonish their 
Japanese counterparts never to forget Japan’s wartime record.  Although some 
Chinese believe that Japan has apologized enough (Rose 2005, 108), most 
Chinese feel strongly that Japan has to come to terms with its past and “face up to 
history” to aid in the normalization of relations between the two countries.  As 
long as “a sizeable segment of the population feels little remorse and vehemently 
opposes any apology” (Kristof 1998: 39), “conservative elements in Ja-
pan…ma[ke] frequent efforts to deny the history of Japanese aggression” (Wu 
2000: 297), numerous Japanese continue to believe that their country’s “purpose 
for invading its neighbors was…entirely noble” (freeing them from Western 
colonizers), and “cabinet ministers march to the Yasukuni Shrine” (Kristof 1998: 
40), China’s resentment and mistrust of Japan is unlikely to diminish.  Until 
serious change comes about, the Chinese can be expected to maximize their po-
litical utility by playing the “history card.”
10  
Does this mean that the prospects for improved Sino-Japanese relations are 
slim?  Not necessarily.  A significant number of Japanese and Chinese people 
appear to be ready to move on, confront and transcend the past, and work toward 
a better, more cooperative future.  Assuming that the time has come to tackle the 
vexing problem of war guilt before further “apology fatigue” on the part of Japan 
(Green 1999: 158) creates additional obstacles, what concrete steps should East 
Asia take to transcend this significant hurdle that stands in the way of greater 
cooperation? 
Here, the paper argues, European history can provide useful lessons for East 
Asia.  Clearly, Europeans have come a long way from the dark days of World 
War II.  They managed to deal with the past, make amends, and reestablish trust 
by giving rise to supranational institutions, thereby “forging new identities that 
extend beyond traditional ethnic and national boundaries” (Lebow 2006: 4).  As 
will be discussed below, over the course of several decades, the Federal Republic 
of Germany (FRG) and, since 1990, a unified Germany, undertook a variety of 
steps to confront its past, reach out to those who were harmed so gravely during 
the Nazi regime, and pledged never to commit such crimes again.  As members 
of the nation in whose name atrocities were committed most Germans understand 
their responsibility to guard against the possibility of repetition and, no longer 
being the actual perpetrators of these crimes, they also appear to be reformulating 
their identity (Barkan and Karn 2006: 10).   
In the following section the paper examines three crucial elements of 
reconciliation: (1) remembrance/truth seeking; (2) restitution/justice; and (3) 
                                                 
10 Note that there is a large literature that argues that China uses Japan’s historical legacy to 
enhance its own domestic legitimacy.  See, for instance, Shambaugh 1996, Rose 1998, and Zhao 
2000. 
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apology/settling the past.
11  Comparing various steps taken by Germany and 
Japan in settling their historical legacies, the paper makes clear why the latter 
thus far has been unable to successfully transcend its past. 
 
Remembrance/Truth Seeking 
 
As Rose (2005: 2) points out, there have been very different interpretations of the 
events of 1931-1945 in China and Japan (as well as within Japan) and Japanese 
national memory, for several decades, has been a significant stumbling block for 
improved relations with Japan’s neighbors.  World War II from Japan’s 
perspective (also known as the “Great East Asian War” or the “Pacific War”) 
was viewed as “freeing Asia from the oppressive domination of the West” 
(Jansen 2002: 626).  Since the Chinese were weak and had allowed themselves to 
become enslaved by the West, Japan, thinking of East Asia in terms of a “single 
house,” had the duty to “liberate” China (Vohra 2000: 161).  At the same time, 
Japan portrayed itself as the victim of nuclear attacks, rather than aggressor.   
During the Tokyo trials the suffering of Chinese and other Asian victims. 
(‘comfort women,’ forced laborers, victims of biological experiments) was 
completely ignored (Rose 2005: 36).  The trials not only failed to bring about 
justice, but led to what many scholars have termed Japan’s “collective amnesia” 
for 40 years (Rose 2005: 37).  
To make matters worse, the content of Japanese history textbooks ever since 
the Ministry of Education obtained the authority to screen them in 1953 has been 
highly controversial.  Encouraged to adopt a “patriotic tone,” and to 
“soften…Japan’s excesses during World War II,” authors speak of “self-
defense,” “liberation,” and label the Nanjing massacre a “fabrication” (Ienaga 
1996: 332).  The most recent revision of high school textbooks that caused a stir 
centers around the Imperial Army’s responsibility in the Battle of Okinawa.   
Instead of acknowledging the Army’s role in ordering civilians to commit mass 
suicide in the final weeks of WW II, the textbooks now merely state that “mass 
killings and suicides took place among the residents” (Financial Times April 2, 
2007: 6).  This “biased historiography,” time and again has led to calls by 
Chinese and other Asian victims for factual accuracy (Ienaga 1996: 348).
12 
In Germany there were the Nuremberg trials (1945-46), followed later by the 
Eichmann (1961) and Auschwitz (1963-65) trials, but Germans, for the most part, 
tried to come to terms with their past in post-war debates about the Nazi period 
and the Holocaust (Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung) which occurred in distinct 
stages.  As Kansteiner (2006: 108) explains, in the 1950s the FRG experienced a 
period of “communicative silence” about the burden of the past.  More 
                                                 
11 For an in depth study on Sino-Japanese relations which uses these three elements of 
reconciliation, see Rose 2005. 
12 For a detailed discussion of the textbook issue see Rose 2005 chapter 3. Weber 
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concretely, “the consequences of war and ‘war crimes’ were acknowledged by 
the new political elites
13 in their dealings with their Allied supervisors, but not 
necessarily in communications with the German population” (ibid).  In 1959 the 
appearance of anti-Semitic graffiti caused the German government to introduce 
educational reforms and, in the 1960s, a group of Germans who had belonged to 
the Hitler Youth—but who had been too young to have been involved in any 
crimes—became more vocal and sought to bring about further changes in the 
educational system (Kansteiner 2006: 112).  
Moreover, German historians wrote “world-renowned” histories on the 
Holocaust and, aside from unearthing the historical facts, encouraged Germany to 
confront its past (Bindenagel 2006: 306).  Since Germany cannot escape its 
historical legacy, German politicians reminded German citizens time and again, 
they have to deal with it squarely.  In a speech on May 8, 1985, the 40
th 
anniversary of the end of World War II, German President Richard von 
Weizsaecker stressed: “All of us, whether guilty or not, whether old or young, 
must accept the past.  We are all affected by its consequences and held 
responsible for it” (Bindenagel 2006: 290). 
In the 1970s, the student movement assured that discussions of personal guilt 
would not be dodged.  It was important that a “clear distinction be made between 
those who committed crimes and the nation they came from” (Kaiser 2006: 92).  
Since guilt is individual rather than collective, one needs to differentiate guilty 
perpetrators and their descendants.  Although the latter hold responsibility for the 
future, Kaiser (2006: 93) makes clear, they are absolved from responsibility for 
the past.  To guard against the possibility of repetition, the German government 
decreed that it is a crime to deny the Holocaust, endorses full archival openness 
to make sure information relating to Germany’s dark past will not be distorted, 
and continues to work hard to create new relationships of trust.  Projects on 
common history textbooks are on-going, and town partnerships, youth and 
teacher exchange programs--created decades ago to combat the revival of 
nationalism--are still going strong.  
 
Restitution/Justice 
 
Under the Potsdam declaration, the Allied powers decided that Japan would have 
to hand over assets and capital which would then be dispersed as reparations.  
                                                 
13 Katzenstein (2005: 86-7) explains that the political class in Germany after 1945 was 
recruited from democratic parties during the Weimar Republic and therefore largely consisted of 
people who had been imprisoned or in exile during the Nazi dictatorship.  These people had an 
interest in talking about Germany’s “problematic past” and wanted the history books to reflect 
adequately what had happened during the Nazi period.  In Japan, on the other hand, the political 
class remained largely unchanged after the war, “except for the very top leadership,” and the 
government therefore favored “textbooks that expressed a strong, nationalist historiography.”    
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Between January 1948 and September 1949 China received $22.5 million worth 
of machinery and equipment and $18.1 million-worth of stolen goods were 
returned to China (Rose 2005: 42).  As Cold War tensions began to intensify, 
however, the U.S. government recommended to forgive reparations for fear of 
weakening Japan.  In a Peace Treaty with Japan in 1952 Taiwan agreed to waive 
reparations and, in 1972, the People’s Republic of China followed suit in a Joint 
Statement signed with Japan. 
Although, as Rose (2005: 5) demonstrates, this left the door open for civil 
compensation, to this day, only a small number of Chinese victims have received 
compensation.  In general, the success rate appears to be better if a complaint is 
directed against a company, rather than a government, but even then a variety of 
criteria need to be met (claims must be in the hands of legislators rather than the 
judiciary; claims must be supported by a large group; claims must have merit, 
etc.) “for civil redress to be successful” (Brooks 1999 quoted in Rose 2005: 77-
78).  Most cases are dismissed and, typically, judges either argue “that 
compensation claims were settled under international law, … that under the Meiji 
constitution the Japanese state cannot be held liable, or that the twenty-year 
statute of limitations makes the claims invalid” (ibid 96).   
Whereas victims of Japanese atrocities have not fared very well when it 
comes to restitution, victims of the Nazi regime, comparatively, have done much 
better in their search for justice.  In 1947 U.S. occupation authorities launched 
the first German restitution and compensation programs and some of these are 
aiding Holocaust survivors to this day.  According to Bindenagel (2006: 294) the 
compensation programs provided by the FRG “were quite extensive” with the 
government paying “over $70 billion … directly to victims.”  Also, in the 1990s, 
Germany launched a “$700 million humanitarian effort” to aid victims of Nazi 
atrocities in Eastern Europe.  Negotiations among German business leaders, 
politicians, and victims of Nazi slave labor conducted between 1999 and 2000 
led to a $5 billion settlement (Bindenagel 2006: 301) which was widely 
perceived as just.  And, just this March, KarstadtQuelle agreed to pay $117 
million to the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany which 
had filed suit on behalf of the Wertheim family who—being Jewish--had lost its 
property in the late 1930s to the Nazis (New York Times March 31
st, 2007, B3).       
 
Apology/Settling the Past 
 
Clearly, since the end of World War II, the Japanese government has issued 
numerous apologies for its conduct during the war, but, to this day, these 
apologies have not achieved the desired effect, i.e., improved Japan’s relations 
with its neighbors considerably.  Why is this the case? 
As Rose (2005: 19) suggests, for an apology to be effective certain criteria 
must be met: “it must be offered with the backing and authority of the collective 
so that the apology is official and binding; it must be made publicly and on the Weber 
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record; and it should acknowledge the violation, accept responsibility, and 
indicate that there will be no repetition of such acts in future.”  Moreover, 
reciprocity may be a must since each time an outstretched hand is not seized a 
further opportunity is lost (Kaiser 2006: 92).
14     
In any event, an apology must be “meaningful” (Kristof 1998: 38), 
“genuine,” “sincere,” and “backed by actions” (Rose 2005: 100).  Over the 
course of several decades, Japan repeatedly has expressed “regret,” “keen 
responsibility for the suffering it has caused,” “remorse,” “sincere remorse,” 
“genuine contrition and deepest apologies” (Rose 2005: 101), but none of the 
apologies issued to date has been accepted by the majority of Chinese people.  
During a visit to Tokyo at the end of 1998, for instance,  Jiang Zemin “pressed 
for a formal ‘apology’ (owabi) and ‘remorse’ (hansei),” but, as Green (1999: 
158-9) explains, only got hansei.
15  Similarly, apologizing to former ‘comfort 
women’ in Korea in 1993, the Japanese government acknowledged “moral” but 
not “legal” responsibility (Rose 2005: 71).  
To make matters worse, many Japanese Prime Ministers have insisted on 
visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.  Obviously, Japanese citizens should be allowed to 
honor their war dead.  Ever since Class A (leading) war criminals were enshrined 
at Yasukuni in 1978, however, any visit there by a Japanese Prime Minister 
represents a “political act of state recognition of the[se] souls” (Takahashi 2006: 
156).  The crux of the matter, as Takahashi (2006: 175) explains, is that tens of 
thousands of Taiwanese and Koreans, who had been drafted into the Japanese 
military during the Asia-Pacific War, are also enshrined at Yasukuni.  These 
“victims of colonial rule by Japan [were enshrined] in precisely the same way as 
Japanese people who died perpetrating the colonial rule…as ‘gods who defended 
the nation.’  For the bereaved families…who suffered colonial rule, this is an 
insult” (ibid), and they therefore undertook legal proceedings to remove their 
relatives from enshrinement, but to no avail.
16                 
There are at least two ways in which the Japanese government could defuse 
this politically charged situation.  On the one hand, it could decide to create a 
politically “neutral” war memorial that would make no reference to Japan’s war 
criminals (Rose 2005: 125).  Alternatively, Japanese Prime Ministers could 
“leave the commemoration and mourning of the souls enshrined at Yasukuni up 
to the priests at the shrine,” even if that would mean jeopardizing some domestic 
votes (Takahashi 2006: 157).   
                                                 
14 For studies that argue that an apology does not require reciprocity, in fact, may be more 
effective unilaterally, see Long and Brecke 2003:26; and Suzuki 2007: 6.  
15 It is important to understand that there are different levels of apology in the Japanese 
language and that the exact wording chosen is crucial. 
16 Priest Ikeda rationalizes the refusal to remove the souls by arguing that “at the time when 
they died they were Japanese, so it is not possible for them to stop being Japanese after they died” 
(Takahashi 2006: 176).  As Takahashi is quick to point out, however, this completely ignores the 
fact that “the[se] people were semi-forcibly drafted into the war.”  Asian Security 
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An analysis of apologies made by the German government to come to terms 
with the Nazi past shows that Germany has been much more successful in 
moving beyond this dark chapter in its history.  This, as Kaiser (2006: 91) makes 
clear, in large part, is due to the fact that the Germans recognized that “the 
acceptance of guilt in the past must not only be open and public, but, in order to 
be truly meaningful and effective, it must generate a formal apology.”  Case in 
point, former German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s reconciliation with the East.  
While visiting the Warsaw Ghetto Monument in 1970, Brandt spontaneously fell 
to his knees, “[doing]”, as he later explained in his memoirs,  “what human 
beings do when speech fails them” (cited in Teitel 2006: 105).  This “executive 
apology” was then followed by the signing of the Warsaw Treaty.   
As part of the 1999-2000 settlement among German business leaders, 
politicians, and victims of Nazi slave labor mentioned above, German President 
Johannes Rau offered a similar apology, “emphasizing acknowledgement and 
repentance rather than money” (Barkan and Karn 2006: 23).  Rau told his 
audience, which included Holocaust survivors: “I know that for many it is not 
really the money that matters.  What they want is for their suffering to be 
recognized as suffering and for the injustice done to them to be named injustice.  
I pay tribute to all those who were subjected to slave and forced labor under 
German rule, and, in the name of the German people, beg forgiveness.  We will 
not forget their suffering” (reprinted in Barkan and Karn 2006: 24).
17 
So then what lessons can Japan draw from the European experience?  “In the 
best cases,” as Barkan and Karn (2006:7) stress, “the negotiation of apology 
works to promote dialogue, tolerance, and cooperation between groups knitted 
together uncomfortably (or ripped asunder) by some past injustice.  … [An] 
apology can create a new framework in which groups may rehearse their past(s) 
and reconsider the present.”  To the extent that apologies can “amend the past” 
(ibid. 8), their psychological value is immense.  Germany seems to fit this “best 
case” scenario.  Having addressed its historical legacies and “by building a new, 
shared identity with former enemies,” Germany, in Lebow’s mind, has been able 
to “transcend, at least in part, [its] Germanness” (2006: 30).  Moreover, given 
that an “apology becomes an act of rehabilitation for the perpetrators and their 
descendants” (Barkan and Karn 2006: 17), “atoning for the war,” as Kristof 
(1998: 44) points out, “would not only liberate Japan’s neighbors; it would also 
free Japan itself.”
18  Both of these developments, it seems, should enhance the 
prospects of future Sino-Japanese cooperation.     
                                                 
17 To live up to this pledge, the German government regularly provides money to education 
programs and memorials (Bindenagel 2006: 294). 
18 For an interesting study that advocates an apology as a new strategy, see Suzuki (2007: 5-7).  
He argues that Japan, as a democracy, has “greater political space…to debate and forward 
alternative interpretations of history.”  With time, an apology may lead to “collective identity 
transformations,” and help to “de-securitise” China’s identity.  
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Japan’s Threat Assessment 
 
North Korea, as Saunders (2004: 150) makes clear, is the most immediate threat 
to Japan.  “[F]ollowing years of provocative probing of Japanese sea and air 
defense perimeters by North Korean gunboats and fighter aircraft, admitted 
development of nuclear weapons, kidnappings of Japanese citizens, relentless 
espionage, …the 1998 launch of a ballistic missile over Japan” (ibid.), and the 
most recent atomic test by North Korea, it is not surprising that Japan seeks bal-
listic missile defense (BMD) (Kliman 2006: 2). 
Aside from North Korea, the problem of China persists.  “[T]hroughout the 
post-war period, Japan…[has] maintained a policy of constructive engagement 
toward Beijing” (Green 1999: 152), but continues to remain troubled by the 
uncertainty regarding China’s future behavior.  It is thus strategic instability that 
is believed to be the main enemy—“the lack of transparency in the intentions and 
strategic thinking of Beijing” (Lee 1997: 252)—rather than the fear of an 
imminent attack.   
Japan is well aware of the fact that “China has from time to time behaved in 
ways offensive to the rest of the world…[and] shown its willingness to use force 
to settle disputes, even when its own territory [was] not under attack” (China’s 
incursion into Vietnam in 1979, or its entering the Korean War) (Roy 1994: 156).  
And, most recently, China stunned the world by shooting down a satellite in 
outer space. 
By and large, however, Japan, like many of its neighbors, is cautiously 
optimistic when it comes to China.  Unlike “a few years ago, [when] many of 
China’s neighbors voiced growing concerns about the possibility of China 
becoming a domineering regional hegemon and powerful military threat,” 
Shambaugh (2004/05: 64) explains, “most nations in the region now see China as 
a good neighbor…and a non-threatening regional power.”   
This is not to say that “Japan does [not] harbor concerns over improvements 
to China’s military capabilities, especially its nuclear and missile prowess” (Wu 
2000: 305).  It does worry about developments such as China’s nuclear weapons 
test in 1995, or the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, and therefore pursues the 
development of theater missile defense (TMD)--which it may also need to protect 
itself against North Korean ballistic missiles (Garrett and Glaser 1997: 393).   
Particularly vexing to Japan are the many ways in which the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) has sought to shore up its military capabilities vis-à-vis Taiwan: the 
“deployment of approximately 600 short-range ballistic missiles opposite 
Taiwan…; the deployment of large numbers of attack fighters opposite Taiwan; 
the buildup of surface ships, submarines, and amphibious landing craft within 
range of Taiwan; periodic large-scale military exercises around Taiwan; and the 
refusal to forswear the possible use of force against Taiwan” (Shambaugh 2004: 
86).  “If the PRC [People’s Republic of China] chose to blockade Taiwan or a 
military conflict across the Strait turned out to be a protracted one,” Wu (2000: Asian Security 
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305) claims, “Japan’s lines of communication through the channel would be 
jeopardized.”  And yet it deserves to be stressed again that it is not the large 
military expenditures that make China’s neighbors uneasy but the anxiety 
stemming from the significant uncertainty concerning Chinese intentions. 
But there are also outright pessimists.  Roy (1994: 149), for instance, argues 
that “a prosperous Chinese economy…would give China the capability to 
challenge Japan for domination of East Asia.”  “If China’s economic power 
continues to grow rapidly relative to Japan’s,” he insists (1994: 165), “serious 
political tensions between China and Japan are certain, and military conflict is 
likely.”  Or, put differently, power politics pretty much would dictate an 
economically stronger China to start acting like a major power—“bolder, more 
demanding, and less inclined to cooperate with the other major powers in the 
region” (ibid. 160).  Solomon and Drennan (2001: 231), paint an equally bleak 
picture suggesting that, “[a]s we enter the twenty-first century, Asia’s security 
environment seems likely to be shaped by the distrust, if not rivalry, between 
China and Japan.”   
To make things worse, China with an “authoritarian and unstable 
government…is more likely to use force in pursuit of its goals” (Roy 1994: 160), 
and “fac[ing] less resistance than Japan to building a superpower-sized 
military…may provoke a military buildup by Japan, plunging Asia into a new 
cold war” (ibid. 150).  Glaser (1993: 271), similarly, discusses the possibility of 
an increasingly powerful China causing a regional arms race due to the security 
dilemma.  It is therefore imperative, according to Solomon and Drennan (2001: 
232), to keep the US involved in East Asian politics.  “Without the forward US 
military presence (i.e., the stationing of US military personnel in South Korea 
and Japan), these scholars suggest, “a resurgent rivalry between China and 
Japan” may not be avoidable and could easily lead to Japan’s remilitarization. 
At the same time it is understood that a fragile China, one that might 
experience significant domestic conflict and even disintegrate, also is not in East 
Asia’s best interest.  On the contrary, an impoverished and unstable China would 
also be worrisome, since in this scenario Japan would have to deal with millions 
of refugees (Wu 2000: 307). 
 
Institution-Building in East Asia 
 
Given the history of the region, East Asians are sensitive to infringements on 
their sovereignty and reluctant to curtail their freedom of action.  When they do 
agree to cooperate in the context of international organizations, they insist on 
consensus decision- making--as in ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) which will be discussed in more detail below--to protect their sovereignty 
(Simon 2001: 3).  
To the extent possible, East Asian countries, much like others, and as 
predicted by neorealists, seek to engage in self-help.  Since cooperation leaves a Weber 
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country vulnerable to opportunistic behavior on the part of its allies, the country 
can be expected to do everything in its power to enhance its security before 
relying on others.  Japan, for instance, although its autonomy for a number of 
years was significantly constrained by systemic forces as a result of World War 
II, gradually improved its capabilities by modifying Article 9 and allowing its 
Self-Defense Forces to evolve.  According to Kliman (2006: 67) this trend is 
likely to continue “as normative constraints on Japan’s defense policy weaken.” 
Yet, “[i]n light of Japan’s traditional problems with China, Korea and Russia, 
… possible repercussions for the security of sea lanes as a result of China’s 
territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea” (Lee 1997: 
257), and continuing military constraints (no nuclear weapons; military export 
restrictions), self-help is clearly insufficient to assure Japan’s security.  Instead it 
is essential for Japan to retain close ties with the US, to share the defense burden 
and thereby enhance the chances of US troops remaining stationed in the country, 
and prolong the security alliance with the US indefinitely.  As Cha (2003: 108) 
demonstrates, ever since the end of World War II it was bilateralism that helped 
promote peace in the region.  Specifically, the American “hub and spokes 
network of bilateral alliances” (ibid.) deserves credit for bringing stability to East 
Asia.
19   
Presently, the “hub and spokes model” consisting of five bilateral alliances 
between the US and Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand 
predominates.  But is it wise to put all of one’s eggs in one basket, that is, solely 
rely on bilateralism?  Cha (2003: 111) seems to think so, arguing that multilateral 
arrangements offer little security beyond what the existing alliances already 
provide, would only restrict maneuverability and thus add little value.  Betts 
(1993/94), on the other hand, considers too heavy a reliance on the US 
dangerous.  Even though “[t]he United States remains formally committed to a 
strategic role in the Pacific,” he explains (1993/94: 51),  “its military presence 
has…been attenuated as the flag has come down from Philippine bases, land- and 
sea-based tactical nuclear weapons have been removed, and defense budgets cuts 
trim the number of forces regularly on station elsewhere in the neighborhood.”  
Shambaugh (2004/05:95), much like Cha, acknowledges the importance of 
bilateralism and the crucial role of the US in shoring up East Asian security, yet 
advocates for Japan to develop broader security ties and predicts the emergence 
of a “multitextured and multilayered regional system.”  As has become apparent 
in the European case, there are numerous forms of institutions with varying 
memberships, levels of commitment, etc., to choose from.  Thus, in the 
following, several institutional arrangements that have been discussed in the 
European context, and/or have been put in place there, will be considered for 
East Asia alongside already existing security structures. 
                                                 
19 This fact, obviously, has not gone unnoticed and explains, at least in part, why former 
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi agreed to aid the US in Iraq (see Kliman 2006: 139). Asian Security 
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If one continues the above discussion of security arrangements and, 
gradually, increases the number of countries involved, trilateralism logically 
follows bilateralism.  And there are a few scholars who have given trilateral 
security structures some thought.  Lee (1997), for example, leaves no doubt that 
it is imperative to engage China.  “As the future of Asia-Pacific security will to a 
large extent be determined by China, the United States and Japan,” he argues, “a 
stable triangular relationship involving Sino-Japanese relations, Sino-American 
relations and US-Japan relations would be of paramount importance for the 
maintenance of stability and prosperity of the region” (ibid. 258).  The key here, 
obviously, is a stable triangle and it is not clear whether the US, Japan and China 
can cooperate giving equal consideration to each partner.  Funabashi (1993: 83) 
is skeptical, reminding us that “[t]riangular relationships, by their nature, reduce 
international relations to a zero-sum game: any of the three powers is apt to 
suspect the other two of colluding to augment their bargaining power.  A triangle 
made up of China, with its despotic government and closed economy, Japan, with 
its ambiguous policy decision-making process, and the United States, with its 
tradition of playing China and Japan against each other,” he concludes, “could be 
a dangerous one.” 
Given the risks associated with trilateralism, it may make sense to add 
additional members to the security structure to reduce the likelihood of two 
countries ganging up against one.  Minilateral arrangements consisting of a small 
number of participants (3-4)
20 may be considered.  By virtue of their relatively 
small size it may be possible to give rise to such arrangements fairly quickly, 
deal with real security issues (like the cooperation on North Korean nuclear 
proliferation by the US, Japan, and South Korea), keep the arrangements focused 
and, once they have served their purpose, disband them (Cha 2003: 116-7).   
Minilaterals whose members are great powers are referred to as concerts.  In 
this form of collective security a small group of major powers cooperates to resist 
aggression, monitors events, and reaches decisions via consensus.
21  The most 
well-known concert is the Concert of Europe where Britain, Austria, Russia and 
Prussia managed to uphold the status quo on the European continent from the end 
of the Napoleonic Wars (1815) until the Crimean War (1854-56).  Based on the 
stability the cooperation of the great four European powers brought,
22 Betts 
(1993/94: 75) suggests that, “if a concert of great powers in East Asia is feasible, 
we should seek it.”  At the same time, however, he seems to doubt the 
effectiveness of such a security provision for East Asia advising that “no one 
should depend on [a concert] to solve more than modest disputes” (ibid. 71). 
                                                 
20 In situations where there is a great likelihood of two countries ganging up against the third, 
obviously, a minilateral arrangement consisting of three participants would defeat its purpose, that 
is, to enhance the security of all participants. 
21 For a more detailed discussion of concerts, see Kupchan 1994. 
22 France was successfully brought back into the European security arrangement at the 
Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. Weber 
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Adding additional members to minilateral security structures leads to 
multilateral arrangements
23 and, when one thinks of these in the context of Asia, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comes to mind.  Founded 
in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to 
“demonstrate solidarity against communist expansion in Vietnam and insurgency 
within their own borders,”
24 today ASEAN consist of 10 members (Brunei, 
Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia were added over time) and mainly 
seeks to promote economic and cultural cooperation.  As Acharya (2003: 206) 
makes clear, however, ASEAN also has developed a number of security goals: it 
seeks to deny any power to dominate the region; works toward the peaceful 
management of regional territorial disputes; seeks to prevent an arms race and to 
keep the US strategically engaged in the region.  Moreover, it tries to engage 
China rather than to contain it (ibid. 219).  To accomplish its goals ASEAN 
prefers informal over structured talks, searches for consensus--though not 
necessarily unanimity--and “attempt[s] to reconcile national strategies with 
multilateral norms and principles” (Acharya 2003: 254-268).   
Aside from ASEAN other multilateral structures exist in the region to 
promote stability.  The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) founded 
in 1993, for example, brings together diplomats and members of the Defense 
Departments of China, the US, Russia, Japan, and South Korea to engage in 
“track-two” security dialogues.  Similarly, the Council on Security Cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) founded in 1994 promotes track-two discussions.  
Unlike NEACD, however, CSCAP is a non-governmental organization that was 
created by research institutes in the region and its participants are individuals (Jin 
2002: 192-3). 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), also launched in 1994, is an informal 
multilateral dialogue mechanism of 26 members
25 who seek to address security 
issues in the Asia-Pacific region.  Drawing upon the chief normative framework 
for inter-state behavior developed by ASEAN, namely the “Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation,” Acharya (2003: 185-9) explains, the chief purpose of ARF is to 
build “security with others rather than against them.”  Hence, whereas confidence 
building, preventive diplomacy, non-discrimination and transparency are 
encouraged, the organization discourages the use of force by members to settle 
disputes, but “does not make any provision for common action to punish an act 
of aggression” (Acharya 2003: 190).  Some of the measures proposed by ARF 
include a regional arms register, the exchange of defense white papers, observers 
during military exercises, etc. (ibid. 190).  And, with respect to the rivalry be-
tween the two big East Asian countries, Buzan and Weaver (2003: 158) argue, 
                                                 
23 The cut-off point between these two institutional arrangements seems somewhat arbitrary. 
24 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASEAN 
25 The current members of ARF consist of ASEAN plus Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, the 
People’s Republic of China, the European Union, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, 
Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, East Timor, and the United States. Asian Security 
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ARF “binds both Japan and China into a regional institutional framework, 
allowing Japan to address its historical problem, China to address fears of its 
neighbors, and both to avoid conspicuous balancing behavior towards each 
other.”  
To sum up, a variety of cooperative security arrangements presently exist in 
East Asia and the hub and spokes model discussed above, clearly, is of utmost 
importance.  Yet there is recognition that sole reliance on a bilateral relationship 
with the US is insufficient (even dangerous), and that arrangements on multiple 
levels of governance and with varying degrees of commitment are desirable.  As 
Huang (2002: 260), borrowing from Vinod Aggarwal suggests, “bilateral security 
arrangements should be nested into transregional security regimes such as ARF 
and CSCAP, so that the norms, rules and practices of transregional security 
regimes can transplant to bilateral security arrangements.”  Similarly, 
Katzenstein (2004:103), focusing on Japan, explains that the country favors 
bilateralism, yet, seeks to complement it with “embryonic multilateralism” 
(track-two dialogues) to create trust.  Vaeyrynen (2001: 166) could not agree 
more.  In his mind, Japan also seeks a multifaceted approach to security, namely 
“to deepen regional economic integration, enhance subregional security 
integration and mutual reassurance, and rely on firm and predictable US-
Japanese cooperation.”  
What is also clear is that East Asians prefer a “gradual, incremental approach 
to cooperation over legalistic and fast-track modalities of institution-building” 
(Acharya 2003: 15).  In other words, it is preferable to begin by building mutual 
trust, respect, and tolerance through regular talks and then graduate to more 
ambitious goals.  “[C]onfidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy and 
conflict resolution,” according to Lee (1997: 262), are the bottom line, and multi-
lateral institutions, by “redefin[ing] identities and acceptable standards of 
behavior” (Katzenstein 2004: 120), and promoting greater transparency, are a 
good way of getting there.   
And yet, ARF and CSCAP are “talk shops,” …they do not negotiate treaties 
or impose formal obligations” (Simon 2001: 4).  In fact, ARF, as Katzenstein 
(2004: 115) explains, “has sidestepped the most pressing security issues in Asia: 
conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and in the South 
China Sea.”     
Does this make them paper tigers?  Hardly.  These institutions fulfill an 
important role: the creation of trust and reciprocity (Simon 2001: 4).  By virtue of 
“[c]onsensus decision making [they] also permit some states to abstain from an 
agreement without obstructing the will of the majority,” and thereby allow for 
greater flexible than unanimity rule (ibid).  These institutions are vital when it 
comes to community building and their members hope that by engaging each 
other they can promote understanding, avoid problems from spiraling out of 
control, and over time create more sophisticated security structures that can cope 
with bigger problems.  The idea is to acquire information and then, gradually, Weber 
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change interests and preferences.  Or, as Johnston and Evans (1999: 264) put it, 
“the most important function of dialogue fora is not the rules they create but the 
suspicions they allay and the norms they reinforce.”  In the case of ARF and 
CSCAP this translates into the non-use of force for settling disputes.   
Much like in Europe, it is hoped that integration in one area (for instance the 
economic realm) will spill over into others and facilitate cooperation there (Betts 
1993/94: 72).  But as European developments also have shown, this does not 
happen over night, nor should one expect smooth sailing all the way.  As the 
failure of the European Defense Community (EDC), for instance, makes clear, it 
is likely that there will be occasional setbacks.  In fact, the present “rise in 
political tensions and nationalism” in East Asia may constitute just that (Kaiser 
2006: 96).     
Strategic instability does exist in East Asia and the countries in the region 
seem to understand that it is in their interest to include their most likely 
adversaries in cooperative security arrangements, rather than to ally against them.  
Along those lines it, for instance, makes sense to include Japanese troops in 
multilateral peacekeeping, especially “if the alternative were Japanese remili-
tarization outside such a framework” (Betts 1993/94:57).
26  It may also be 
beneficial to create confidence-building measures in the region that resemble the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of the 1970s (Kaiser 
2006: 97).  To mention but one further possibility, a multilateral arrangement 
resembling the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) may be of great 
help in stabilizing the region by making it virtually impossible for the members 
to go to war with each other.    
What specific form cooperative security arrangements in the region will take 
in the not too distant future is still to be determined.  What is clear is that these 
institutions will be “a compliment to, rather than substitute for, existing bilateral 
arrangements” (Acharya 2003: 195).  In the words of Acharya (2003: 325) the 
”best prospects for the regulation of Great Power competition in Asia are through 
cross-cutting bilateral channels, with occasional resort to ad hoc multilateral 
consultations.”  He even goes further and suggests that, depending on the issues, 
a “division of labor” between ARF and something resembling a “concert” of the 
Great Powers may be desirable (ibid. 326).   
Japan these days seeks to “hedge against possible Chinese hegemony” and 
tries to integrate China into the region (Green 1999: 165).  China, likewise, seeks 
to take steps to prevent Japan’s remilitarization.  It is clear to all parties involved 
in East Asian security matters that institutions are not a “cure-all” but, due to the 
benefits outlined above, a step in the right direction.  The goal is to encourage 
positive behavior when feasible, but have cooperative structures to rely on when 
benevolence fails to accomplish the desired outcome. 
                                                 
26 Obviously, the case of German rearmament within a European Army to exercise control 
over the German military is important here. Asian Security 
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 In the end, those who caution that East Asia is NOT Europe are correct.  
Whereas the Europeans already curtailed their freedom of action significantly in 
the early post-1945 period, introduced multilateral structures, and progressed 
fairly rapidly toward greater integration, the East Asians for a number of years 
relied on bilateral security arrangements with the US and only fairly recently 
began to experiment with multilateral security structures.  Despite this delayed 
start and more incremental approach to trust building, this paper has shown, there 
are important lessons East Asia can learn from Europe when it comes to the 
process of security integration.  First, the European case makes clear that 
historical legacies not only need to be addressed, but dealt with in a particular 
manner, to remove the big stumbling block these issues still represent for East 
Asia.  Specifically, studies of European reconciliation identify elements 
(remembrance, restitution, apology) essential in coming to terms with the past 
and thereby provide East Asia with a blueprint that it can follow and, where 
needed, modify to account for differences in timing, cultural heterogeneity, etc.  
Second, to achieve the remarkable stability the Europeans have enjoyed since the 
end of World War II it appears to be beneficial, if not imperative, to coordinate 
security provisions on multiple levels and, over time, give rise to a complex web 
of governance that can allay suspicions, reinforce rules, and promote trust.   
Third, European integration also demonstrates that spillover from one area of 
cooperation to another is likely, but, that it is also likely that there will be 
setbacks on the road to greater institutionalization.  
As the above discussion has shown, East Asians are no longer solely relying 
on their bilateral security relations with the US, but also imbedding their security 
provisions in regional institutional structures.  ARF is no NATO or OSCE, but it 
does represent a step in the right direction.  Similarly, Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe’s recent conciliatory moves toward China are encouraging.  It is 
about time both Japan and China take concrete steps to deal with their historical 
legacies, remove remaining obstacles to cooperation, and move beyond talking.  
If Europe is any indication, Action Plans will have to be next.  
Finally, conceptually speaking, if there are any lessons to be learned it is that 
regional stability assessments, by themselves, do not suffice to shed light on East 
Asian security provisions.  To understand why East Asian countries have given 
rise to the specific security structures in existence today it is essential to “cross-
fertilize” governance approaches with ideational and psychological conceptual 
frameworks.  Reason clearly mattered in these decisions, but an accurate un-
derstanding of why the actors behaved the way they did cannot be obtained 
without examining their ideas and emotions. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
The Euro-Med Partnership and Regional Integration 
 
 
Astrid B. Boening 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I seek to explore a region of the world, the Mediterranean, which 
has through the millennia been significant as a passageway for peoples and their 
trade and cultures. S. Victor Papacosma (2004, 15/6) writes, particularly 
concerning the Eastern Mediterranean, that 
 
            despite their proximity, the diversity of the indigenous groups 
contributed little to harmony and much more to clashes among them … 
[and this region was characterized by] fragmented distributions of 
power and security systems that posed obstacles for this major avenue 
of economic and naval traffic. 
 
Today, progress has certainly been made – but much obviously needs to be 
done in the regions bordering the Mediterranean to remove obstacles not only to 
economic traffic but to build bridges to traverse the cultural and political 
diversity between the East and the West and the North and the South of the 
Mediterranean, and to substitute military clashes with peaceful socio-economic 
and cultural interactions. Previous experiences of regional Mediterranean 
integration, such as the Roman Empire or the spread of Christianity in the East 
and West Roman Empires were certainly not always peaceful.  Hence I would 
like to examine here a modus operandi which is intended to serve as a peaceful 
“bridge” not between “Them” and “Us”, or “the West” and “the Rest”, but which 
utilizes approaches, such as functionalism and institutionalism, which have been 
historically successful in integrating neighboring countries that had an extensive 
history of “un-neighborly” relations, such as France and Germany, into a system 
which has brought not only prosperity but also peace to them, i.e. the European 
Union (EU), and applied it to the Mediterranean regions in the Euro-Med 
Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process. 
 
Structures for Peace, Stability and Prosperity   
Emanating from meetings and negotiations started on October 30, 1991 at the 
Peace Conference in Madrid the structure of the Madrid Framework for a Boening 
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bilateral and a multilateral negotiating track was developed which enabled the 
first-ever direct talks between Israel and her immediate Arab neighbors on 
November 3, 1991. These negotiations focused on key issues of concern to the 
entire Middle East: water, environment, arms control, refugees and economic 
development. These negotiations led to the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference 
of Foreign Ministers of the future EMP states in Barcelona in November 1995 
and marked the official starting point of the EuroMed Partnership. Its three main 
objectives are:  
 
1.  the definition of a common area of peace and stability through the 
reinforcement of a political and security dialogue; 
2.  the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic 
and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade 
area; 
3.  and the rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural 
and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between 
cultures and exchanges between civil society (Horizon 2020 Bulletin 
2005, 2). 
 
The EMP constitutes the EUs main multilateral foreign policy instrument in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Currently, the EMP comprises the 
twenty-seven EU member states, and ten Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey, which is also an EU candidate country) and Libya (as observer since 
1999). Malta and Cyprus, who were also original EuroMed Partners, are now EU 
member states. The EMP is the Mediterranean region-specific program of the 
broader (and more recently established) European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). 
The ENP per se was developed in 2004 to address the strategic objectives set out 
in the EUs December 2003 European Security Strategy. These objectives include 
the avoidance of emerging new dividing lines, be they economic, political or 
social, between the enlarged EU and its neighbors by extending to the countries 
neighboring the EU measures aimed at  institutional and economic strengthening 
similar as those extended to EU members internally. The ENP offers its 
neighbors a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to 
common values (e.g. democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, 
market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP overall goes 
beyond existing diplomatic and institutional relationships to offer a deeper 
political association and economic integration and to extend the zone of 
prosperity, security and peace to them (EU Commission website: ENP). 
The EMPs specific mandate is based on the political, economic and 
culturally strategic significance of the Mediterranean region to the European 
Union (EU) and seeks to develop a relationship between its partners based on 
“comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature Euro-Med 
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of the links forged by neighbourhood and history” (EU Commission website 
2006: Barcelona Declaration). The “three pillars” of the EMP consist of the 
following in greater detail and follow the dual regional (multilateral) and bilateral 
tracks established in the Madrid Peace Conference for the international relations 
among EMP members:  
The political and security partnership with the aim of strengthening the 
political dialogue is based on “observance of essential principles of international 
law, and to reaffirm common objectives in matters of internal and external 
stability” (Ibid.). EMP partners agreed to act in accordance with the UN Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (such as guaranteeing “the 
effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of 
expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, both individually and together with other member of the 
same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, 
language, religion or sex” (Ibid.) as well as other obligations under international 
law, including their regional and international agreements. Furthermore, they 
agreed to  
 
develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while 
recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and 
freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial 
system, … respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies [both 
with MENA AND the EU], promote tolerance between different groups 
in society and combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and 
xenophobia. … to respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to 
self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the UN … including those relating to 
territorial integrity of states (Ibid., emphasis mine). 
 
In the Economic and financial partnership aspect of the EMP the 
participants emphasize the importance of sustainable and balanced economic and 
social development with a view toward achieving their objective of creating an 
area of shared prosperity and recognizing the impediment debt represents to 
development (e.g. by promoting an environment conducive to both internal 
savings as the basis for investment, and by direct foreign investment), the need to 
dialogue and regionally cooperate for an acceleration of socio-economic 
development (e.g. through the promotion and development of the private sector, 
upgrading the productive sector, establishing appropriate institutional and 
regulatory frameworks for a market economy, such as those protecting 
intellectual and industrial property rights and competition, those promoting 
mechanisms for technology transfer), the progressive establishment of a free-
trade area and a substantial increase in the European Union’s financial assistance 
to its partners (Ibid.). Boening 
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      This aspect of the EMP also emphasizes the interdependence with regard to 
the environment which requires increased regional cooperation and coordination 
between existing multilateral programs. Furthermore it stresses the importance of 
the conservation and rational management of fish stocks in the Mediterranean 
Sea, including improved research into stocks, including aquaculture to re-stock 
the Mediterranean Sea and inland lakes. Additionally it acknowledges the pivotal 
role of the energy sector in the economies of EMP partners and the need to 
strengthen cooperation and intensify dialogue in the field of energy policies, 
including the appropriate framework conditions for investments in, and the 
activities of, energy companies (Ibid.). The supply, management and 
development of water resources, the modernization of agriculture and the 
development and improvement of infrastructure, especially in rural areas, 
including efficient transport systems and information technologies, were also 
declared priorities (Ibid.). We notice that some of the original concerns addressed 
in the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 are specifically adopted by the EMP. 
      The participants at the Barcelona Conference acknowledged that the creation 
of a free-trade area and the success of the EMP require substantially increased 
financial assistance through the EU and the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
necessitating the sound macro-economic management in terms of promoting 
dialogue and optimized financial cooperation among their respective economic 
policies (Ibid.). 
      Social, cultural and human affairs are addressed within the EMP with the 
aim to develop human resources and to promote understanding between cultures 
and exchanges between civil societies (Ibid.). The EMP participants recognize 
that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean 
region, the dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at the human, 
scientific and technological levels are essential factors in bringing their peoples 
closer by promoting understanding between them and improving their perception 
of each other, including the importance of the role which mass media can play in 
the reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures as a source of mutual 
enrichment (Ibid.). 
            Additionally, the importance of civil society specifically, and the 
development of human resources overall, such as social development and 
education and training for young people, e.g. the familiarization with the cultural 
identity of each partner country, by facilitating active exchange programs 
between partnership states, are set goals of the EMP. The importance of these 
programs, beyond enabling the EUs southern neighbors to develop a workforce 
with skills (i.e. increase their human capital) improving their economic situation, 
is to also develop civil society as a significant component of functioning 
democratic institutions and strengthened rule of law.  
            By addressing socio-economic needs, the EMP seeks to alleviate 
consequences of poverty, such as higher crime and violence rates and poor health 
and nutrition, which can then become factors contributing to illegal migration to Euro-Med 
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the northern Mediterranean countries. Beyond these socio-economic approaches, 
EMP states also address mechanisms for the rule of (international) law by 
agreeing to cooperate in the repatriation of illegal immigrants as well as 
cooperating in the joint fight against drug trafficking, international crime and 
corruption, racism, xenophobia and intolerance (Ibid.).  
 
Goals of the EMP 
         Overcoming not a clash of civilizations but of mutual suspicions   
 
Huntington’s (1996, 32) ominous words regarding common divisions between 
countries, such as between modern, developed countries and poor, developing 
countries, or the Muslim distinction between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, the 
abode of peace and the abode of War respectively, are the type of divisions the 
EU seeks to ameliorate and bridge through the programs of the EMP. We note 
that the Dar al-Islam has been undergoing what some scholars have described as 
more serious internal divisions than schisms within the Dar al-Harb (i.e. between 
Muslim and non-Muslin regions). The EMP, by definition, not only encompasses 
both Shia and Sunni populations, but of course also Jewish and Christian member 
states. Beyond the religious diversity, there is also a significant gradient between 
economically richer and poorer regions in the EMP. Nevertheless, I would 
disagree with Huntington that the West is moving towards a phase of a “universal 
state” (Ibid. 53), at least with respect to the northern Mediterranean states versus 
the Southern and Eastern states. While the goals of the EMP are, i.a. trade 
harmonization and coordination, its purpose, with its emphasis on diversity, is 
rather the maximization between cultural parameters of member countries than a 
homogenization among the regions encompassing the EMP.  
 
         Development as Freedom 
Amartya Sen (1999, 11) distinguishes “five distinct types of freedom, seen in an 
‘instrumental’ perspective… 1. political freedoms, 2, economic facilities, 3. 
social opportunities, 4. transparency guarantees, and 5. protective security”, 
which are not only ends of development but also principal means (Ibid.) which he 
views as empirically linked and strengthening each other reciprocally (Ibid., 12). 
Importantly, Amartya Sen points to free and sustainable individual agency, 
whereby “individuals can effectively shape their own destiny” (Ibid.), rather than 
simply being “passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development 
programs” (Ibid.). 
       Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (2007) pointed out in response to a 
speech by Ben Bernanke (2007), chairman of the US Federal Reserve, in view of 
the effects of globalization, that to guard against resulting polarizations in 
personal income, skill-based technological changes need to be addressed. As the Boening 
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previous outline of the overall subject areas addressed in the EMP shows, we 
note that these are exactly some of the issues which the EMPs addresses as part 
of the social-cultural “basket”.  
 
          The EMP and collective security 
Carlos Echeverria wrote in 1999 (preface) that when the Berlin wall crumbled, 
the fear was expressed that the security of Europe might occur at the expense of 
Mediterranean security requirements. The EMP was founded partially to address 
this concern as the Western European Union became more and more integrated 
into the EU. Echeverria (1999) already suggested eight years ago, with the post-
World War II history of political instability in the Middle East already well-
known, but the current Iraqi regional destabilization then unimaginable, to utilize 
the regional experience and confidence of the armed forces of non-European 
Mediterranean nations in peacekeeping operations to make the EUs approach in 
the Mediterranean demand-driven and proactive. While military aspects are not 
explicit items on the agenda of the EMP, they certainly fall into the “political 
first basket” of the EMP and certainly cannot be ignored in the role of the EMP 
as contributing to the Mediterranean security complex, not only from a socio-
economic development standpoint, but also an active political one. 
              
Challenges to progress in the EMP 
Ulla Holm (2004, 1) views the dialectic faced by the EU in the Mediterranean in 
terms of the tension in the conceptualization of the Mediterranean as a cultural 
cradle of great civilizations versus as a conflict laden zone, interlinked with the 
discourses of the EU as an exporter of democracy through a model to copy rather 
than an empire-builder through respect for cultural diversity and Arab 
sovereignty while exporting political shared European values. 
        The  Eastern  Mediterranean  in  particular is poised today more than ever 
before to become the epicenter of global strategic concern writes S. Victor 
Papacosma (2004, 19) due to the much greater number of variables involved than 
existed during the Cold War. This leads to much greater difficulty in determining 
common policy among traditional allies and neighbors). The continuing security 
dilemmas facing the states in this region validate in my opinion Adler’s (1998, 
120, quoted in Attina 2000, 5) belief that multilateral institutions and the 
community-building practices and the “institutions they activate produce the 
necessary conditions for peaceful change, i.e. cognitive and material structures, 
transactions between states and societies and collective identity or ‘we-feeling’”. 
Today, twelve years after the inauguration of the Barcelona Process, the need for 
these multilateral institutions and community-building practices are more needed 
than ever while the political hurdles loom larger than over. I would disagree with 
Rosa Balfour (2004, 1) who writes that Euro-Med 
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        the EU, by nature and because of its history, is ill-suited to 
embracing paradigms such as the clash of civilizations. Limited by its 
capabilities as a ‘civilian power’, it has sought to develop relations 
based on dialogue, on economic integration as a means of building 
secure and stable environments, and on diffusing its norms through 
persuasion rather than coercion.  
 
Rather, her observation (Ibid.) that the Wider Europe strategy published by 
the Commission in March 2003 and the new European Security Strategy 
prepared by the High Representative for CFSP the same year “propose major 
conceptual changes in the EUs relations with the rest of the world which, if 
implemented, could transform the EUs still hesitant status as an international 
actor” is not optional in my opinion today, 2007, but imperative in light of the 
geopolitical “reconfigurations” taking place in the region. The risks and 
challenges make not only strategic thinking but an enhanced focus on action vis-
a-vis the EUs southern neighbors a priority. 
 
Recommendations/outlook for the EMP 
Bettina Huber (2005, 3) writes that cooperation in the EMP is based on the 
assumption that the deepening of neighborhood relations cannot be achieved 
through governmental agreements alone, but that essential participation and 
contribution by civil society is urgently needed to bring the partnership to life 
and to create the greater understanding and closeness between the people 
envisioned by the Barcelona Declaration in 1995. The EU posits the security 
environment of the EMP in the human dimension of good governance, human 
rights and the rule of law (Balfour 2004, 3). While the intentions of the EMP are 
not only laudable but address many of the criteria which scholars and political 
leaders (e.g. note the criteria for the Madrid Peace Conference) have identified as 
contributing to economic growth and development in general, hereby enhancing 
regional stability, we need to remember that the EMP is not legally binding, i.e. 
participation is not uniformly strong. Instead it applies concepts of 
“benchmarking” and “differentiation” on an individual country/case basis, 
“allowing countries to make progress without jeopardizing the entire regional 
approach” (Ibid., 4). Hence this “common model of relationship does not exclude 
a certain degree of differentiation among the states which are part of this model” 
(Flaesch-Mougin in Thiele and Kostelnik 2005, 63). This approach by the EMP 
varies from a purely realist one which might suggest that the overall wealthier 
North might keep its distance and rather remain vigilant toward the Southern and 
Eastern regions of the Mediterranean. In fact, the EMP seeks to counteract the 
risks and threats from the Other, and to increase understanding between the 
cultures (Ortega in Batt et al. 2003, 5) in Constructivist fashion. This is to the Boening 
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credit of the EMP as a specialized regional exception of the ENP, which has been 
accused of “one size fits all” (Aldis 2005, 5) programs and approaches. 
  Some scholars have accused the EMP of being an imperialist tool of the EU 
for an extension of territory and herewith, power. I would view the EMP rather as 
a model for assisting MENA to develop politically, economically and socially, 
not only to make the southern neighbors of the EU less likely to emigrate 
illegally in droves to the EU north of the Mediterranean, but also to offer the 
political/security, economic/financial and socio-cultural options and tools, such 
as through a harmonization of practices, for the integration into some areas of the 
“Four Freedoms” (goods, people, services and capital), for a peaceful coexistence 
in the culturally, politically and economically diverse North African and Middle 
Eastern “neighborhood” of the EU. This “process” of the EMP is multilateral not 
only due to the character of its membership, but also because it is based on 
several international conventions, such as UN declarations, or the parallel “three 
baskets” of the Helsinki Declaration of 1975. This application of EU soft power 
in countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean is more than just cultural 
power in Joseph Nye’s (2002, 11) terminology, but is being applied by the EU in 
its foreign policy in the EMP to promote peace and human rights through the 
reciprocity between economic and education, identified by e.g. A. Sen as 
essential for development to translate into individual freedom. 
Gonzalo Escribano (2005) points out that the ENP’s economic prescriptions 
overall are perceived as merely cosmetic. The EMP per se needs to continue to 
focus on the increased participation of its members in the Single European 
Market, involving the Four Freedoms (of the movement of goods, services, 
capital, and workforce). It is about inclusion rather than exclusion. Euro-
Mediterranean is not a zero-sum game but needs to be recognized and supported 
as an endeavor for cumulative growth on all shores of the Mediterranean to 
achieve peace and stability within and among all its members. 
As we know, peace processes in the Middle East are still more hope than 
reality at the moment, with the extent of spillover from possible greater regional 
fragmentation post-Iraq yet unknown. In this institutional vacuum of other 
regional security cooperative institutions, such as the Arab Maghreb Union or the 
Arab League (Vasconcelos 1999, 30), the realization of the EMPs intent to 
extend beyond the EU a zone of “peace, prosperity and stability” as a tool of EU 
soft power, utilizing proven approaches to address regional (in-) security in the 
Mediterranean through step-by-step processes of harmonization are more urgent 
than ever.   
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Introduction 
 
The 1990s saw a resurgence of regional trade initiatives in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC). Triggered by security, political and economic motivations, 
these schemes were initially viewed as positive developments. In particular, 
analysts emphasized the differences between this new wave of “open” regional-
ism and the inward-oriented regional integration projects of the 1950s and 1960s 
(Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2001). Yet a closer look suggests that the perfor-
mance of many of these agreements has been far from impressive. Progress on 
tariff cuts has been slow and the implementation of signed treaties, uneven. The 
failure of many LAC countries to follow through on the commitments they un-
dertake at the regional level undermines the economic and political sustainability 
of these organizations, ultimately compromising their underlying objectives.  
Scholars frequently acknowledge the existence of serious commitment prob-
lems in LAC regional organizations (Devlin and Ffrench-Davis, 1998; Bouzas, 
2001; Duran and Maldonado, 2005; etc.). Yet, there have been few attempts to 
systematically measure and take stock of the implementation and compliance 
deficit in these blocs. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on regional 
integration in LAC, by presenting and analyzing original data on the compliance 
and implementation records of members of the four main blocs in the region, 
namely, the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Com-
munity (CAN), the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The empirical evidence presented in this 
paper suggests that there are indeed commitment problems in the four organiza-
tions. It also shows that there are variations both across and within the four 
agreements.  
The paper draws on International Relations (IR) and International Political 
Economy (IPE) theoretical perspectives to account for these variations. It argues 
that the two main perspectives in the debate on compliance with international 
agreements, the enforcement and management approaches, are useful to account 
for patterns of cross-national implementation and compliance in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Yet, the tendency of these approaches to neglect the role of Gómez-Mera 
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external influences could prove misleading when examining implementation and 
compliance gaps in regional trade agreements among developing countries. The 
paper thus argues that greater attention needs to be paid to external constraints, 
and in particular, to the role of globalization. The empirical findings presented 
here suggest that international interdependence and vulnerability have had an im-
pact on the ability and willingness of LAC countries to honor their regional 
commitments.   
The paper is structured as follows. The next section begins with a general 
discussion of the concepts of commitment, compliance and implementation in the 
IR literature, and then presents the main theoretical perspectives on the sources 
of non-compliance with international agreements. The third section assesses 
whether such problems are in fact present in LAC regional agreements by ex-
amining different indicators of compliance and implementation. It then examines 
the sources of commitment problems in LAC regional organizations, focusing 
specifically on the determinants of practical implementation. The final section 
summarizes the main empirical results and their theoretical implications and dis-
cusses avenues for future research.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Conceptualizing Commitment, Compliance and Implementation  
Neoliberal institutionalist scholars have emphasized the role of international in-
stitutions in helping self-interested states to achieve and sustain cooperation in an 
anarchic international setting. Yet the effectiveness of institutions in promoting 
cooperation remains contingent on member states’ commitment to undertaking 
and observing the institution’s norms, rules and regulations.  In this paper, com-
mitment is viewed as encompassing the two interrelated but distinct notions of 
implementation and compliance. Following Underdal (1998: 26), I define im-
plementation as “the measures that governments take to translate international 
accords into domestic law and policy” and compliance as the extent to which 
they adhere to the provisions of these agreements. A further distinction can be 
made between legal and practical implementation. According to Tallberg (2002), 
the former refers to the “measures that states take to make international accords 
effective in their domestic law,” and the latter to the practical steps they take to 
adjust their behavior to these accords. In this sense, and consistent with Young 
(1979) and Simmons (1998), implementation entails the practical and legal 
adoption of treaty regulations that are expected to facilitate and promote com-
pliance.  
Three additional considerations are relevant when discussing compliance and 
implementation in regional trade organizations. First, the two concepts are inde-
pendent of the notion of regime effectiveness, which tends to refer to the extent to 
which an organization is able to achieve its stated or implicit objectives (Sim-
mons, 1998; Underdal, 1998). This is useful to understand the survival of some Obstacles Latin America 
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economically irrelevant regional organizations in the developing world. Some 
customs unions among developing countries, for example, are created with the 
ultimate (but perhaps implicit) goal of increasing member states’ leverage in 
multilateral trade negotiations. In such cases, compliance and implementation 
problems may not necessarily undermine their underlying strategic rationale. At 
the other extreme, a regional trade agreement created mainly to promote trade 
among partners could generate high levels of compliance and implementation but 
fail to significantly expand intra-bloc interdependence for a number of reasons 
(e.g. small market size, lack of complementarity among partners’ economic 
structures, unfavorable external or domestic circumstances). Ultimately, we 
would expect commitment problems to work to undermine regime effectiveness 
(Young, 1992). Yet, this paper focuses on the former and does not directly ad-
dress the latter.  
Second, scholars tend to differentiate between “first” and “second order” 
compliance. First-order compliance implies adherence to original or standing 
rules and treaties signed by states. In contrast, the concept of “second order” 
compliance is typically used to refer to compliance with legally binding decisions 
taken by a third-party, usually in response to a case of first order non-compliance 
(Chayes and Chayes, 1995). The advantage of focusing on second-order com-
pliance, which has been frequent in research on the GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, is that it is easier to empirically establish the “rate of 
compliance” (Simmons, 1998). In this paper, however, I focus on first-order 
compliance.  
Finally, as Underdal (1998: 6) points out, both implementation and com-
pliance are matters of degree-- “an actor may comply with some provisions but 
not with others, and meet some obligations partially.
 1 In the context of a customs 
union, for example, member states may observe their commitments to eliminate 
all barriers to intra-bloc trade, but might fail to implement common external tariff 
agreements (CET), maintaining different levels of tariffs on third parties’ prod-
ucts. Similarly, a country might adjust its external trade policy to implement the 
CET in all but a number of sectors or product lines. This understanding of com-
pliance and implementation in degrees of intensity has important methodological 
implications.  Drawing on these insights, Figure 1 summarizes the concepts of 
implementation, compliance and commitment that will be used in the rest of the 
paper. The table distinguishes between the process of policy and/or norm formu-
lation and the subsequent ability of states to commit themselves to that policy. 
The notion of commitment is viewed as including both the ability and/or willing-
ness of a state to implement and to comply with it after implementing it. A 
further distinction is made between “legal” and “practical” implementation.  
 
                                                 
1 Underdal states that, therefore, “a useful model should be able to account for a significant 
amount of the variance at the level of individual actors as well as at the level of regimes.” Gómez-Mera 
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Figure 1 
The Different Dimensions of Commitment to Regional Policy and 
Agreements 
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The Sources of Commitment Problems  
 
Two main perspectives can be identified in the debate on the sources of 
compliance with international agreements: the enforcement and the management 
approaches (Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996). 
These two approaches diverge on what determines and on how to address 
problems of non-compliance and implementation.  
Enforcement scholars assume that states are rational actors whose 
compliance and implementation decisions depend on the structure of material 
incentives that they face. This is consistent with traditional IR perspectives on 
cooperation, and particularly with the realist view that international institutions 
are “epiphenomenal” and that states are cynical when joining them, knowing that 
they might subsequently decide to renege on their rules. In Tallberg’s (2002: 
611) words, “states’ interests may include signature but not compliance.” From 
this perspective, non-compliance can only be deterred through effective 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.  Obstacles Latin America 
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The enforcement approach assumes that both systemic and domestic level 
factors could alter the structure of incentives at a particular time, leading states to 
shirk on their commitments (Downs, Rocke and Barzoom, 1996). Consistent with 
power politics approaches, one group of scholars argues that powerful states tend 
to be less sensitive to changes in the structure of material incentives (Borzel et. 
al., 2006). According to the power preponderance hypothesis, therefore, 
economically and politically strong states are less likely to comply with and to 
implement international agreements. In contrast, others argue that stronger states 
are able to exercise their power at the decision-making and negotiating stages, so 
that only those agreements that reflect their preferences will emerge. Powerful 
states are thus expected to exhibit higher levels of compliance and 
implementation. Moreover, and consistent with hegemonic stability theory, 
regional hegemons can act to provide centralized mechanisms for monitoring and 
sanctioning defection, thus leading to higher levels of compliance and 
implementation within the organization (Mattli, 1999). 
Neoliberal institutionalist insights on cooperation are also consistent with 
enforcement approaches to compliance. Like realists, neoliberals focus on 
material incentives for compliance and implementation, but they emphasize the 
role of institutional mechanisms in promoting and facilitating compliant behavior 
(Keohane, 1984). Institutions work to provide information and increase 
transparency, reducing uncertainty about partners’ behavior and underlining the 
reputational consequences of uncooperative behavior. Crucially, institutions 
provide monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that increase the costs of 
defection. Drawing on this perspective, Smith (2000: 2) has argued that more 
legalized dispute settlement mechanisms are expected to improve compliance 
rates “by increasing the costs of opportunism.” 
A third set of arguments, also consistent with the rationalist underpinning of 
enforcement approaches, emphasizes instead the role of domestic level variables. 
Several studies have examined the links between regime type and compliant 
behavior. Two contending hypotheses have emerged from this literature. The first 
predicts a positive relationship between democracy and compliance and 
implementation, emphasizing two main causal mechanisms. According to the 
“democratic legalist” argument, liberal democratic regimes tend to be more 
willing to observe and respect international law because of their commitment to 
the rule of law and to legal institutions (Simmons, 2000). Other scholars point 
instead to the importance of domestic public opinion and “audience costs” in 
deterring non-compliant behavior in democracies. In this view, democratic 
leaders who renege on international commitments may face negative electoral 
consequences and will thus face stronger incentives to comply than autocrats 
(Fearon, 1994; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002).  
An alternative view highlights the domestic distributional implications of 
international agreements, challenging the contention that domestic pressures 
always deter non-compliance. Because those groups that are harmed by Gómez-Mera 
 
116
international commitments will lobby their governments for non-compliance, 
democratic leaders might face simultaneous pressures for and against 
compliance. Ultimately, whether a democratic state chooses to comply or not will 
depend on the balance of power among these domestic groups (Tomz, 2002; 
2003). This argument is particularly relevant when studying commitment 
problems in regional trade agreements, which have clear distributional 
consequences at the domestic level.
2  
In contrast to the enforcement perspective, the management  approach 
assumes that states in general do (or at least want to) comply with their 
international obligations (Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Chayes, Chayes, and 
Mitchell, 1998). Non-compliance, according to this perspective, is involuntary. 
States do not comply because they are constrained either by norm ambiguity 
(vagueness and uncertainty in treaty wording, inadequate time tables, etc.) or by 
capacity limitations. In some cases, lack of information constrains the ability of 
states to come through on their commitments. Non-compliance may thus be 
“inadvertent” (Chayes and Chayes, 1995). As a result, for management scholars 
problems of non-compliance and non-implementation can only be addressed 
through capacity-building, more flexible time-tables, and greater rule 
specification. International institutions play an important role in this respect, not 
in providing enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms as enforcement scholars 
would expect, but in promoting capacity building and disseminating information.  
Two types of state capacity problems can hinder compliance and 
implementation: administrative and political limitations. Small states, for 
example, might be constrained by inadequate financial and human resources and 
technical capacity limitations in their attempts to implement certain types of 
international agreements (Borzel et. al. 2006). Macroeconomic conditions might 
also indirectly affect the administrative capacity of a state and hence influence its 
international behavior (Tallberg, 2002). Other management scholars emphasize 
the role of political capacity and autonomy, arguing that the number of domestic 
level actors that are able to block political decisions (i.e. veto players) affects the 
extent to which a state is able to observe international commitments. The main 
theoretical expectation is that a higher number of veto players decreases the 
likelihood of compliance and implementation.
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The literature on regionalism has also highlighted the role of interest groups and other 
societal actors both in pushing for regional integration and in conditioning the extent and pace of 
the process of integration (Milner, 1997; Moravcsik, 1998; Chase, 2003).  
3 Several European Union (EU) scholars, however, have found that countries with several veto 
points in fact decreases the average number of infringements and improves the record of legal 
implementation (Borzel et. al. 2004).  Obstacles Latin America 
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Figure 2  
Summary of Hypotheses*  
 
*Sign of expected impact on commitment to regional trade agreements between parentheses.  
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promotes regionalism among developing countries through a number of causal 
mechanisms.
4  
While highly illuminating, this literature suffers from two main weaknesses. 
First, these arguments neglect the possibility that increased economic interdepen-
dence and global power asymmetries might, under certain conditions, work to 
hinder (not promote) compliance and implementation. These scholars view re-
gionalism as either a reaction against or an instrument of US-led “neoliberal 
globalization.” They overlook the fact that many developing countries, particu-
larly in the Americas, have had a positive reaction to the more recent US strategy 
of aggressively pursuing bilateral free trade agreements in the region (Schott, 
2004; Zoellick, 2007).
5 While in the case of MERCOSUR, US bilateralism has 
created further defensive incentives for regional cooperation, in other cases it has 
had the opposite effect. According to Phillips (2005: 21), for example, US bilate-
ralism has “worked to undermine the cohesion of sub-regional groupings” in 
LAC. This is nowhere as clear as in the case of the Andean Community. In April 
2006, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez decided to exit the bloc, accusing 
partners Colombia and Peru of “killing” the Community, after completing FTAs 
with the US.
6 
In addition, the proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral agreements in LAC, 
not only with the US but with other countries within and outside the Western 
Hemisphere, has practical implications in terms of compliance and implementa-
tion. In line with the “spaghetti bowl” argument (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 
1996), the proliferation of overlapping agreements increases the administrative 
costs of compliance and implementation. It could also lead to confusion about 
implementation. Several analysts have, for example, referred to the uncertainties 
created by the DR-CAFTA and its interaction with pre-existing CACM agree-
ments and regulations in Central America (Cornejo and Granados, 2006; 
                                                 
4 Several interrelated arguments can be identified within this literature. A first body of work 
has implicitly and/or explicitly viewed regionalism as a negative manifestation of the process of 
global economic integration, and in particular, as a mechanism for facilitating the “regional 
hegemony” of the neoliberal ideology (Gamble and Payne, 1996; Gill, 1999; Phillips, 2004). Other 
scholars within this group have instead viewed regionalism more as a deliberate defensive response 
to the economic and competitive pressures posed by economic globalisation and by the spread of 
neoliberal policies in the 1990s (Breslin and Higgott, 2000; Bowles, 2002; Phillips, 2002).  In some 
cases, regional integration is viewed as an intermediate step to full participation in the global 
economy—for example as an attempt to improve competitiveness within a protected extended 
market before facing global competition (Phillips, 2000). Alternatively, regionalism among 
developing countries has been viewed as a strategy to improve their market access in a context of 
“dysfunctional” multilateralism. Finally, regionalism has been interpreted as an attempt to provide 
marginalised countries with a viable alternative to the multilateral level (Mistry, 2003; Tussie, 
2003). 
5 Admittedly, this “positive” reaction could be linked to the asymmetries of power in US-LAC 
countries relations and associated fears of marginalization.  
6 See BBC News, “Venezuela quits Andean Trade Bloc,” (20 April 2006). Obstacles Latin America 
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Gonzalez, 2005).
7 Overlapping and “crisscrossing” agreements also have a clear 
impact in LAC states willingness and ability to implement CET agreements. In 
the 1990s, the Menem’s government attempts to have Argentina sign a bilateral 
agreement with the US almost resulted in the downgrading of MERCOSUR to a 
FTA (Gomez Mera, 2005b). More recently, according to INTAL (2002), negoti-
ations with third parties have worked to divert CACM members’ attention and to 
hinder progress towards the implementation of the CET.  
A second shortcoming of the new regionalism literature lies in its lack of at-
tention to the impact of trade and financial vulnerability on states’ ability and 
willingness to observe regional commitments. Here it might also be useful to dif-
ferentiate between the distinct effects of trade and financial interdependence. The 
literature on financial globalization has highlighted the important constraints that 
capital mobility places on developing countries’ policy autonomy (Andrews, 
1994; Cohen, 2000; Haggard and Maxfield, 1996). Several empirical studies, on 
the other hand, have documented the complex impact of global financial pres-
sures on regional trade cooperation. Bowles (2002), for example, examines the 
impact of the Asian Crises on regional cooperation in East Asia and in South 
America. Both ASEAN and MERCOSUR were severely affected by the capital 
outflows that hit the two regions in the late 1990s.  
In South America, capital outflows in the late 1990s exacerbated balance of 
payments problems increasing the costs of observing regional trade commit-
ments. For Brazilian and Argentine policy-makers, protectionist measures were 
an attempt to moderate balance of payments deficits. The recessionary and ma-
croeconomic effects of the financial crises also worked to exacerbate 
distributional tension at the domestic level, leading to a protectionist backlash 
against regional integration both in MERCOSUR and ASEAN (Solingen, 2001; 
Gomez Mera, 2005a). In addition, as Phillips and Higgott (1999) have noted, the 
crisis of confidence that hit emerging markets in the late 1990s created tension 
within blocs, as members sought to “differentiate” themselves from their troubled 
partners.  This suggests that it might be worth examining and comparing the ef-
fects of both trade and financial openness and vulnerability when examining the 
sources of commitment problems in RTAs.  
 
Commitment Problems in LAC Regional Organizations 
 
There have been few attempts to systematically measure and take stock of the 
problems of implementation and compliance in LAC regional organizations. To a 
great extent, this reflects the scarcity of reliable and consistent data on LAC 
countries’ compliance and implementation records. Here the contrast with the 
                                                 
7 For a comparison of divergences in the Rules of Origins regimes in CAFTA and CACM see 
Cornejo and Granados (2006), Appendix C. For a comparison of the coverage and scope of the two 
agreements, see González (2005).  Gómez-Mera 
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European Union (EU) is daunting. EU scholars benefit from the wide availability 
of information on member-states’ infringements, which has facilitated the emer-
gence of a rich body of quantitative and qualitative research on the sources of 
commitment problems among European countries (Borzel et. al. 2006; Tallberg, 
2002; Sverdrup, 2004; Falkner et. al., 2004; etc.). This data is collected and pe-
riodically released by the European Commission, as part of its monitoring 
activities. In contrast, not all regional organizations in LAC have supranational 
bodies that provide centralized systems of enforcement and/or that systematically 
collect and disseminate information on infringements and implementation fail-
ures.
8 A related problem derives from the fact that different blocs rely on 
different enforcement mechanisms and thus, when available, the information on 
non-compliance tends to be uneven and not easily comparable across blocs.
9 As a 
result, it is difficult to measure and compare the record of commitment of LAC 
countries across blocs.  
The information provided by each regional organization could, under certain 
conditions, be used to examine patterns of compliance and implementation 
within these trade organizations. This could serve as a starting point for analyz-
ing broader patterns of commitment with trade agreements in the region. As a 
proxy of non-compliance, I use the average number of formal complaints (pre-
sented by either partners or by the regional bodies) against each country in 
MERCOSUR, CAN, CACM and CARICOM.
10 This information is summarized 
in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 CARICOM members, for example, have only recently inaugurated the Caribbean Court of 
Justice (CCJ), which will be in charge of monitoring the implementation of the Single Market and 
Economy (CSME) and managing the bloc’s dispute settlement mechanism. The agreement 
establishing the CCJ was signed on February 14, 2001 by the governments of Antigua and 
Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, Suriname and 
Trinidad and Tobago. The agreement was later signed by Dominica and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines on February 15 2003. For further information, see 
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org  
9 For a detailed comparison of the dispute settlement mechanisms in the different blocs, see 
Lacarte and Granados (2004). 
10Where possible, I tried to check this information with additional reports by international 
organizations (in particular, ECLAC and the IADB) and with news reports and other official 
documents.  Obstacles Latin America 
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Figure 3 
Average Number of Violations in LAC Blocs, 1998-2005 
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Source: MERCOSUR (2002; 2003; 2004); Duran Lima and Maldonado (2005), CAN Secretariat (2004), 
Costa Rica’s COMEX  website, CARICOM website, ECLAC (2003; 1999); CARICOM (2002); INTAL 
(1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006). 
 
 
Figure 3 would, at first glance, suggest that there is significant variation 
across and within blocs in terms of compliance. It shows that countries like 
Guatemala, Argentina, Ecuador and Colombia exhibit poor records of 
compliance, while their partners Costa Rica, Paraguay and Bolivia (respectively) 
fare much better. This suggests that there might be a negative relationship 
between size and compliance, although this hypothesis would be rejected if we 
look at the case Uruguay in MERCOSUR. Comparing the standard deviations of 
the average violations for each bloc, it emerges that the extent of intra-agreement 
variation in terms of compliance occurs in CACM (1.55) and the lower in 
CARICOM (0.35). 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to challenge the validity and reliability 
of this indicator (formal complaints presented at the bloc’s dispute settlement 
fora), to measure non-compliance. First of all, it excludes the cases of undetected 
and unreported non-compliance or those that are successfully managed directly 
between the aggressor and the affected partners. Partners and/or regional bodies 
might fail to detect a violation, or they might choose not to formally report it. Gómez-Mera 
 
122
Second, in the case of MERCOSUR, for example, it is mainly partners who 
present formal complaints to the Common Market Group. The validity of the 
indicator could thus be affected if some partners exhibit a greater tendency to 
present complaints than others. Alternatively, regional bodies may be biased 
towards or against some partners. Third, given that LAC blocs tend to be cha-
racterized by significant exemptions among partners, the number of complaints 
does not take into account the fact that those partners who benefit from a larger 
number of exemptions might have a lower need to violate regional agreements.
11  
It is even more challenging to measure and compare practical 
implementation levels within and across blocs.
12 Several attempts have been 
made by regional integration scholars to design indicators of the “success” and 
depth of integration (e.g. Hufbauer and Schott, 1994; Feng and Genna, 2005; 
Ruiz, 2004).
13 However few of these have focused on the issue of 
implementation. One exception is Haftel (2007), who creates an index of 
economic scope and implementation that first considers the stated depth of 
integration of different agreements and then assesses the extent to which these 
are implemented. This index, however, uses the regional organization as the unit 
of analysis, assuming that all countries within the bloc implement agreements to 
the same extent. This is a questionable assumption. 
In order to make more reliable comparisons across countries in terms of 
implementation, I create a composite index or “Implementation Achievement 
Score” (IAS), which assesses a state record in undertakings its regional 
commitments in three main areas: (1) the customs union (implementation of the 
common external tariff); (2) the internal market (removal of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to intra-regional trade of goods and services); and (3) macroeconomic 
convergence (the extent to which it has been able to reach the agreed 
convergence targets). I use an ordinal scale of 0 (no implementation at all) to 4 
(complete implementation) for the first two of these components and a scale of 1 
to 3 for the latter.
14 Perfect compliance would result in an IAS of 11 points. To 
code the achievement of each state (to the year 2005), I rely on progress reports 
published both by individual governments and by the regional organization, 
independent evaluation reports by international organizations, such as ECLAC 
                                                 
11 Focusing on the case of the EU, Borzel (2000) argues that infringements (or complaints) 
data can be used only if it can be assumed that the reported cases represent a random sample of all 
existing cases and that there are no major sources of bias.  
12 Several EU scholars have used the transposition deficit (the rate at which member states 
transpose regional regulations to the domestic level) as a proxy for legal implementation and 
commitment.   
13 See De Lombaerde, Pietrangeli and Weeratunge (2006) for a comprehensive overview of 
different indicators used to monitor progress in regional integration initiatives. 
14 This scale seeks to improve on Haftel’s (2007), which only includes three quite restrictive 
categories.  Obstacles Latin America 
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and the IADB, as well as newspaper reports and other qualitative assessments by 
integration experts.
15  
The results are summarized in Figure 4. The latter shows that there are 
significant variations across LAC countries in terms of the implementation of 
regional commitments (See also Table A1 in Appendix). It also suggests that 
overall levels of implementation are not particularly high within the region. The 
average implementation score for the year 2005 was 6.42. In fact, no country was 
given the top score for (11 points), with top performer Trinidad and Tobago 
obtaining just 9 points. The distribution of the IAS scores seems to cluster around 
the average value, with no cases under 4 or above 9 points. 
Figure 4 also shows that the top performers in terms of compliance are not 
necessarily the best in terms of practical implementation. Patterns of 
implementation seem not to be too consistently related to size, in contrast to what 
enforcement scholars would predict. Figure 5, in turn, suggests that there are also 
important variations within each bloc. The greater variance happens in CAN, 
where Colombia has been quite committed to implementing its agreements, and 
smaller partners Peru and Bolivia have received special treatment since the bloc’s 
inauguration. In contrast, in MERCOSUR partners exhibit consistently low levels 
of implementation of regional agreements. 
If the average IAS is calculated for each bloc (See Figure A2 in the 
Appendix), we find that MERCOSUR is the worst performer with an average 
score of 5, and CACM is the leader with a score of 6.8. However, the differences 
among CACM and CARICOM (6.6) are very small. Figure A2 (See Appendix) 
in fact shows that there are not dramatic differences in overall performance 
among LAC blocs. It would be more interesting, however, to compare the 
implementation record of LAC agreements with other integration schemes 
among developing countries.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 For the CET IAS, I use the following coding rules:  (1) IAS1=0 if no steps taken to 
implement the previously agreed on CET; (2) IAS1= 1 if CET applied to less than 50% of state’s 
trade and high variability in tariff levels; (3) IAS1=2 if CET applied to more than 50% but less than 
85%; (4) IAS1=3 CET applied to over 85% of tariff lines; (5) IAS1= 4 full implementation.  For 
the internal market IAS: (1) IAS2=0 if no concrete steps have been taken to remove tariff and non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) to intra-regional trade of goods and services; (2) IAS2=1 if the state has made 
very little progress in removing barriers to intra-regional trade (e.g. heavy reliance on non-tariff 
barriers, exemption lists, etc.); (3) IAS2=2 if state has liberalized regional trade considerably but 
maintains restrictions, exemption lists and special regimes; (4) IAS2=3 high levels of liberalization 
– if state has liberalized intra-regional trade almost completely but maintain negative lists or 
sectorial exemptions; (5) IAS=4 complete intra-bloc liberalization of goods and services. Finally, 
for macroeconomic convergence: (1) IAS3= 0 if state diverged from target in 10% or more; (2) 
IAS3=1 if state diverged from target in less than 10% and more than 1%; (3) IAS3=2 if state 
diverged from target by 1% or less; (4) IAS3=3 if state met (or surpassed target). I use this coding 
rule for each target and then average the different scores to obtain the final IAS3. Gómez-Mera 
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Figure 4 
Implementation Achievement Score, 2005 
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Figure 5 
Implementation Achievement Score for the main LAC Blocs 
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Explaining Commitment Problems in LAC Agreements 
 
How relevant are the theoretical approaches discussed earlier, typically used to 
explain implementation and compliance problems in the EU, when trying to 
account for the sources of these problems in LAC trade agreements? Statistical 
analysis can be used to test empirically the hypotheses derived from the 
enforcement and management approaches. This analysis uses the state as the unit 
of analysis, which results in a dataset of 26 observations. Given the small number 
of observations, ordinary least squares (OLS) is used. Given the suspect validity 
of the number of reported complaints as an indicator of compliance, the 
discussion here focuses on practical implementation, as proxy for commitment. 
The dependent variable for this analysis is thus the IAS, measured as the progress 
in practically implementing regional commitments (intra-bloc liberalization of 
trade in goods and services, adoption of the CET and macroeconomic 
convergence) up to 2005.  
  The independent variables, their operationalization, and the data sources 
used in their measurement are summarized in Table 1. To test the general 
enforcement hypothesis that states will be more likely to implement and comply 
with agreements when the benefits of participating outweigh the benefits of non-
compliance, I use the variable TRADE DEPENDENCE, measured in terms of 
export reliance on the regional market (exports to the bloc as a proportion of total 
exports).
16 I expect that the more dependent a state is on the bloc for placing its 
exports, the more committed it will be to implementing agreements. To test the 
realist hypothesis on the effects of POWER on compliance and implementation, I 
use real GDP as a proxy for economic power.
17 To test whether being a “regional 
hegemon” affects states’ implementation behavior, I use a dummy variable 
(HEGEMONY) that is 1 if the country is considerably larger than its partners.
18 
Domestic level hypotheses on the role of democracy are tested using the Freedom 
House index of political rights
 (FREEDOM)
19 and the  RULE OF LAW indicator 
from the World Bank’s governance indicators (WBI).
20 WBI Indicators are also 
used to test propositions derived from the management approach. 
                                                 
16 Annual intra-bloc exports as a percentage of total exports. Value for each country is the 
five-year average (2000-2004) of annual export dependence.  
17 GDP at constant 2000 US$ prices. Values are five -year average of annual GDP (2000-
2004). The rest of the independent variables are also averaged (and lagged). 
18 Countries coded as hegemons are: Brazil (MERCOSUR), Colombia and Venezuela (CAN) 
and Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (CARICOM). 
19 See http://www.freedomhouse.org 
20 See http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance. Rule of law is conceptualized as “the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” Gómez-Mera 
 
126
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS seeks to capture the administrative, finan-
cial and technical capacity of the state.
21  
Finally, a number of variables are used to test the globalization and 
external influences hypotheses. I use two indicators to measure external 
vulnerability: OPENNESS, measured as exports and imports as a proportion of 
GDP and as current account as a percentage of GDP. To capture the impact of 
financial globalization and vulnerability to capital flows I use INTERNA-
TIONAL BORROWING, measured as the value of all foreign loans and bonds.
22 
The hypothesis linking the number of free trade agreements that each country has 
signed and its ability and incentives to implement previous regional 
commitments is tested with the variable FTA (the number of free trade 
agreements with LAC and third countries completed to December 2005). The US 
dummy variable is 1 if the country has an agreement with the US.   
  
Table 1  
Summary of Hypotheses, Variables and Data Sources 
 
Theoretical 
Approach 
 
Variable 
 
Measure 
 
Source 
 
1. Enforcement 
 
 
Trade dependence 
 
Intra-bloc X/Total X 
 
BADECEL, WDI 
 
 
Power  preponderance  GDP (constant 2000 
US$) 
WDI 
 
  Power asymmetry  Hegemony (dummy) 
 
 
  Democracy  Rule of Law  WBI 
 
2. Management 
 
 
State capacity 
 
Gov. effectiveness  
Regulatory quality 
 
WBI 
 
 
3. Globalization & 
Vulnerability 
 
 
Trade openness 
 
Current account 
 
Financial vulnerability. 
 
Proliferation of PTAs 
 
 
 
Exports + 
Imports/GDP 
 
CA/GDP 
 
International Loans + 
Bonds 
 
N. of PTAs signed to 
2005 
 
FTA w/US (dummy) 
 
BADECEL, WDI  
 
WDI 
 
WDI 
 
WTO 
 
 
                                                 
21Governance effectiveness is conceptualized as “the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies.”  
22 See Leblang (1997). Obstacles Latin America 
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Results are reported in Table 2. Models 1 and 2 test the two conventional 
approaches, enforcement and management. Models 3-5 add the globalization and 
vulnerability variables to test the claim that globalization affects implementation 
levels. The empirical results suggest, first of all, that there is not a significant 
relationship between economic power and implementation achievements. 
POWER, operationalized as GDP is not significant in models 1 and 2. These 
results challenge neorealist-inspired hypotheses on power preponderance and 
commitment to international agreements. By contrast, the dummy variable 
HEGEMONY is significant in all specifications of the model, suggesting that 
regional hegemons tend to be more committed than their weaker partners.
23 
Controlling for other factors, being a regional hegemon improves the 
implementation score in about 1.8 points (Model 4). 
Second, and consistent with the enforcement approach, the empirical analysis 
shows that there is a positive relationship between TRADE DEPENDENCE and 
implementation achievement. This suggests that the greater the export reliance of 
a state on the regional market, and thus the greater the expected benefits of being 
a member of the bloc, the greater a member state’s commitment to implementing 
regional agreements. The substantive impact of this variable on the index of 
implementation is nevertheless quite small: a 1% increase in trade dependence 
results in an increase of less than 0.04 in the implementation achievement score.  
Third, the findings presented in Table 3 challenge conventional expectations 
on the role of domestic level variables, such as regime type and state capacity on 
implementation of regional agreements. RULE OF LAW was not found to have a 
significant impact on the dependent variable, when controlling for other systemic 
and domestic level factors (See Model 2).
24 The variable GOVERNMENT 
EFFECTIVENESS did not appear to have a significant effect on implementation 
achievement levels, either (Models 2 and 4). These could be seen as challenging 
the management approach argument on state capacity, although it could be well 
argued that other indicators of the latter could lead to more promising results. 
Similar results were, however, obtained using REGULATORY QUALITY and, 
following Borzel et. al. (2006), using real GDP per capita.  
Finally, the empirical analysis supports the argument presented in this paper 
regarding the importance of considering the links between globalization, 
vulnerability and commitment to regional trade agreements. Trade openness has 
a positive and significant impact on implementation achievements, indicating that 
greater trade interdependence creates incentives for states to comply with and 
implement regional trade agreements. Models 3 suggests that the substantive 
                                                 
23 The fact that the coefficient of the variable hegemony is consistently significant (and has a 
positive sign), however, tell us nothing about the extent to which they are able to promote higher 
levels of implementation within their blocs. To study this, it would be necessary to use the regional 
organization as the unit of analysis and to explore the role of hegemony in overall levels of 
implementation/compliance. 
24 The same results were found using FREEDOM instead of RULE OF LAW.                Gómez-Mera 
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impact of this variable might not be very important, however. Nevertheless, this 
result could be seen as providing empirical support for claims that globalization 
promotes regional cooperation. The variable PTA, on the other hand, is 
statistically significant and substantive in models 4 and 5. However, the 
coefficient of PTA does not have the expected sign. The results obtained would 
suggest that the greater the number of agreements a country has signed, the more 
committed it is to its original bloc. This would challenge claims that the 
proliferation of overlapping agreements acts to divert governments’ attention and 
create information and capacity problems. Instead, the empirical findings suggest 
that multiple membership in agreements of different scopes could work to 
increase capacity of implementation, for example. This result could also be 
interpreted as suggesting that increased participation in preferential trade 
agreements leads to an improvement of competitiveness and hence pro-
integration stance of export-oriented sectors. International borrowing, on the 
other hand, seems to have a negative impact on implementation achievement. 
However, this variable does not seem to have a significant impact on the 
dependent variable. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has focused on compliance and implementation gaps in the four main 
regional organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, namely, CACM, 
CAN, MERCOSUR and CARICOM. While frequently acknowledged, the extent 
and sources of these commitment problems have been under-examined. The 
paper seeks to take a step in that direction by applying insights from the 
International Relations literature, and in particular, from work on the EU. While 
the results presented are preliminary and the measurement and coding strategies 
need further refinement, the purpose is to highlight the importance of studying 
these issues systematically and to suggest ways in which to do this. 
The paper begins by clarifying the distinction between the concepts of 
implementation and compliance and the different indicators that can be used to 
measure each of these. Preliminary data on reported complaints against member 
states at the regional administrative and dispute settlement bodies is presented. 
This data suggests that there are significant variations in within-bloc compliance 
levels. To measure implementation, the paper uses an Implementation Achieve-
ment Score, which assesses the progress made by each country in the LAC region 
towards meeting their regional trade commitments. The examination of this 
indicator across a sample of LAC countries suggests that overall levels of 
implementation are low. Although there are not significant differences in the 
average levels of the IAS across blocs, there are marked differences within each 
bloc. 
To account for these cross-national differences, the paper performs a 
preliminary empirical analysis that tests the explanatory power of competing Obstacles Latin America 
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hypotheses derived from International Relations theoretical debates on 
compliance. The results suggest that, consistent with enforcement perspectives, 
trade dependence on the regional market and regional hegemony are important 
explanatory variables for predicting implementation achievements. By contrast, 
limited empirical support is found for hypotheses linking regime type and state 
capacity with implementation. Given that the observation of the distribution of 
the IAS score across countries suggests that smaller states have had greater 
problems implementing agreements, this result could change if an alternative 
proxy for state capacity is used.  
Most importantly, the empirical findings confirm the importance of 
considering exogenous factors in the examination of implementation and 
compliance in international agreements among developing countries. Both 
external vulnerability and the number of PTAs signed by a LAC country appear 
to have a significant effect on its implementation record. Further research will 
focus not only on refining the measurement and operationalization of the 
dependent and independent variables but also on incorporating the temporal 
dimension to the cross-national analysis presented here. Ultimately, however, and 
given the inherent inter-linkages between many of the explanatory factors 
considered here, there are limits to a quantitative approach to the problem of 
compliance and implementation. A qualitative examination of the mechanisms 
through which global economic forces and external power asymmetries interact 
with domestic level variables (not only state capacity and democratic institutions 
but also configurations of domestic political institutions and interests) would 
greatly enhance our understanding of commitment problems in RTAs among 
developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Gómez-Mera 
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Table 2 
OLS Determinants of the Implementation Achievement Score for LAC 
Countries 
2005 
  Y = IAS
Independent Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
TRADE 
DEPENDENCE 
 
 0.026** 
(1.931) 
 
0.029** 
      (1.934) 
 
0.036* 
(2.955) 
 
  0.036*** 
(3.035) 
 
  0.040*** 
(3.428) 
 
 
HEGEMONY 
 
 
 2.032** 
(2.741) 
 
2.205*** 
      (2.909) 
 
 1.902** 
(2.642) 
 
  1.871*** 
(3.516) 
 
  1.729*** 
(3.069) 
 
POWER 
 
-0.0000 
(-1.129)    
 
-0.000 
(1.090) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
GOV. 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 
0.689 
(1.423) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.476 
(1.232) 
 
 
 
REGULATORY 
QUALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
0.730 
(1.412) 
  
 
 
RULE OF LAW 
  
0.492 
(1.190) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPENNESS 
 
  
 
 
 0.032* 
(1.950) 
 
 
 
 
 
PTA 
 
      
    0.724*** 
(3.846) 
 
  1.057*** 
     (4.028) 
 
US 
 
       
-0.938 
(-1.634) 
 
INTERNATIONAL 
BORROWING 
       
0.000 
(0.673) 
 
CONSTANT 
 
   5.552*** 
       
(11.130) 
 
5.512*** 
(10.961) 
 
   4.749*** 
(8.440) 
 
 1.701 
(1.609) 
 
0.570 
(0.501) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
0.26 
 
0.23 
 
0.343 
 
0.533 
 
 
0.54 
 
 
Observations 
 
26 
 
 
26 
 
26 
 
26 
 
 
26 
 
OLS Regressions with two-tailed t-tests. T- statistics in parentheses. ***p <0.01; **p<0.05; 
*p<0.1. 
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TABLE AI: Implementation Achievement Score 
 
 
 
 
 
FTA 
 
CU 
 
MC 
 
Total 
MERCOSUR 5 
Argentina 2 2 1 5 
Brazil 3 2 1 6 
Uruguay 212 5  
Paraguay 211 4  
  
CACM 6.8 
Nicaragua 3 2 1 6 
El Salvador  3 3 3 8 
Guatemala 3 3 2 8 
Honduras 2 1 1 4 
Costa Rica  3 3 2 8 
  
CAN 6 
Bolivia 2 2 1 5 
Ecuador 2 2 2 6 
Colombia 3 3 2 8 
Venezuela 3 3 1 7 
Peru 2 0 2 4 
  
CARICOM 6.6 
Antigua 2 2 2 6 
Barbados 2 3 3 8 
Belize 1 3 2 6 
Dominica 3 2 2 7 
Grenada 2 2 2 6 
Guyana 2 3 2 7 
Jamaica 3 3 1 7 
St. Kitts & Nevis  2 1 2 5 
St. Lucia  2 2 2 6 
St. Vincent & 
Grenadines 
232 7  
Suriname 1 1 3 5 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
333 9  
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Figure A1 
Distribution of IAS Scores 
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Figure A2 
Average IAS by Bloc 
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North America after NAFTA 
 
 
Roberto Domínguez 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the inception of the European integration process five decades ago, scho-
lars have speculated whether or not the European Union (EU) experiment can be 
replicated in other regions of the world.  The answer has varied and a diversity of 
nuances between the two ends of the aisle has appeared: skepticism and enthu-
siasm.  Fortunately, both positions present powerful arguments in their 
explanations. On the one hand, it has been argued that the unique features of the 
EU have been an impediment to comparative analysis. (Sbragia, 7-8).  In this 
light, the EU is different because of its supranational institutions, the qualified 
majority system and its “governance without government, governance without 
money and governance without partisanship.”(Sbragia, 8). However, on the other 
hand, the mere existence of a variety of integration processes around the world 
and its permanent evolution have also encouraged scholars and decision makers 
to debate ideas and implement policies aiming to develop distinct types of re-
gional integration models.  In this regard, how can we define the process of 
regionalization in North America? Is it just a trade cooperation arrangement? Are 
there any other impacts of NAFTA on the regional that have transformed North 
America?  
Based on the experiences of regionalization and integration processes, 
this paper identifies the main transformations North America has undergone as a 
result of the implementation of NAFTA.  The main argument is that the operation 
of NAFTA has set in motion a process of regionalization in North America and 
gradually an increasing number of policies encompass a regional dimension.  In 
such a process, the pivotal actor is the United States, while Canada and Mexico 
are reactive partners who seek to defend their domestic interests as well as ac-
commodate themselves in the regional dynamic led by the United States. The 
emerging regionalism in North America reflects that NAFTA has accomplished 
some of its goals.  Nonetheless, there is an ongoing discussion with regard to the 
expanded agenda of the region and several proposals have been brought to the 
academic and political debate. In this regard, four main sections are considered to 
assess the regionalization of North America. The first introduces some analytical 
elements about the regionalization in North America; the second analyzes the Domínguez 
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conditions for regionalization while the third refers to the effects of NAFTA and 
the fourth evaluates the commitment of the members to deepening regionaliza-
tion.  
 
1. Are regionalization and integration possible beyond the confines of Eu-
rope? 
 
The literature on comparative regionalization and integration is extensive but not 
extensive enough to provide convincing answers to the numerous questions as to 
the genesis, scope and above all, the future of the multiple integration process.  
Some scholars have conducted research to understand the conditions that favor 
the formation of either supranational arrangements or intergovernmental projects; 
others have been seeking to explain the striking differences in the targets and 
contents of regional laws, while a third group of students has been concerned 
with measuring and explaining the efficiency of integration models. (Mattli, 
2005).  The variety of perspectives makes clear that comparative regional inte-
gration studies is a fertile research area and that there is a need to develop more 
systematic research.  Thus, several variables have been taken into account to ex-
plain why countries integrate and what the main obstacles and conditions are to 
deepen integration processes. In a brief review of the literature, it is possible to 
be aware of the vivid debate on the integration in Latin America.   
Based on three scholars, (Haas and Schmitter, 1964; Fawcett, 2004; 
Jayasuriya, 2001), we can observe at least sixteen variables that help to explain 
obstacles and steps forward of the integration process in Latin America.  In a 
seminal article published in the 1960s, Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter sug-
gested nine variables that are more or less consistently present in integration 
processes: size of units, rate of transactions, extent of pluralism, elite comple-
mentarities, governmental purposes, power of union, decision-making style, rate 
of transactions and adaptability of governments. More recently, Louise Fawcett 
considered pertinent three related issues to discuss contemporary regionalism: 
capacity, sovereignty and hegemony.  On the other hand, Kanishka Jayasuriya 
has outlined four central elements of a regional project governance: a stable set 
of international economic strategies, a distinctive set of governance structures 
which enables regional economic governance, a set of ideational constructs to 
make possible the regional governance and the definition of region, and a con-
vergence of domestic coalitions and political economy structures across the 
region (Jayasuriya, 2001).  
The variety of variables taken into account reflects the complexity of the 
integration processes.  Many of them are interrelated and are more or less rele-
vant depending on the specific case to be studied.  Some others are unrelated or 
less significant for specific cases. In this regard, in order to study integration 
processes, the sixteen variables can grouped in three main areas: a) conditions for NAFTA 
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the integration process, b) institutional regional structure, and c) commitment of 
the members. 
 
2. Conditions for Integration: North America after NAFTA 
 
One the basic conditions for creating or deepening an integration process is the 
perception of benefits derived from it. NAFTA has set in motion a process of 
regionalization divided in two main stages: NAFTA-ization and North-Ameri-
canization. Both concepts attempt to reflect the changes in North America and 
are based on the concept of Europeanization, which can be broadly defined as 
bargains between states leading to ongoing political adjustment within states.  In 
the case of Europe, it can refer to the reciprocal influence of European integration 
and the domestic politics of its member states, in either top-down or bottom-up 
terms.  In fact, the original concept of NAFTA-ization is operational for the pur-
poses of studying NAFTA and its reverberations in the three economies of the 
region. Its proponent, Mark Aspinwall, defines it as follows: “it is about political 
change, not about social or economic change (such as growth in migration or 
trade). The underlying hypothesis is that regional agreements between states set 
in motion a process of domestic political adjustment, which is likely to vary ac-
cording to the nature of the agreement” (Aspinwall, 6). 
The contribution of Aspinwall lies in the study of the effects of NAFTA in 
the three countries and points out that the domestic political adjustments have 
been more numerous in Mexico and Canada than in the United States.  However, 
in order to reach a more comprehensive perspective of North America as a re-
gion, there is a conceptual demand to expand the themes of the agenda beyond 
the strict impacts of NAFTA. 
Along with Aspinwall’s conceptualization, from the perspective of this essay 
NAFTA-ization corresponds to the first stage of the regionalization of North 
America. In this stage, the priority is the development of mechanisms and poli-
cies aimed at increasing NAFTA related exchanges. Unlike the European model, 
based on a combination of supranational and intergovernmental institutions, 
North America has initially evolved as a region driven by the economic rationale 
of free trade. The Prime Minister of Canada has emphatically reiterated his view 
in this regard: 
 
To Harper (Prime Minister of Canada), “there is a clear difference 
between European integration, driven by that of continent’s political and 
intellectual elites, and North American integration, driven by well, by 
our business elites. It’s not a case of the leaders of the countries seeking 
to impose this upon society and upon the economy… What it is the case 
of is the business community, in particular, increasingly inviting us to 
cooperate more fully and to address a lot of inadequacies in NAFTA” 
(Wells, 2006). Domínguez 
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Prime Minister Harper sheds some light about the limitations of NAFTA in 
comparison to the European integration.  However, three comments can be made 
about his remarks. The first is that the concept of integration has several implica-
tions from the economic and political standpoints, namely, supranational 
institutions; these elements are absent in the architecture of North America.  The 
second is that NAFTA has not been a fixed agreement frozen in time and space; 
conversely, it has impacted a variety of aspects in the economic and political life 
of the three partners beyond the strict business agenda.  
Thus, the second stage of the regionalization of NAFTA is the North-Ameri-
canization of the region. Unlike the first stage, in this case, four elements play a 
crucial role: 1) deeper interdependence, 2) NAFTA-related political adjustments, 
3) bureaucratic and civil society learning process about the region, and 4) the 
demands for coordination of policies (security) beyond the commercial track. 
Therefore, while there are no prospects of European style integration in North 
America, it could be argued that NAFTA has paved the way for the regionaliza-
tion of North America.   
On the other hand, the perceptions of the citizens play a relevant role in set-
ting the conditions for an integration process.  One of the expectations of citizens 
is that their opinions and political preferences will be reflected in public policies.  
Scholars argue from different standpoints that democracies tend to represent the 
common interest of their constituents. However, it is common that in the complex 
policymaking process there are mismatches between expectations and policies. In 
the case of foreign policy, sometimes the “wisdom” of politicians leads to poli-
cies that are contrary to the opinion of their constituents. The effects can be either 
harmful (invasion of Iraq) or beneficial (European integration) for the society 
affected by those decisions.  
Public opinion is a helpful instrument to illustrate how citizens perceive their 
counterparts in the region. How, then, does public opinion perceive NAFTA and 
North America as a region? Based upon several surveys conducted in the three 
countries, a general trend indicates that public opinion tends to see negatively 
globalization and economic regionalization because both can affect local jobs. 
What is interesting is that most of the legal implementations of NAFTA have 
already taken place and actually economic threats such as outsourcing are more 
likely to occur in India or China.  For instance, in the case of the United States, a 
2006 survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that 
with regard to globalization 60% of Americans see globalization as mostly good 
for the United States. However, 49% of Americans say that international trade 
overall is bad for the environment, and 60% say that trade is bad for creating jobs 
within the United States. On the other hand, 67% say it is bad for job security for 
American workers, and 72% say that outsourcing is bad because American work-
ers lost their jobs to people in other countries (Global Views, 2006).  
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On the other hand, a September 2004 survey conducted by Queen’s Univer-
sity School of Policy Studies showed that 67% of Canadians found that the 
irritations of free trade with the United States were a cost Canada would have to 
pay in order to get good access to world markets (COMPAS, 2004). When asked 
whether their country was a winner or a loser with regards to NAFTA, a 2005 
survey showed that 60% of Canadians saw their country as a loser, up from 47% 
in 2002.  Seventy percent of Canadians support NAFTA and 75% supports in-
creasing trade between the three countries (Weber, n.p.). In the case of Mexico, 
with regard to NAFTA, 70 percent of the public believes that the United States 
has benefited the most from NAFTA. Forty-four percent believe NAFTA has 
been good for the economy, 50% believe it has been good for business, and 49% 
it has been good for job creation. Sixty-four percent of Mexicans support 
NAFTA. 
Beyond the theme of NAFTA, the abrasive role of U.S. foreign policy since 
2003 provoked negative opinions around the world.  However, in the case of its 
two neighbors there is a positive perception to enhance cooperation in the field of 
security. From the Canadian perspective, a 2005 Pew Research Center Survey 
(Pew Research Center, June 23, 2005) found that 59% of Canadians have a fa-
vorable opinion of the United States, down from 72% in 2002. However, in 2005, 
only 19% of Canadians believed that the U.S. foreign policy took the interests of 
their country into consideration. With regard to security, 74% of Canadians be-
lieve that Canada should adopt U.S. immigration and import control procedures 
to keep the border between the two countries open.  In the case of Mexico, re-
garding terrorism, Mexicans believe that they should help in the War on Terror in 
the following ways: permit American agents to work with Mexican agents in 
guarding Mexican airports, ports, and borders; increase Mexico’s entrance and 
exit requirements for people from other countries; and increase control on the 
movement of goods through Mexican airports, ports, and borders.  
 
3. Institutional Regional Structure: The effects of NAFTA 
 
Since NAFTA came into force in 1994, there has been a vivid debate about its 
effects on the three countries.  The explanation about it would vary based upon 
the ideological perspective and the selection and use of indexes, dependent and 
independent variables.  However, the middle ground assessment would suggest 
that both positive and negative effects and that not all the harm in the region can 
be attributed to NAFTA. Table 1 summarizes the main debates about its effects. 
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Table 1  
Debates about the effects of NAFTA 
NAFTA Debate  Cavanagh and Anderson  Serra and Espinosa 
Wages  11 percent slide in real wages in 
Mexico, manufacturing wages 
lower in 2000 than in 1981. 82 
percent rural poverty rate in 
Mexico (1998) and 58 percent 
of Mexicans live in Poverty 
(1999). In 1999, wages in the 
factory were at $1.74 an hour, 
lower than the national wage of 
$2.12 an hour. 
Wages for 1981 distorted due to 
over inflation of Peso, hourly 
wages at a factory have gained 
8.4 percent over pre-NAFTA 
levels. Mexican firms exporting 
more than 80 percent of profits 
paid between 58-67% higher 
wages than average wage rate 
(1994-1996). 
Tariffs  US Corn imports have 
devastated small farmers in 
Mexico. NAFTA requires a 
removal of protectionist 
barriers, which means there will 
be no protections by 2008, and 
the Mexico market will be 
flooded with US Corn. 
Only a certain amount of corn 
will be allowed to enter Mexico 
duty free; the rest is subject to a 
tariff, which amounts to 162 
percent of the US corn entering 
Mexico.  
Unions and Labor  The globalized marketplace 
allows employers to suppress 
the rights of workers in Mexico. 
Attempts to unionize are met 
with violent crackdowns by the 
owners and police. The agency 
set up under NAFTA has been 
unable to hold governments or 
corporations responsible for 
their workers’ rights violations. 
NAFTA’s side agreement on 
labor was always intended to 
protect workers’ rights while 
preventing the use of labor-
related claims as protectionism. 
Labor unions have had greater 
political independence since 
NAFTA, and were a factor in the 
election of the opposition leader 
in 2000. 
Environment Mexican  government 
investment in environmental 
protection has declined about 
45 percent since 1994, and the 
NAFTA committee only gives 
$3 million a year in funding for 
projects. Attempts to deal with 
pollution have resulted in 
lawsuits by corporations. 
Public investment has been 
declining due to budgetary 
restraints. The trade 
liberalization of Mexico will 
eventually lead to more funding 
for environment protection. It is 
important to prevent 
protectionist measures that might 
be used to punish polluters. 
Taken from: J. Enrique Espinosa, Jaime Serra, John Cavanagh, and Sarah Anderson, “Happily Ever 
NAFTA?” Foreign Policy (September/October 2002), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2458&print=1  
Elaborated by: Carlyn Jorgensen  
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In the 1990, Mexico revealed its intention to negotiate a free trade agreement 
with the United States. This decision challenged “all previous conceptions of 
Mexico-U.S. relations” (Gustavo Vega and Luz María de la Mora, 171).
 Fifteen 
years later, NAFTA has lost its uniqueness since both Mexico and the United 
States have implemented a network of free trade agreements with other countries 
and regions.  On the other hand, it has become clear that creating winners and 
losers is the natural consequence of the logic of free markets, and NAFTA is not 
the exception. Sidney Weintraub has said that “NAFTA has not been a pana-
cea… it must be assessed for what it is…. a trade and investment agreement that 
succeeded in its central purpose” (Weintraub, 126). 
Most of the publications in this field recognize the successes of NAFTA.  
Between 1993 and 2000, for instance, trade in the NAFTA region increased from 
$289 billion to $659 billion.  Trade flows between the United States and Canada 
reached $411 billion and between Mexico and the United States $263 billion in 
2000.  Mexican exports to the United States and Canada grew by an outstanding 
234 percent and 203 percent respectively between 1993 and 2002 (US Trade 
Representative, 2004, 2). Today, twenty-two U.S. states have Mexico as either 
the first or second market for their exports.  For nine others Mexico is their third 
most important export destination (NAFTA Works, September 2004, 1). With 
regard to total FDI flows between the three countries, they amounted to $63 bil-
lion between 1989 and 1994; during 1995-2000, total flows increased to $202 
billion, tripling in dollar volume. 
On the other hand, the connection between trade liberalization and invest-
ment growth is illustrated by three sectors where commercial ties have been 
relatively more extensive: the automotive industry, textiles and clothing, and the 
electronic industry. “In these three sectors, deeper integration is clearly evident 
between the three economies” (Gustavo Vega-Cánovas, 3).
  
However, despite the success indicated by the macroeconomic data, some 
criticisms emerge in the interpretation of these numbers.  For instance, “In the 12 
years since NAFTA was ratified, the yearly U.S. trade deficit with Mexico and 
Canada has grown from $9.1 billion to $110.8 billion” (Meyerson, 2005). In this 
vein, a study conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
shows the following findings: a) NAFTA has not helped the Mexican economy 
keep pace with the growing demand for jobs (500,000 jobs were created in manu-
facturing from 1994 to 2002, while the agricultural sector has lost 1.3 million 
jobs since 1994); b) real wages for most Mexicans today are lower than when 
NAFTA took place (caused by the peso crisis); c) there has been an increase in 
the number of migrants to the United States (although not necessarily as a result 
of NAFTA) (Audley, Papademetriou, Polaski, and Vaughan, 2003. 4-7).  
From the U.S. government’s perspective, officials have admitted the quali-
fied success of NAFTA.  As one U.S. official pointed out, “In fact, the result is 
that NAFTA has been virtually job neutral.  Given what most reputable econo-Domínguez 
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mist say about the employment effects on NAFTA, that finding is not surprising” 
(Aldanas, 2004, 7). 
Perhaps one of the assessments in which most of the analysts agree is with 
regard to Mexico.  Whereas wages in Mexican export-related industries are 37 
percent higher than the rest of the economy, (US Trade Representative, July 1, 
2004), the gap that existed when NAFTA came into effect widened instead of 
narrowed.  In 2001, seven years after the implementation of NAFTA, “Mexican 
manufacturing salaries went from $2.10 an hour versus $11.7 an hour in the 
United States to $1.90 an hour versus $13.80 an hour in the United States” (Ben-
susán, 2004, 126). In March 2005, in the context of the Tri-national Summit, 
Harold Meyerson stated: “Since NAFTA was enacted, real wages for Mexicans 
have declined, the nation’s poverty rate has increased, and illegal immigration to 
the United States has soared.  For both Mexican and American workers, NAFTA 
has been a lose-lose proposition.  For the U.S. corporations that have outsourced 
their work to Mexico, though, NAFTA has been a clear profit center” (Meyerson, 
March 30, 2005). 
Other less quantitative affects should not be overlooked. NAFTA is a very 
detailed and precise agreement, containing 22 chapters and numerous annexes 
establishing the obligations of member states. NAFTA creates strong pressure to 
harmonize tariffs, update rules of origin and harmonize other standards in order 
to promote trade. Legal changes were required in all three member states as a 
result of NAFTA. The three countries scheduled changes in order to implement 
NAFTA provisions. Some examples are the provisions in Chapter 19. However, 
Mexican adjustments were more profound. For instance, national laws were 
changed in areas such as telecommunications, intellectual property rights, auto-
motive sector, competition, monetary policy, inward investment, and others 
(Aspinwall, 2007, 7-8). To some extent, this is what Clarkson called the “Ameri-
canization of Mexican Law (Clarkson, 2002, 25-26). 
With regard to the side agreements, most scholars agree that the environ-
mental one - the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC) (North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 2005)- 
has had a limited impact on the region since it was not designed to significantly 
reverse the environmental consequences of economic growth in Mexico.  How-
ever, it may be taken into account as a pilot project to examine the effectives of 
institutions designed for Mexico and other nations where trade-led growth needs 
to be channelled in a more environmentally-friendly fashion. 
One of the parameters for assessing the environmental side agreement is 
through its institutional performance.  The NACEC has two mechanisms that 
provide additional means to monitor the enforcement of environmental laws in 
North America.  The first mechanism is through Article 14 and 15.  Under this 
mechanism, 43 cases have been filed under articles 14 and 15 as of February 
2004.  There were 7 active files against Mexico, 4 against Canada, and none 
against the United States.  With regard to the closed files, 14 were against Mex-NAFTA 
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ico, 10 against Canada and 8 against the United States (Council for 
Environmental Cooperation, June 15, 2004). The second mechanism is Article 
22, which allows any of the three NAFTA governments to enter into a dispute 
resolution process with parties that persistently fail to enforce environmental 
laws.  According to Article 22, nations found in violation can be fined and after a 
long process can eventually have NAFTA privileges suspended. However, this 
Article has never been invoked (Gallagher, 2004, 77).   
In addition to the mechanisms, few NACEC’s programs have modestly con-
tributed to increased funding, monitoring, and citizen participation.  NACEC’s 
Fund for Pollution Prevention Projects in Mexican Small and Medium Size En-
terprises (FIPREV), and its North America Fund for Environmental Cooperation 
(NAFEC) are both sources of funds for industry and communities (Ibid, 75). In 
light of the modest contributions of the environmental side agreement, Hufbauer 
and Schott have stated that “without NAFTA, the Mexican government would 
have had less incentive to pass environmental legislation or to improve its en-
forcements efforts, and the achievements, modest though they are, of 
Commission on Environmental Cooperation, NADBank, and BECC would not 
exist”( Hufbauer and Schott, 2002). 
On the other hand, the Commission for Labor Cooperation was created under 
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) (North Ameri-
can Agreement on Labor Cooperation, January 23, 2005). The outcomes of the 
NAALC have been rather disappointing due to both their design as well as im-
plementation.  Some of the obstacles are the following: a) there is no intent to 
harmonize worker’s rights, which allows each country to maintain its respective 
comparative advantages; b) there are no independent powers to supervise na-
tional authorities in the enforcement of labor laws and regulations; c) restrictions 
on protecting the 11 NAALC principles limit the application of sanctions to only 
three cases (child labor, minimum salaries, and safety and hygiene standards in 
the workplace) and leave collective rights unprotected; d) slowness of the arbi-
tration process, and e) procedural disparity in each of the National Administrative 
Office (NAO) (Bensusán, 128-129).      
The NAOs have received a total of 25 complaints.  The distribution of the 
total number of complaints by country from 1995 to 2001 supports the initial 
assumption that Mexico is the country with the greatest challenges in complying 
with labor laws (16 complaints), followed by the United States (7 complaints) 
and Canada (2 complaints). The decrease in the number of complaints (4 in 1994, 
1 in 1995, 2 in 1996, 3 in 1997, 10 in 1998, 2 in 1999, 1 in 2000, 2 in 2001, and 
none in 2002) demonstrates the loss of interest by trade union organizations in 
Mexico and the United States in testing the effectiveness of this instrument.  In 
1998, the NAALC became more dynamic because of the intensification of trans-
border labor union cooperation (Bensusán, 130).  
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Some of the concrete achievements resulting from the labor agreement are: 
pressure on Mexican authorities to implement a public registry of collective con-
tracts; the imposition of a fine by Mexican authorities against a company (Hang 
Young) due to a violation of safety and hygiene standards; easing of the preg-
nancy testing requirement in maquiladoras; easing the practice of denouncing a 
worker’s migratory status by work inspectors in the United States (Bensusán, 
131). 
 
4. Commitment of the Members: Security and Prosperity Partnership 
 
At the decision-making or governmental level, the prescription is that North 
America needs a cautious adaptation.  On March 23, 2005, Presidents Bush and 
Fox and Prime Minister Martin announced the establishment of the “Security and 
Prosperity Partnership for North America” (White House, March 23, 2005). Un-
like lofty official declarations, it is remarkable that ministerial-level working 
groups were established to identify concrete, measurable and achievable steps 
towards the Partnership’s goals.  By June 2005, the ministers will issue their ini-
tial reports and thereafter the groups will report semi-annually.  
One of the most relevant statements of the Partnership is the “Two-Speed 
European Style.” The document considers that “The Partnership is trilateral in 
concept; while allowing any two countries to move forward on an issue, it will 
create a path for the third to join later.” Likewise, the official proposal does not 
include any reference to migration or institutional development of any kind.  
As indicated in its title, the North American partnership is divided into two 
sections.  The first focuses on common security encompassing the following as-
pects: a) implementing common border security and bio-protection strategies; b) 
enhancing critical infrastructure protection, and implementing a common ap-
proach to emergency response; c) implementing improvements in aviation and 
maritime security, combating transnational threats and enhancing intelligence, 
and d) implementing a border-facilitation strategy to improve the legitimate flow 
of people and cargo.  The second part of the partnership highlights four aspects 
of economic prosperity: a) improving productivity through regulatory coopera-
tion to generate growth; b) promoting collaboration in energy, transportation, 
financial services, technology; c) reducing the cost of trade through the efficient 
movement of goods and people; and d) creating safer and more reliable food 
supply while facilitating agricultural trade and enhancing the stewardship of the 
regional environment. 
  It is interesting to note that the in the process of regionalization the trila-
teral annual meetings have become part of the agenda.  The last meeting of the 
leaders was held in Cancun, Mexico, in March 2006, and the next meeting is set 
for sometime in 2007 in Ottawa, Canada. In Cancun, the three leaders discussed 
economic integration of the three countries, border security, energy security, 
emergency management, strengthening competitiveness through the North NAFTA 
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American Competitiveness Council, and preparing for the Bird Flu and other 
pandemics.  
  As a preface of the trilateral meeting in Canada, in February 2007 in Ot-
tawa, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Canadian Minister of Affairs, 
Peter MacKay, and Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, Patricia Espinosa, 
met to discuss the issues they felt were important for the upcoming summit. The 
issues they discussed included public health problems, environmental threats, 
natural disasters, clean energy, and combating criminal organizations. At a press 
conference, Secretary Rice stated that the United States and Mexico are con-
cerned about each other’s prosperity, and that in order to solve the problem of 
illegal immigration into the US, it is important to bring prosperity and develop-
ment to Mexico so Mexicans can work in their country and provide for their 
families. The three also answered questions about Iran and the role of Canada 
and Mexico in the War on Terror.  
Although it is still early to asses their scope, there are three intergovernmen-
tal regional institutions that may catalyze the interconnections in the area. The 
first is the North American Competitiveness Council, which was created to con-
sider issues that could be addressed on a trilateral or bilateral level, provide long-
term advice, provide input on compatibility of the security and prosperity agen-
das, and offer ideas on the private sector’s role in promoting North American 
Competitiveness.  
The second is the North American Energy Working Group- this was orga-
nized in 2001 and incorporated as part of the SPP in March 2005. The NAWEG 
has nine expert groups working on areas such as electricity, energy efficiency, 
hydrocarbons, natural gas trade, nuclear collaboration, oil sands, regulatory ex-
perts, and science and technology. The third is the North American Steel Trade 
Committee (NASTC) - this was formed in 2002, and incorporated into the SPP 
into March 2005. The NASTC is supposed to direct and launch a North Ameri-
can steel strategy to deal with the global steel market and government 
interference into it. It is supposed to work with the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to eliminate distortions negatively af-
fecting the North American steel markets. 
 
Final thoughts  
 
Twenty years ago, the intent of this article perhaps would be centered on the 
problematic cooperation between North and South as reflected in the relationship 
between Mexico and the United States.  A decade ago, the inquiries might have 
been focused on the uncertainties of the nascent North American Free Trade 
Agreement.  In 2008, it is accepted by most scholars and decision-makers that 
NAFTA must be revisited. 
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The options for North America analyzed in this paper resemble the old and 
new European debates about regional integration.  On the one hand, there are the 
skeptical ideas which reject regional formulas entailing any evolution beyond 
free trade.  Historically, sooner or later, such ideas eroded and were eventually 
replaced by more integration-oriented approaches in the European experience.  
On the other hand, regionally oriented perspectives that privilege collective solu-
tions for facing the challenges of an interdependent world have shown that 
integration is possible.  A similar debate along these lines is currently taking 
place in North America. 
Despite the disagreements in the proposals for North America, there is also 
some consensus that we can foresee as taking place in the short term. A “selec-
tive customs union” and further cooperation in the security seem to be at the 
forefront of the pragmatic agenda. Other attempts in this direction may have al-
ready started in an embryonic fashion, such as the reports to the three Executives 
that will be delivered next June in the context of the North American Partnership. 
Perhaps in 2010 the substance of a seminar like this will be different, hopefully 
more focused in deepening integration in North America.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CARICOM:  Coming of Age? 
 
 
Wendy Grenade 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The contemporary global political economy is characterized by synergies and 
dichotomies between globalism and regionalisms. While this is not new, it has 
taken on added currency in recent years with the intensification of globalization 
and trade liberalization.  As Hettne and  Söderbaum (2002:33) contend, regional 
integration is “…a complex process of change simultaneously involving state as 
well as non-state actors and occurring as a result of global, regional, national and 
local level forces.”  For them, regions are viewed as “emerging phenomenon, 
ambiguously both forming part of and driving, as well as reacting against and 
modifying the global order.” The European Union (EU) is the most advanced and 
sophisticated regional project and provides a useful reference point, as a model of 
governance beyond the sovereign state. This paper argues, however, that the 
motivation for regionalism in the North is different from that in the South.  As 
Hettne et al (2001: 5) remind us, core regions are coherent, politically strong, 
well organized at the supranational level, not only economically growing but 
leading in technological innovation.  Core regions are ‘policy-makers’ which 
organize for the sake of being better able to control the rest of the world, the 
world outside of their own region and compete among themselves in exercising 
this influence.  Peripheral regions are ‘policy-takers’ since they are politically 
more turbulent and economically more stagnant.  Consequently they have to 
organize in order to stop the threat of marginalization.  At the same time their 
regional arrangements are fragile and ineffective.  
Therefore, for the developing world, regional integration is both necessary 
and problematic. While this is not new, global forces have generated renewed 
urgency for integration in the South. Within this context the paper examines the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
1 As the Caribbean seeks to navigate the 
                                                 
1 Four member states signed the initial Treaty of Chaguaramas which established CARICOM 
in 1973:  Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.  In 1974 CARICOM widened to 
include thirteen states:  Antigua and Barbuda,  Belize, Dominica, Grenada,  Montserrat, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The Commonwealth of the Bahamas 
became the thirteenth member state in 1983, Suriname, the fourteenth  in 1995 and Haiti, the 
fifteenth in 2002.   Grenade 
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global environment regional integration continues to be a necessary imperative.  
As such there have been concrete steps toward deeper  integration, for example,  
the establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) and the launch of the 
Caribbean Single Market (CSM) in 2005 and 2006 respectively.  Yet, despite 
those visible attempts to deepen integration,  the emerging institutional design 
still caters for a minimalist
2 form of integration. The paper argues that after 
thirty-four years, the Caribbean is coming of age, but with inherent deficiencies. 
The paper is structured in three parts. Following this introduction the first 
section examines some theoretical imperatives. Second, it analyses the current 
state of Caribbean integration, mindful of the significance of the EU model as a 
frame of reference. The final section offers conclusions and suggestions for 
further research.     
 
Theoretical Imperatives 
 
There is an ongoing debate as to what is ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalization’. The 
New Regionalism Theory (NRT)  distinguishes between these two concepts. On 
the one hand, ‘regionalism’ represents the body of ideas, values and concrete 
objectives that are aimed at creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of 
security and wealth, peace and development within a region.  On the other hand, 
‘regionalization’ denotes the empirical process which can be defined as a process 
of change from relative heterogeneity and lack of cooperation towards increased 
cooperation, integration, convergence, coherence and identity in a variety of 
fields such as culture, security, economic development and politics within a 
given geographic space (Schultz, et al., 2000:5).   
 
Regional Integration and Development 
 
Scholars in the developing world have often stressed the relationship between 
integration and development. As Axline (1977) indicates, while classical theories 
have been successfully applied to Western Europe, in the case of the developing 
world, an understanding of regional integration requires a different theoretical 
approach born out of an understanding of the world’s political economy.  In this 
context, regional integration is viewed as ‘collective self reliance’ which pro-
vides member countries with a stronger platform with which to interact with the 
global economy and pursue relations with other groups and countries. This 
perspective underscores the point that regional integration is not an end in itself 
but can be evaluated in terms of its contribution to development.  
                                                 
2 Term adapted from Selwyn Ryan who refers to ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ in the context 
of the reform of the Westminster system in the Caribbean.  See Selwyn Ryan (1999).  
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With the emergence of the NRT the concept of ‘development regionalism’ 
has gained potency. There are seven main arguments for development 
regionalism. First, is the sufficient size argument. That is, regionalism is 
imperative, particularly in the case of micro-states which either have to cooperate 
to solve common problems or become client states of the ‘core countries’.   
Second, the NRT agues that self-reliance is rarely viable on the national level.  
However, it may yet be a feasible development strategy at the regional level, if it 
is defined as coordination of production, improvement of infrastructure and 
making use of complementarities.  
Third, NRT holds that economic policies may be more stable and consistent 
if underpinned by regional arrangements which cannot be broken by a participant 
country without some kind of sanctions from the others.  This refers to the 
credibility argument.  Fourth, collective bargaining on the regional level could 
improve the economic position of marginalized countries in the world system, or 
protect the structural position and market access of successful export countries. 
Fifth, regionalism can counter the disruptions caused by globalization and 
uneven development, reinforcing societal viability by including social security 
issues and an element of redistribution in the regionalist project. Thus the social 
stability argument refers to the allocation of regional funds to support less 
developed economies within the regional movement.  
Sixth, regional environmental security complexes constitute imperatives for 
regional cooperation.  Finally, successful regional conflict resolution could 
eliminate distorted investment patterns, making resources locked in the ‘security 
fund’ (military expenditures) available for more productive use (the peace 
dividend argument).  As such, regionalism can become a factor counteracting 
hegemony and preventing non-democratic trends in the periphery (Hettne, et al 
2001:36-37).  
Against this background, the large question is, what type of regional projects 
are emerging in the South in the contemporary era and to what extent are they 
modelled after the EU? The following section uses the case of the CARICOM to 
discuss these questions. 
 
The Case of the Caribbean
3 
 
Any discussion of Caribbean integration, must take into account the historical 
legacy of the region. The Caribbean territories began their association with mod-
ern society as “the pawn of European power politics” or in other words as the 
“appendage” or “satellite” of European imperialism (Williams, 1970:69). As Eu-
ropean imperial power waned and the Cold War began the United States claimed 
                                                 
3 For purposes of this chapter the Caribbean refers to the fifteen member states of the 
Caribbean Community:  Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica,  Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. Grenade 
 
148
the Caribbean region within its special sphere of influence.  Three distinct his-
torical legacies can be identified:  economic dependence, an adversarial political 
culture and social relations based on class and race. The historical development 
of the region has produced a civilization of a special type.  The region is simulta-
neously characterized by unity and diversity.  Yet it is an area characterized by 
“instability; political and economic fragmentation; constitutional diversity; eco-
nomic, psychological, cultural and in some cases political dependence; large-
scale unemployment; racial tension; potential religious conflicts and the restless-
ness of youth…” (Williams, 1970:503). Therefore, regional integration becomes 
both necessary and problematic. 
A major challenge is in the area of intra-regional trade. Given historical 
factors, Caribbean economies trade more with Europe and the United States than 
with one another. For example, CARICOM’s intra-regional exports, as a 
percentage of total exports – which is an index of integration – for the years 
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 2000 was 8.54 percent; 8.92 percent, 12.99 percent; 
12.37 percent and 15.7 percent respectively.  When compared to other regions 
this is relatively minuscule.  For example, intra-regional exports as a total 
percentage of total exports in the NAFTA region climbed from around 30 percent 
in 1982 to 58 percent in 2002 (Pastor, 2005:5).  
Uneven development is another factor.  Trinidad and Tobago is the dominant 
exporting country in the CARICOM region.  Between 1981 and 2001 that 
country exported 56.7 percent of total intra-regional exports.  Other major 
exporters were the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
4 with 14.1 
percent; Barbados with 12.2 percent; Jamaica with 10.4 percent and Guyana with 
4.2 percent.  During the same period, Jamaica was the dominant importing 
country in terms of intra-regional trade, with approximately 20.9 percent.  The 
OECS contributed 29.9 percent of total intra-regional imports; Barbados 17.8 
percent; Trinidad and Tobago, 16 percent and Guyana, 11.3 percent (CARICOM, 
2005:115-116).  What this suggests is that intra-CARICOM trade centres largely 
around Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica which are the two largest economies.  
It is necessary to note that given small size the CARICOM region has relatively 
limited capacity to exploit economies of scale.  
 
The Early Federal Experiment 
 
Although there were very early attempts at integration,
5 the West Indian 
Federation (1958-62) among ten former British colonies is usually cited as one of 
                                                 
4 The OECS comprises Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and The Grenadines. 
5For example the 1833-1958 Windward Island Federation (Grenada, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, St. Lucia and Tobago) and the 1871-1956 Leeward Island Federation 
(Antigua and Barbuda, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla and Dominica)   Emerging CARICOM 
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the key moments in the process of Caribbean integration. This early experiment 
was part of a wider British project which was aimed to curtail the costs of empire 
for a weakened post-war Britain while seeking to minimize the impact of 
decolonialization on the small island economies unable to survive on their own.  
However, a convergence of factors led to the early demise of the Federation in 
1962.  Writers have cited many political, economic, socio-cultural and 
geographic factors for the short-lived federal venture (Lewis, 1968; Williams, 
1970). One such factor was the position of the Jamaica Labour Party which led to 
a referendum and that country pulling out of the Federation. 
There was also lack of any great commitment by local politicians to cede 
power to the center. In essence, there was unwillingness of insular political 
leaders “to have the spotlight shifted from them to the federal leaders” (Williams, 
1970:513). Instead what emerged in the twentieth century was a fierce sense of 
nationalism where political leaders had a desire for independence and not to 
belong to a supranational organization.  This was influenced by developments in 
the post emancipation period which saw the rise of nationalist movements in the 
Caribbean.  The early demise of the Federation has left a psychological scar 
which has contributed to the relatively slow pace of integration. 
 
CARICOM: Stepping into or sliding out of the Future? 
 
At the end of 2006 Edward Seaga, the former prime minister of Jamaica, 
commented on what he referred to as “CARICOM sliding out of the future.”
 6  
According to Seaga, at the present level, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
functions in “pieces and patches” without any overriding authoritative 
machinery. He observed that all major decisions are made in the “round-about 
process of agreement”, first at the level of the cabinets of member governments, 
then regional Heads of Government meetings. Seaga noted that while 
participating governments are willing to meet at the level of Heads of 
Government and arrive at a consensus on issues, they are not willing to cede 
absolute authority on vital issues which will affect their home base. Seaga 
observed that CARICOM’s answer to the lack of authoritative leadership is the 
[proposed] establishment of a CARICOM Commission with super powerful 
public officials appointed to take decisions in prescribed matters “as if they were 
a single regional CARICOM Cabinet overriding the national executive of 
member countries.”
7 He cautioned, however, that anyone who believes that this 
would work does not understand the psyche of Caribbean leaders nor, indeed, the 
people. Seaga continued to make the point that those who argue for this structure 
point to the functioning, workable example of the EU. They considered that the 
                                                 
6 Edward Seaga. ‘CARICOM Sliding out of the future.” Jamaica Gleaner. December 31, 
2006. (http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20061231/lead/lead8.html) accessed January 19, 
2007. 
7 Ibid. Grenade 
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success of the EU means that CARICOM can work in that way. But, in Seaga’s 
view, the EU is a relatively homogeneous group of nations with all members 
having broadly similar levels of development. Wide dissimilarities are ruled out 
in the membership process for admission. Member countries have to ensure that 
they meet the minimum criteria for membership. He compared CARICOM today 
to the early demise of the West Indian Federation in 1962 and cautioned that 
CARICOM is likely to face “a slide, not a climb, in the future.”
 8 
To what extent does Seaga’s pessimism reflect CARICOM’s reality? 
CARICOM’s Secretary-General, Edwin Carrington (2006), shares a different 
view. He points out that the recently launched Caribbean Single Market (CSM)
9  
is the “most ambitious undertaking” that CARICOM has ever attempted. 
Carrington acknowledges that the challenge to sustain Caribbean development 
remains as formidable as ever. However, he contends that CARICOM is “not 
lying down in the face of those challenges. [Instead] the Caribbean is putting its 
house in order even as it reaches out to strengthen its ties with its traditional 
partners and to develop stronger links with the new ones…”  
The above represent two extreme views.  This paper seeks to offer a balanced 
account of the state of Caribbean integration.  To do so, this section looks at the 
three goals of CARICOM as outlined in the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas:   
economic integration; functional cooperation and foreign policy coordination.   
 
Economic Integration 
 
Economic integration is problematic for CARICOM. The 1973 Treaty of 
Chaguaramas provided for a common market which never materialized within 
the first thirty years of CARICOM.  Cognizant of global imperatives, CARICOM 
Heads of Government through the 1989 Grand Anse Declaration decided on a 
Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) ‘in the shortest possible time’.  
After several setbacks the Caribbean Single Market (CSM) was launched in 2006 
and the single economy is scheduled to come on stream in 2015.  According to 
CARICOM (2005:245) some of the key elements of the CSME include: 
 
♦  The free movement of goods and services  (currently over 95 percent of 
goods move freely across the region);  
 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 On January 30, 2006 six CARICOM member states – Jamaica, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago signed the formal declaration signalling the launch of the 
CARICOM Single Market (CSM). In June of that same year, other member states, with the 
exception of Haiti, Montserrat and The Commonwealth of The Bahamas, became members of the 
CSM.  Emerging CARICOM 
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♦  The right of establishment, to permit the establishment of CARICOM-
owned businesses in any member state without restrictions and on the 
same terms as national enterprises; 
 
♦  A common external tariff,  which is a rate of duty applied by all member 
states of the single market on entry of a product from a country, which is 
not a member of the single market; 
 
♦  Free circulation – which refers to the free movement among member 
states of goods imported from extra-regional sources.  This would 
require collection of duties only at first point of entry into the single 
market and the establishment of arrangements for sharing of customs 
revenue collected from these goods among the countries to which they 
are consigned (this aspect is still to be developed); 
 
♦  A common trade policy which refers to agreement among the members 
on matters related to internal and international trade and a coordinated 
external trade policy negotiated on a joint basis; 
 
♦  Free movement of labor which involves the removal of work permits,
10 
hassle-free travel, providing for the transfer of social security benefits, 
harmonizing social services, such as education and health and 
establishing common standards and measures for accreditation and 
equivalency of qualifications and skills.  In the first phase the free 
movement of persons is restricted to the following categories:   
university graduates, media workers, sports persons, musicians, artistes, 
managers, supervisors and other service providers. [Teachers and nurses 
were added to the list in 2006].  
 
♦  Harmonization of laws which include the harmonization of company, 
intellectual property and other laws; 
 
♦  Economic policy measures to include coordinating and converging 
macro-economic policies and performances; harmonizing foreign 
investment policy and adopting measures to acquire, develop and 
transfer appropriate technology; 
 
♦  Monetary policy measures which involves coordinating exchange rate 
and interests rate policies as well as the commercial banking market; and 
                                                 
10 A CARICOM passport has been designed and Suriname was the first member state 
to issue one in January 2005.  
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♦  Fiscal policy measures to include coordinating indirect taxes and national 
budget deficits.  
 
Since the CSM is in its infancy it is too early to assess its viability.  However 
while it has the potential to benefit the region in the long term, there are some 
initial challenges.  For example the smaller economies which comprise the OECS 
delayed entry into the CSM on the question of development fund.  Chapter seven 
of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (2002:93) makes provision for 
disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors.  Article 142 (1) states: 
 
The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose 
of establishing a regime for disadvantaged countries, regions and 
sectors within the framework of the Treaty as well as a special 
regime for the Less Developed Countries in order to enhance 
their prospects for successful competition within the 
Community, and redress, to the extent possible, any negative 
impact of the establishment of the CSME. 
 
The NRT does argue that social stability is a key aspect of development 
regionalism.  It advances the idea that development regionalism includes the 
allocation of regional funds to support less developed economies within the 
regional movement. However, unlike the EU, CARICOM is a grouping of small 
developing countries and although the Revised Treaty provides for a develop-
ment fund, the pressing question is, who would fund the development fund?  To 
date Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados have made modest commitments to the 
fund and the Caribbean Development Bank is working out modalities for its 
implementation. But this is a troublesome issue for CARICOM. 
 
The Girvan Report – Toward a Single Economic Space and Development Vision 
 
In terms of the way forward, at its Eighteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting held in 
February 2007, CARICOM Heads of Government adopted a paper entitled 
“Towards a Single Economy and a Single Development Vision” as a framework 
for the further elaboration of the single economy, with the understanding that 
refinements will have to be done in time for final sign off at the Regular Meeting 
of the Conference in July 2007.  It was agreed, however, that the Single Vision 
would be used as the basis for a comprehensive development plan (CARICOM, 
2007). The ‘Girvan Report’, as it is called, recommends a single development 
vision for sustainable development which should be holistic; encompassing 
development in all its dimensions – economic, social, environmental and 
governance dimensions (Girvan, 2006:8). The Report suggests sequencing of the 
CSME as follows:   Emerging CARICOM 
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Phase I (2005-mid 2008) consolidation of  the single market and initiation of 
the single economy.  Phase II (2009-2015) consolidation and completion of the 
single economy. This phase will include – 
 
¾  implementation of common policies in energy related industries, 
agriculture, sustainable tourism and agro-tourism, transport and small 
and medium enterprises; 
¾  Harmonization of taxation systems, incentives, and financial and 
regulatory environment; 
¾  Harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies; 
¾  Implementation of Regional Competition Policy and Regional 
Intellectual Property Regime; 
¾  Implementation of CARICOM Monetary Union. 
 
This is ambitious, particularly monetary union, given the vast differences in the 
various currencies within the CARICOM region (See Table 1.).  
 
Table 1 
CARICOM Currencies 
Country  Currency  Equivalency to the 
US$1 
    
The Bahamas  Bahamian dollar  Bah$1 
Barbados Barbadian  dollar Bar$2 
Belize Belizean  dollar  BZ$2 
Guyana  Guyana dollar  G$195.34*  
Haiti Gourde  G41*   
Jamaica Jamaican  dollar J$58.24* 
Suriname  Suriname Guilder  SF$2,540**   
Trinidad and Tobago  Trinidad and Tobago dollar  TT$6.2** 
The OECS  East Caribbean dollar  EC$2.7 
  *Floating (2003) 
  **Floating (2002)  
(Source:  CARICOM Secretariat, 2005: 405) 
 
As is the case in the EU, monetary union takes time, given currency 
differentials.  Also, a country’s currency is an important aspect of its sovereignty.  
Currently of the EU-15 Britain, Denmark and Sweden are still not members of 
the euro zone. CARICOM will do well to draw insights from the EU in this 
regard. Grenade 
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Despite limitations, the Girvan report (2006:6 - 8) notes that the expected 
benefits of the CSME include “greater efficiency in both the private and public 
sectors, higher levels of domestic and foreign investment, increased employment, 
and growth in intra-regional trade and of extra-regional exports. However it 
points to three caveats: 
 
1.  The CSME cannot be ‘all things to all men’ 
2.  [CARICOM] should be careful not to expect or promise more from the 
CSME than it can realistically deliver, so as not to create disappointment 
at a later stage 
3.  Most of the development effort of member states will continue to be 
made nationally and sub-regionally which is where much of CSME 
implementation will take place. The CSME will not substitute for 
national strategies rather it will complement them. 
 
The Report observes a major challenge which relates to the disconnect 
between the people and the regional project.  It refers to an ‘information deficit’ 
among the citizens of the Community.  The Report notes that some citizens are 
cynical about the slow pace of implementation [of the CSME], while others are 
apprehensive about the possible adverse effects of increased competition for jobs 
and markets. The Report goes on to state that the people of the Community need 
to be assured that the economic benefits of integration will be broadly spread 
across and within countries, as well as across social groups.  They also need to be 
assured that integration will make a difference to ‘quality of life’ issues such as 
crime, health and education (Girvan, 2006:6-7).  In the case of the EU similar 
concerns have been raised.Yet despite concerns, Arthur argues that: 
The creation of a Caribbean Single Market and Economy is a 
historic necessity which must be brought to full fruition, no 
matter how arduous the task may at times appear, how negligible 
the immediate returns, or how vast the pitfalls and obstacles that 
threaten to ensnarl it.  It offers the societies of the region, 
individually and collectively, the only realistic and viable option 
by which to achieve sustainable development, and in the process 
the prospect of erasing the two great economic deficits which 
confront the region at the start of this new century.
11 
                                                 
11 Owen Arthur. “Implementation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, 
and its Implications for US-CARICOM Economic relations.”  Feature Address to the 
American Business and Consulting Group Special Symposium, Brooklyn, New York, 
April 2, 2004 
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However, some commentators question the viability of a single market 
and economy without steps toward greater polity unity. Gonsalves (2004) poses a 
critical question: “Does not the single economy require the creation of an 
appropriate supra-national entity to which there ought to be a transfer of a 
measure of sovereignty, in its pooling, similar, though not necessarily identical, 
to that of fashioning the European Union?” 
12  Gonsalves (2004a) further 
elaborates: 
 
The course we have taken to view CARICOM as a community 
of independent sovereign states, that is, if we proceed without a 
supranational authority to which some measure of sovereignty is 
transferred to direct the operation we can still succeed but it will 
take much longer and there will be greater pain and frustration.  
We have chosen to proceed in the most difficult way to a single 
market and economy.  We ought to do it the way the Europeans 
have done it, to transfer some measure of sovereignty to a 
supranational entity through a single law in the independent 
states and have that particular supranational entity provide 
directives to drive the CSME.   Instead, what we are seeking to 
do is to see if whilst we are being a community of independent 
states that we can have a measure of supranationality without in 
fact creating a central supranational authority… 
 
Brewster (2003) also questions whether a Single Market and Economy is 
realistic without some measure of political unity. He also cites the EU model as a 
reference point for CARICOM. Therefore, a weakness of the CSME relates to the 
institutional arrangements which should be in place to facilitate deeper economic 
integration.  The establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) in 2005 
as a dispute settlement mechanism is a step in the right direction. However more 
needs to be done.  Recognizing this deficiency, in  2003, through the Rose Hall 
Declaration, CARICOM Heads of Government took the initiative to develop a 
system of ‘mature regionalism’ in which critical policy decisions will have the 
force of law throughout the region as a result of the operation of domestic 
legislation and the revision of the Treaty of Chaguaramas and the authority of the 
CCJ in its original jurisdiction, taking into account the constitutional provisions 
of member states.  Since 2003 a number of committees have been set up to 
advance the Rose Hall Declaration, which decided on the need for an Executive 
Commission to address what the West Indian Commission (1992:54) referred to 
as “the implementation paralysis” within CARICOM.  
Currently the Report of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on 
Governance  on ‘Managing Mature Regionalism, is on CARICOM’s agenda 
                                                 
12 Ralph Gonsalves is the current Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Grenade 
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(Lewis, 2006).  The Report indicates that “A critical element in the effort to 
advance the integration process is the need to devise suitable structures of 
regional governance to manage an integrated economic space. This must be 
based on a pragmatic approach to regional decision-making, since the promotion 
of the goals of economic integration presupposes an increasing degree of political 
consensus aimed at  facilitating the achievement of agreed objectives.” The 
Report recommends a CARICOM Commission comprising three members and a 
President to “exercise full executive responsibility for the implementation of 
decisions relating to the CSME and any other areas of the integration process as 
the Conference of Heads of Government may from time to time determine and to 
initiate proposals for Community action in such areas” (Lewis, 2006:2). The 
TWG also recommends the abolition of the Community Council. Instead it 
proposes that the various sectoral ministerial councils should be directed by the 
Heads of Government to exercise, to the maximum, their decision-making 
responsibilities. It also recommends that the Commission will encompass the 
structure of the CARICOM Secretariat. 
The Report (Lewis, 2006:12) notes that: 
 
…the Caribbean Community has not yet achieved the level of 
integration experienced by the European Union.  Nevertheless, 
we believe that some of the principles and practices involved in 
the operation of the latter are quite relevant to Caribbean current 
and future integration requirements and could, therefore, be 
adapted in an effort to improve the effectiveness of governance 
in the Caribbean Community. In particular, consideration should 
be given to the adoption of a system that differentiates leally 
among specific kinds of Community decision-making:  viz. 
regulations, directives, decisions, and recommendations and 
opinions. 
 
The TWG (Lewis, 2006:14) recommends that it is useful to apply the 
principle of ‘proportionality’ utilised by the EU.  This stipulates that the content 
of and the institutional arrangements devised for Community action shall not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Revised Treaty.  It also 
recommends that this should be supported by the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ 
which is also utilised by the EU. This principle asserts that regional action would 
not be pursued in cases where action by individual member states is sufficient to 
achieve the specified goals of the Community and these states demonstrate a 
commitment to pursue such action.  Nonetheless it recommends that CARICOM 
continues to be a community of sovereign states, which reinforces the inter-
governmental nature of the regional project. It does, however, propose the 
passing of a Single Caribbean Act by the parliaments of member states which 
will permit the reception of Community Law in the jurisdictions of member Emerging CARICOM 
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states.  It also recommends the strengthening of the Assembly of Caribbean 
Community Parliamentarians to address the democratic deficiencies in 
CARICOM and automacity of financing to improve the financial arrangements of 
CARICOM, as is the case in the EU. 
The Conference of Heads of Government considered the Report at its Inter-
sessional meeting in February, 2007 and agreed that member states should   
consider the policy issues and recommendations contained in the report and the 
wide-ranging consultations should be held with other stakeholders including the 
parliamentary Opposition and Civil Society before the submissions of their 
positions to the Secretary-General. Though different in content to some degree, 
this report is akin to the 1992 Time for Action  which recommended elements of 
the EU model for CARICOM.  The question is, would the report be 
implemented?  As The West Indian Commission (1992:56) noted, CARICOM 
has become associated with “inordinate delay and indecisiveness, with bu-
reaucracy, with meetings which generate rhetoric and paper but spur little action 
that makes a difference.” The challenge for CARICOM, in the economic realm, 
is to shift from integration on paper to action on the ground. This will require 
serious re-design of the institutional structure, decision-making procedures and 
culture which underpins integration. 
 
Functional Cooperation 
 
It is widely accepted that CARICOM has done best in the area of functional 
cooperation, particularly in the areas of health, education, sports and culture.   
Particularly in the area of health, the Pan Caribbean Partnership against 
HIV/AIDS has been instrumental in the fight against the epidemic.  The 
Caribbean hosted the 2007 Cricket World Cup (CWC).  This brought to the fore 
the question of security.  A common CARICOM visa was issued and there was a 
regional approach to managing the event.  According to Barbados’ deputy prime 
minister: 
 
Sometimes you need catalysts to bring about transformation in 
society. There is no doubt in my mind that the challenges of trying 
to keep the region secure during Cricket World Cup will come to 
be regarded as one of the major catalysts in the integration 
movement of the region.
13  
 
CARICOM Heads of Government have recently recognised security as the fourth 
pillar of the Community (CARICOM Secretariat, 2007). This is timely given the 
non-traditional security threats which plague the region, such as the illicit drug 
                                                 
13 Mia Mottley, Deputy Prime Minister of Barbados, Barbados Nation Sunday 
March 4, 2007 ‘A stop closer to oneness’ Grenade 
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trade, violence and criminality and  HIV/AIDS. It is necessary to note that the 
discourse on security in the Caribbean is framed within the alternative paradigm 
which seeks to broaden the definition of security beyond the military sphere 
(Buzan and Weaver, 2004; Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1989; Matthews, 1989; 
Ullmann, 1984; Weaver 1995). 
As Griffith (2003; 2004) reminds us, security is multi-dimentional and 
has never been viewed merely as protection from military threats. He defines 
security as protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from external 
military attack and coercion, from internal subversion and from the erosion of 
cherished political, economic and social values.  Within this framework, security 
becomes critical to survival, not only for the  viability of the state but also for 
socio-economic development. Griffith has used the case of illicit drug trafficking 
to illustrate how non-traditional security threats can undermine development. As 
the Girvan Report notes functional cooperation in non-economic spheres needs to 
be recognised as an integral part of the CSME.  
 
Foreign Policy Coordination 
 
On the question of foreign policy coordination, there has been mixed results. 
CARICOM played a leading role in initiating the negotiations for the Lomé 
Conventions. It also benefited from collective diplomacy in the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO), the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) negotiations as well as in 
various commissions and joint councils with Canada, Cuba, Japan, Mexico, the 
United States, the Organization of American States (OAS), the G3 (Columbia, 
Venezuela and Mexico), among others.  In addition, by trading each others’ 
support, the CARICOM countries succeeded in getting their nations elected to 
key international positions, such as Commonwealth Secretary-General and ACP 
Secretary-General. CARICOM has also been successful in assisting with 
territorial disputes in the region (Hall, 2003:xxii).  Currently CARICOM has a 
collective cooperative relationship with Cuba, despite pressures from the United 
States. According to Miller (2004:5-6): 
 
We embrace Cuba as a bona fide sister-state in the Caribbean 
region and are committed to a policy of constructive engagement 
with its government and people.  We do not believe that efforts 
to isolate Cuba, through exclusion from participation in 
hemispheric bodies like the OAS or the emerging Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) or measures that create greater 
hardship for the Cuban people, such as a fifty-year long 
economic embargo, will foster change in Cuba….  We cannot Emerging CARICOM 
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accept “regime change” exogenously imposed upon the people 
of Cuba, to be, in any way, a viable option. 
 
This spirit of solidarity with Cuba has underpinned CARICOM-Cuba 
relations.  In this respect, CARICOM has spearheaded lobbying efforts for Cuba 
to be fully inserted into the hemispheric and wider international system.  For 
example,  CARICOM lobbied successfully for Cuba to be a founding member of 
the Association of Caribbean States (ACS).  CARICOM was also at the forefront 
of the efforts which led to Cuba’s successful application for membership in the 
African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group in 1999.  According to the 
CARICOM Secretariat (2005:31) CARICOM, strongly, though unsuccessfully, 
promoted within the ACP and in negotiations with the EU, the admission of Cuba 
to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. As such, Cuba is the only Caribbean 
country that does not enjoy a bilateral cooperation agreement with the EU since 
Cuba became a member of the ACP and a member of the forum of Caribbean 
ACP states (CARIFORUM) in October 2001 without being a signatory to the 
Cotonou Agreement.  Roy (2004:8) refers to this as an anomaly where Cuba 
belongs to an exclusive golf club without being able to play golf. However, Cuba 
is an observer within the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) 
and an active participant in CARIFORUM. 
Within this spirit of cooperation, in 1993 CARICOM and Cuba signed an 
agreement which established the CARICOM-Cuba Joint Commission.  The 
objectives of which were to promote cooperative relations between the Caribbean 
Community and Cuba in economic, social, cultural and technological fields.  In 
this regard it was agreed that the members of CARICOM and Cuba will seek a 
greater understanding of each others’ views and positions on issues which may 
arise in the various regional and international forums, in an effort to promote 
closer relations. It was further agreed that the Joint Commission will meet once a 
year alternately in a CARICOM member state and Cuba.
14  
CARICOM also had a generally collective stance with regard to the Haitian 
controversy in 2004.  CARICOM deplored the removal of Aristide from office as 
setting “a dangerous precedent for democratically-elected governments anywhere 
and everywhere as it promotes the removal of duly-elected persons from office 
by the power of rebel forces….” CARICOM questioned whether Aristide’s 
resignation was truly voluntary, as it came after the capture of sections of Haiti 
                                                 
 
14 CARICOM Secretariat,  “Agreement Establishing  the Caribbean Community-
Cuba Joint Commission,” December 13 1993.(http://www.caricom.org/archives/-
agreement_caricom-cuba-jointcommission.htm) accessed April 27 2005. 
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by armed insurgents and the failure of the international community to provide the 
requisite support, despite appeals from CARICOM.
15   
With respect to Venezuela, most CARICOM countries have engaged in 
cooperative arrangements with the Chavez administration. In a recent visit to St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines President Chavez called for Caribbean countries to 
join him in his fight against imperialism.  He argued that the Caribbean should be 
‘a sea of resistance to imperalism’.
16 Venezuela has given assistance to 
CARICOM countries particularly in the area of infrastructural development and 
energy through the Petro Caribe initiative.  However, this has ignited tensions 
with Trinidad and Tobago which is a key CARICOM member and the region’s 
only energy producer.  Some observers have cautioned against Caribbean 
countries’ close association with Chavez. According to Sanders:  
…President Chavez is a very volatile man whose policies toward 
a number of Caribbean countries should be analyzed beyond his 
anti-American rhetoric and the supposed largesse of his Petro 
Caribe initiative to supply oil to several countries… The Petro 
Caribe initiative is itself worrying.  For, while it has the veneer 
of a good deal, all that it offers is deferred payment of a portion 
of the world price for Venezuelan oil.   It may help the 
governments with immediate cash-flow problems but it is 
increasing their national debt and mortgaging the future of their 
countries to Venezuela… Caribbean countries have suffered for 
decades from the imposition of the will of the United States, it is 
right that they should try to resist it.   But, they must also be 
careful of the ambitions of another potential [sub-hemispheric] 
hegemon.
17  
Dominica’s prime minister indicates, however, that “we shall make no 
apologies  that President Chavez is our friend and the people of Venezuela   
are our friends.”
18  Given the United States preoccupation with the Middle East, 
and its benign neglect of the region, CARICOM has the political space to 
constructively engage Cuba and Venezuela.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Jamaica Gleaner, “This sets a dangerous precedent” March 1 2004. 
16 Barbadian Nation “Join me in Fight” 18 February, 2007. 
17 Ronald Sanders “A Devilish Problem:  The Caribbean between Bush and Chavez” 
Online Commentary. 22 February, 2007. 
18 Barbadian Nation “Join me in Fight” 18 February, 2007. 
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Conclusions   
 
In the contemporary global political economy, regional integration is an 
imperative for development. As proponents of the New Regionalism Theory 
(NRT) argue, however, the motivations for integration in the North are different 
from that in the South.  While regional schemes such as the EU are consolidating 
their regional projects to better rule the world and compete for power in the Core, 
regional movements in the South are concerned with collective survival, resisting 
domination and strengthening their bargaining position in the global arena.  
This chapter used the case of CARICOM to address the questions: what type 
of regional projects are emerging in the South and to what extent are they 
modelled after the EU? It examined CARICOM along three dimensions: 
economic integration, functional cooperation and foreign policy coordination. 
However to understand the current state of Caribbean integration, the early 
federal experiment cannot be ignored.  The Caribbean ‘benefited’ from British 
tutelage.  In essence the British encouraged ‘bureaucratic/ administration 
integration’ and promoted low cost low risk integration. To date, CARICOM is 
still trapped in that historical mole.  
In terms of economic integration, as the case showed the Caribbean Single 
Market and Economy (CSME) is the pulse of Caribbean integration.  Given it 
small size and the harsh realities of the global environment, CARICOM has an 
incentive to deepen economic integration, hence the CSME.   As The Girvan 
Report shows CARICOM is attempting to move towards a single economy and 
development vision.  This supports the NRT which argues that countries in the 
periphery have to by necessity pursue development regionalism:  the sufficient 
size argument; the need for self-reliance; the question of credibility; to enhance 
collective bargaining; to foster social stability; to promote environmental 
sustainability and to encourage democracy. This focus on development is a 
positive step forward. Are there any reasons to worry? There always are. While it 
is generally understood that development regionalism is necessary, the challenge 
will be to put recommendations into action and to create the institutional 
framework, and political culture necessary to support this type of integration.   
Since CARICOM is a Community of sovereign states which function within 
an inter-governmental framework, implementation is difficult.  This is one major 
difference between CARICOM and the EU.  While the EU pursues inter-
governmentalism and supranationalism, CARICOM is almost purely inter-
governmental (except for the Caribbean Court of Justice which is in its infancy).  
Nonetheless, the 2006 report of the Technical Working Group on Governance, 
like the Time for Action report which preceeded it fourteen years earlier,   has 
proposed elements of the EU model for CARICOM.  It recommends, for 
example, an Executive Commission; an enhanced role for the Assembly of 
Caribbean Community Parliamentarians;  a Single Caribbean Act; the principles 
of proportionality and subsidiarity.  If this report is  adopted, it should help to Grenade 
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reduce the ‘implementation paralysis’ which has slowed down the pace of 
Caribbean integration. It would also shift the emerging CARICOM model closer 
to aspects of the EU model. 
Another challenge to the CSME relates to uneven development within 
CARICOM. Unlike the EU, which can financially afford structural and cohesion 
funds, it is problematic to meet the treaty provisions for a development fund, 
since  CARICOM comprises relatively poor countries. Therefore, for CARICOM 
integration must by necessity go beyond the economic question. This again 
speaks to the differences between regional projects in the developed and 
developing worlds.   
Another deficiency relates to the ‘information deficit’ and the disconnect 
between the ordinary people and the CSME.  This is one similarity that 
CARICOM shares with the EU and it is one feature that CARICOM should not 
emulate from the EU. Steps should be put in place to improve the democratic 
character of the regional movement to ensure that people are put at the centre of 
integration to ensure participation and greater social cohesion and security. 
Further research is needed on the question of democracy and integration. Does 
popular consultation slow down the pace of integration?  Does an elitist approach 
facilitate the advancement of integration?   
It is noteworthy that security is now the fourth pillar of CARICOM.  This is a 
step toward deeper regionalism.   It is necessary to emphasis that in the case of 
the Caribbean security goes beyond the military sphere to include human, 
societal and environmental security. When compared to the EU, security 
generally relates to ‘high politics’ such as the role of NATO and the dynamics of 
the Transatlantic relationship.  This again speaks to the differences between 
regionalisms in the developed and developing worlds. There is need for further 
research on the question of regionalism and security, particularly as it relates to 
the Global South. 
With regard to functional cooperation, CARICOM has been relatively 
successful, particularly in the areas of health, education, disaster management, 
sports and culture.  The EU has been instrumental in providing aid to CARICOM 
and to individual member states in many functional areas. Caribbean countries 
have also received financial bilateral assistance from individual EU member 
states; most notably the British. It is necessary to note that the European 
Partnership Agreements (EPA) which is being negotiated between the EU and 
CARIFORUM, makes provision for financial assistance to advance regional 
integration.   
In terms of foreign policy CARICOM is engaged in controversial 
relationships, particularly with Cuba and Venezuela.  This reflects two factors.  
First, given the Caribbean’s history of external domination – through slavery and 
colonialism – it has almost always adopted a foreign policy stance of Third 
World solidarity.  Second, foreign policy in the Caribbean is for the most part 
linked to development needs. Therefore, by necessity it has to engage in Emerging CARICOM 
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diplomatic maneuvering for its survival. On the question of foreign policy 
CARICOM has had mixed results.  There is need for further research on 
regionalism and foreign policy options in the developing world. 
In summary, the case of CARICOM suggests that regional integration in the 
South is of a special type.  It is riddled by historical ghosts. It is reactionary to 
external forces and must go beyond the economic dimension. Consequently 
foreign policy becomes a strong tool in the region’s collective bargaining with 
the rest of the world.  
The case also suggests that regional projects cannot ignore the EU’s model of 
integration, since it represents some basic ingredients for success – common 
institutions, political leadership and vision, financial commitment to integration, 
among others.  In the case of CARICOM the 1992 Time for Action proposed 
aspects of the EU model.  This report was initially ignored and later implemented 
in part.  Currently, fourteen years on, another report is proposing similar rec-
ommendations along the lines of the EU. It is necessary to note that whereas the 
EU does provide a reference point for integration, it should not be mimicked.  
CARICOM has to find its own path, while drawing insights from the EU.  This 
paper argues that CARICOM has not yet come of age.  However, it has not died 
in infancy either. It has moved beyond functional cooperation, but it is 
proceeding with the process of integration within a minimalist framework.  Time 
will tell to what extent CARICOM will step into or slide out of the future. I 
remain cautiously hopeful. 
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Introduction 
 
The 50
th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome provides a timely op-
portunity for an evaluation of integration in the European Union (EU) and in the 
regions that have more recently followed in its footsteps.  Regional integration 
initiatives have permeated the globe and certain aspects of the European integra-
tion process are apparent in many of them.  While they are all deserving of a 
comprehensive analysis, the focus of the present study is on the EU, the Andean 
Community of Nations (CAN), and the Southern Cone Common Market 
(MERCOSUR). 
A cursory glance of these three integration processes over the past year 
yields, at best, a questionable state of affairs.  In Europe, following the negative 
results of the 2005 French and Dutch referendums on the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, a reflection period was introduced, theoretically a time 
during which the future of Europe was to become clearer.  Almost two years 
later, the reflection period has been extended seemingly indefinitely and there is 
no apparent solution to the current EU’s situation of limbo.  Integration condi-
tions across the Atlantic appear no better and in fact reached crisis levels as 
Venezuela withdrew from the CAN and became a full member of MERCOSUR.  
Within MERCOSUR, the two smaller countries (Paraguay and Uruguay) have 
become somewhat disenchanted with the process, largely as a result of what they 
consider to be unequal trade benefits amongst the organization’s member states.   
While these headline-grabbing problems have received a great deal of public 
attention, and indeed are cause for concern, the day-to-day workings of regional 
integration in Europe and South America have not been interrupted.  In fact, they 
continue with the declared support of the majority of the regions’ leaders and 
with significant progress in certain areas of regional competence.  The most visi-
ble integration has taken place in Europe with Bulgaria and Romania becoming 
full members of the EU on 1 January 2007, and Slovenia adopting the euro as its 
national currency on the same date.  No less important have been the steps taken 
in the CAN and MERCOSUR towards increased regional integration.  It is now 
possible for citizens of all of the CAN countries to travel without a passport or Kanner 
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visa within the CAN, providing a very important element to a truly single market, 
the free movement of people.  A CAN passport meeting all of the newest inter-
national standards has also been adopted, implemented, and internationally 
recognized.  In the Southern Cone, the January 2007 MERCOSUR Presidential 
Council approved the first US$100 million for social, health and infrastructure 
development projects in Paraguay and Uruguay through the MERCOSUR 
Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM).  Similar to the European structural 
funds which have been considered one of the great successes of the EU, FOCEM 
is designed to create more cohesion between the member countries of 
MERCOSUR, and rectify the natural regional inequalities resulting from differ-
ent levels of economic development and strength among the member states.   
In order to strengthen regional integration in the EU, the European Commis-
sion, since 2000, has encouraged improving European governance which became 
one of the Commission’s strategic objectives.  Thus, for the past seven years the 
Commission has been on a constant quest to improve methods of governance not 
just in its own daily practices but also in its external affairs.  The EU has made 
the adoption of good governance initiatives a requirement for the allocation of its 
external regional development funding.  With a conceptual framework based on 
governance, this paper will address to what extent and in what forms the EU, the 
CAN, and MERCOSUR have adopted practices of good governance, specifically 
those related to nonhierarchical governance.  This qualitative analysis is based on 
a comprehensive review of original language primary documents from all of 
these regional organizations, hundreds of news articles, and official speeches.  I 
argue that since 2005 the CAN and MERCOSUR have initiated but not consoli-
dated exercises of good governance, particularly in the social, environmental, and 
cultural competences.   
 
Governance and Regional Integration 
 
Globalization, an undoubtedly contentious concept, both in terms of its meaning 
and its reality, nonetheless provides the context in which governance has become 
an overriding concern in sub-state, state, and supra-state politics.  In its most ba-
sic construct, globalization refers to increased transborder interactions and 
worldwide implications.  From this perspective, “globalization implies that con-
nections across frontiers are not just occasional or random, but rather are 
regularized such that there is a detectable intensification, or growing magnitude, 
of interconnectedness, patterns of interaction and flows which transcend the con-
stituent societies and states of the world order” (Held and McGrew, Goldblatt 
and Perraton, 2003: 67).   In response and complementary to globalization, a pa-
rallel process has emerged, one of regionalization which has typically been 
accompanied by the creation of regional organizations and institutions.  Within 
this increasingly accepted panorama of the current international system, the study 
of the interaction between state and non-state actors in policymaking and deci-Andean Community 
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sion-making processes, governance in its simplest terms, has become 
progressively more necessary to explain national and international political 
processes and outcomes. 
Governance does not negate the primary role of state governments in poli-
cymaking and decision-making either at the national or international levels, 
however, it does recognize the influential role of additional agents in these 
processes such as corporations (domestic and transnational), non-governmental 
organizations, and civil society groups, to name but a few.  At the most basic 
level, from a liberal institutionalist perspective, governance is “the processes and 
institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective ac-
tivities of a group” (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 12).  More precisely, Rosenau 
argues that governance is represented by an increasing number of “centers of 
authority” around the world and at “every level of community” (Rosenau, 2003: 
224).  He further suggests that in comparison to the rule systems of government 
which are highly structured, the rule systems of governance are “social functions 
or processes that can be performed or implemented in a variety of ways at differ-
ent times and places (or even at the same time) by a wide variety of 
organizations” (Rosenau, 2003: 225).  This conceptual approach to governance 
accounts for political participation from different actors, at different times, and 
with regard to different competences, an invaluable tool for understanding politi-
cal processes not contained within sovereign state borders and not limited to state 
actors.  While not necessarily theoretical in nature, governance does provide a 
framework for researching and explaining political interactions and outcomes in 
processes of regional integration. 
The EU has been by far the most widely studied process of regional integra-
tion in terms of governance.  Multilevel governance has focused nearly 
exclusively on the EU and provides an alternative approach to state-centric theo-
ries in analyzing decision-making and policymaking in Europe.  In this view, 
“European integration is a policy-creating process in which authority and policy 
making influence are shared across multiple levels of government – subnational, 
national and supranational” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001 [quoted in Nelsen and 
Stubb, 2003: 283]).  Multilevel governance provides yet another explanatory tool 
for this study by incorporating sub-national levels of government, a necessary 
though not sufficient element for establishing nonhierarchical governance. 
Given the complexities of the EU and the intention to “bring the EU closer to 
the European citizens”, one of the four strategic objectives of the European 
Commission in 2000 was to reform European governance.  In the Commission’s 
2001 White Paper on this subject, European governance is defined as “the rules, 
processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at the 
European level” (Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 8).  The 
White Paper also identifies five principles of good governance that the EU works 
toward achieving, promotes in countries with which it has institutionalized rela-
tions and agreements, and attempts to embrace in its relations with third countries Kanner 
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(Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 27).  These five principles of 
good governance are openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and 
coherence.  Of these, this paper will focus on the principle of participation, sub-
national governmental and non-governmental, in the EU, the CAN and 
MERCOSUR. 
Research related to governance in the EU has come a long way over the past 
decade.  The same cannot be said, however, for governance in processes of re-
gional integration in the developing world,
1 despite the benefits it provides as an 
explanatory tool and its potential contributions to the study of regional integra-
tion and multilevel political processes and outcomes throughout the world.  This 
paper seeks to add to these research areas and continues by considering progress 
in adopting exercises of nonhierarchical governance in the EU, the CAN, and 
MERCOSUR, focusing on the principle of participation by sub-national govern-
ments and civil society in regional policymaking and decision-making processes.  
 
Sub-national Governments’ Participation in the EU, the CAN, and 
MERCOSUR 
 
Participation refers to the involvement of all those with an interest in the delibe-
rations (though not decision-making) of a policy from its conception to its 
implementation, including but not limited to local and regional governments, 
grassroots organizations, and civil society (Commission of the European Com-
munities, 2001).  Why is participation such an important element of regional 
governance?  The answer lies in the indispensability of legitimacy.  “It [the Un-
ion] will no longer be judged solely by its ability to remove barriers to trade or to 
complete an internal market; its legitimacy today depends on involvement and 
participation.  This means that the linear model of dispensing policies from above 
must be replaced by a virtuous circle, based on feedback, networks and involve-
ment from policy creation to implementation at all levels” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001: 11).  Legitimacy has long been a crucial aspect of 
the internal affairs of sovereign states, not only as a means of perpetuating politi-
cal systems but also for recognition and respect in the international community; 
the same holds true for regional organizations. 
 
European Union 
 
The EU, with its mix of centralized and federal states, homogenous and ethni-
cally divided societies, is a regionally diverse organization.  The local and 
regional European governments have the responsibility for implementing the 
                                                 
1 Phillips (2000, 2001, 2003), Griffin (2005), Caballero-Anthony (2004), and Söderbaum 
(2004) have begun to explore the issue of governance in regional integration in developing areas: 
the Southern Cone, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Africa, respectively, yet much work remains 
to be done.  Andean Community 
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majority of the EU policies.  The EU, however, did not institutionalize involve-
ment of these governments until the 1990s, and only after a push for inclusion 
from these governments themselves.   In the 1980s regional and local European 
governments began to collectively pressure the EU to reduce the democratic 
deficit and to recognize the regions in carrying out the EU’s work. These efforts 
resulted in the creation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) in the 1992 
Treaty on European Union.   
First meeting in 1994, the CoR now consists of 344 members, all of whom 
must hold a regional or local authority elected position or be politically account-
able to an elected assembly.  The European Commission and the Council of the 
EU are required to consult the CoR on policies related to the following issues: 
economic and social cohesion; education and youth; culture; public health; trans-
European networks; transport; employment; social affairs; environment; Euro-
pean Social Fund; and vocational training (Committee of the  Regions of the 
European Union, 2007).  The CoR is responsible for providing written opinions 
on requested consultations and initiating its own opinions on additional issues the 
members feel are of particular interest to local and regional governments.  This 
Committee provides a “formal outlet in which local and regional authorities can 
be heard through direct access to the EU institutions and their policy and deci-
sion-making processes” (Roy and Kanner, 2006: 30).    
 
Andean Community of Nations and MERCOSUR 
 
Economic crises and political instability have afflicted the Latin American coun-
tries for centuries. There is no doubt that at the domestic level all of these 
countries are in need of governance reforms.  With these overriding and persis-
tent problems why and how can the process of regional integration be important 
and, even necessary, for developing sustainable solutions in CAN and 
MERCOSUR?  First, while governance may be failing on the national level, it 
may be stronger at other levels, including the regional and the local.  “The wea-
kening of the state does not necessarily imply an equivalent weakening of 
governance, which may be stronger at other levels than the national, involve new 
actors, and be both informal and private” (Söderbaum, 2004: 422). Second, the 
current economic crises and political instability are not contained within national 
borders and therefore, require a regional approach to their alleviation.  Finally, 
just as in Europe, regional integration is not considered an end in and of itself but 
rather a means to resolving deeper and longer lasting problems such as was the 
case of the European Coal and Steel Community, which made war in Europe not 
only unthinkable but materially impossible.  EU leaders argue that the same can 
hold true for South American integration, and are funding projects they believe 
will strengthen the CAN and MERCOSUR.  These two sub-regional integration 
projects have welcomed this cooperative encouragement from the EU and, both Kanner 
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with and without the EU’s financial assistance, have made small strides towards 
increasing participation in regional policy and decision-making processes.  
Prior to the middle of the current decade, integration in the CAN was an ex-
clusively elite progress with a singular focus on business and trade.  The former 
Secretary General of the CAN, Allan Wagner Tizón, in an interview on this sub-
ject with César Contreras Altuve of Ultimas Noticias (Caracas, Venezuela) in 
November 2005, commented “We have not achieved integration that allows ef-
fective solutions to the problems of poverty, exclusion, and inequality in our 
societies.”   Realizing that the economic situation of the CAN countries remained 
precarious the agenda has changed to focus on “development with social inclu-
sion”.  One of the mechanisms adopted to achieve the goals of this agenda is 
greater participation from regional and local governments in the regional integra-
tion process.   
In May 2004, the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers approved the creation 
of the Andean Consultative Council of Municipal Authorities (CCAAM) which 
met for the first time on 1 July 2005.  This consultative body, similar to the EU’s 
CoR, is responsible for providing opinions and recommendations to the institu-
tions that comprise the Andean Integration System (SAI).
2  This institution 
“represents a landmark in Andean integration as it incorporates the cities with a 
leading role in the decentralization of community policies and initiates a cooper-
ative agenda between the local governments” (General Secretariat Andean 
Community, 2007a).  Just as the CoR in the EU, the CCAAM is expected to con-
sult on an established policy agenda: regional development; small and medium-
size businesses; strengthening the Andean identity; utilizing new information and 
communication technologies to strengthen the connections between Andean ci-
ties; civil society; and financial mechanisms to promote local development and 
social cohesion (General Secretariat Andean Community, 2007a). 
Much like integration in the CAN, the process of integration in MERCOSUR 
has been dominated by the elites, particularly the presidents of the member 
countries.  Though there has been a strong push from the local and regional gov-
ernments for greater recognition and participation in the policy and decision-
making processes in the Southern Cone, the heads of state of these countries have 
been reluctant to grant greater sub-state involvement. Just as in the CAN, how-
ever, there is evidence of at least minimal progress towards greater participation.   
 On their own accord, and with the twin goals of gaining greater recognition 
for their potential role in regional integration and institutionalizing their partici-
pation in decision-making processes, several mayors of cities within the member 
                                                 
2 The SAI is a network of institutions, including a Commission, Parliament, Council of 
Foreign Ministers, and Court of Justice (among others) responsible for the policymaking and 
decision-making processes of the CAN. Andean Community 
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countries of MERCOSUR
3 founded a city-level network called Mercociudades.  
The pressure they exerted on the leaders of MERCOSUR and its institutions re-
sulted in the creation of the Specialized Meeting of the Municipalities and 
Departments of MERCOSUR, which met four times from 2001 to 2004.  In 
2004, the MERCOSUR Common Market Council approved the creation of the 
Consultative Forum of Municipalities, Federated States, Provinces and Depart-
ments of MERCOSUR.  In this early stage it is still difficult to determine how 
much involvement this Forum will have in the policy and decision-making 
processes of MERCOSUR, particularly since the Decision that provides for the 
Forum’s creation is rather vague on this point.  There is little doubt that the Fo-
rum comes up short of what the network of MERCOSUR city leaders were 
hoping for (Chasquetti, 2006), yet small progress in this direction is certainly 
more welcome than no progress at all.   
 
Civil Society Participation in the EU, the CAN, and MERCOSUR 
 
Civil society - institutionalized peaceful citizen participation in organized social 
activity – involvement in policy and decision-making processes has become one 
of the key and most widely recognized successful elements in improving gover-
nance at all levels – sub-state, state, regional, and global.  In his 20-year study of 
Italian regional governments, Robert Putnam found evidence that “the quality of 
governance was determined by longstanding traditions of civic engagement (or 
its absence)” (Putnam, 1995: 66).  Particularly in developing countries, civil so-
ciety has been seen as partially filling the gap left by weak, inefficient and/or 
corrupt state and local governments.  In these countries, civil society groups often 
represent the interests of those who have been ignored or marginalized and have 
no formal access to the state.  As civil society has begun to make inroads into 
influencing policy and decision-making at the national level in these countries, 
there has been a push to do so at the regional level as well.  The inclusion of civil 
society groups in policy and decision-making processes creates a networked sys-
tem of governance that is necessarily nonhierarchical and one that theoretically 
will be more effective and have greater legitimacy.   
 
European Union 
 
Much earlier than the EU’s 2001 White Paper on Governance, in fact with the 
creation of the European Economic Community, the European process of re-
gional integration began to provide an institutionalized method for civil society 
to participate in its policy and decision-making processes.  The European Eco-
                                                 
3 The full member countries of MERCOSUR at this time were Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay, and the capital cities of each of these countries were amongst the 12 founding cities 
of Mercociudades. Kanner 
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nomic and Social Committee (EESC) was created through the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome and is an institution designed to be a formal link between the EU and or-
ganized civil society.  This objective was reinforced by the EESC in 2004 when 
it established a Liaison Group to better coordinate and communicate with orga-
nized civil society groups in the EU member states. 
There are 344 members of the EESC from the 27 EU member states.  The 
EESC, like the CoR, is an advisory body from which the European Commission 
and the Council of the EU must solicit an opinion on proposed policies in certain 
issue areas: single market, education, consumer protection, the environment, re-
gional development, and social affairs (Roy and Kanner, 2006: 82).  Like the 
CoR, the EESC is responsible for providing written opinions on requested con-
sultations and initiating its own opinions in cases where the members feel there 
will be a significant impact on organized civil society.  According to a former 
President of the EESC, Beatrice Rangoni Machiavelli, the strength of the EESC 
“lies in our role as representatives of civil society, in the breadth of our mission, 
in the experience and skills of our members who are an integral part of economic 
and social life, and in the quality of our opinions.  This strength will enable us to 
contribute with renewed enthusiasm to a most ambitious and exciting project: 
building a united Europe” (European Economic and Social Committee, 2007). 
European civil society was encouraged and did widely participate in the 
2002-2003 European Convention established to debate the future of Europe, and 
which ultimately produced the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Eu-
rope.  During the Convention, a Convention Forum was created to serve this 
process, particularly via the Internet.  Although the Convention’s work has come 
to an end and the future of Europe is undergoing a period of reflection, civil so-
ciety participation in this debate continues through an EU Internet site called 
Futurum (Europa: The Future of the European Union – Debate, 2007).  The con-
tinued direct participation of civil society in this debate will ensure the future 
path of the EU, when it is decided, is more legitimate in the eyes of the European 
citizens. 
 
Andean Community of Nations and MERCOSUR 
 
Since the transitions from authoritarian regimes in the South American countries, 
most of which took place in the 1980s, there has been a great increase in civil 
society organizations, due in large part to the new democratic environments.   
These civil society groups have been somewhat successful in holding govern-
ments accountable and bringing issues to the national and regional agendas that 
would not have otherwise been priorities.  Just as the EU considers civil society 
to be one of the keys to improving its own governance, it believes the same can 
hold true in South America, which is demonstrated in the White Paper on Gover-
nance and in the EU’s subsequent policies towards the CAN and MERCOSUR.   Andean Community 
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The European Commission’s 2004-2006 Revised Regional Indicative Pro-
gram for the Andean Community includes a specific initiative and budget line for 
CAN interaction with Andean Civil Society. This initiative, funded with €4 mil-
lion of EU technical and financial assistance will:  
 
involve transferring the experience amassed by the EU in its 
work with civil society.  European know-how relating to the 
participation of civil society in political processes will be trans-
ferred, particularly to minorities such as indigenous peoples and 
to other social groups such as women and trade unionists, who 
have traditionally been neither consulted about political initia-
tives nor involved in their implementation or whose vital 
interests are threatened by such initiatives (European Commis-
sion Directorate General External Relations, 2004: 8).    
 
The dual objectives of this civil society program are (1) to strengthen the demo-
cratization of the integration process, and to spread awareness about Andean 
integration and its potential benefits, all to help garner popular support for the 
CAN; and (2) to support and enhance the construction of the Andean zone of 
peace (European Commission Directorate General External Relations, 2004). 
European support for the development of MERCOSUR civil society and its 
inclusion in the Southern Cone integration process is currently much greater than 
it is for the CAN.  The EU had not prior to 2002 developed any civil society-spe-
cific projects with MERCOSUR, however, that significantly changed with the 
MERCOSUR-European Community Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006.  In this 
strategy, the EU funds civil society development and participation within 
MERCOSUR itself as well as joint civil society inclusion in the negotiations for 
the EU-MERCOSUR Association Agreement.  To this end, two EU-
MERCOSUR civil society conferences were held, one in 2000 and one in 2002.  
With regard to financial assistance over this four-year strategy period, the EU 
earmarked €14.500.000 for civil society development and participation, with a 
special emphasis on joint EU-MERCOSUR civil society projects  with the pur-
pose of disseminating a greater amount and higher quality of information 
regarding the EU-MERCOSUR negotiations to the citizens on both sides of the 
Atlantic Ocean. The MERCOSUR and EU-MERCOSUR projects entail estab-
lishing an information society, enhancing MERCOSUR’s social dimension, and 
creating an educational and cultural dimension with audiovisual support and in-
dustry integration (European Commission Directorate General External 
Relations, 2002).   
What progress has been made in these two sub-regional organizations toward 
developing civil society participation in their integration processes?  In the case 
of the CAN there is evidence of not only increased, but sustained and institutio-
nalized mechanisms for civil society groups to interact within the SAI.  In Kanner 
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addition to the relatively new consultative institutions that have been created for 
this purpose, the CAN often posts on its website open calls for public participa-
tion in the form of submitted opinions, points of view and recommendations on 
issues under current consideration by the CAN.   
The creation of institutions that act as liaisons between the CAN and civil so-
ciety are another indication of progress toward meeting the established goal.  A 
Business Advisory Council and a Labor Advisory Council have been operational 
since 1998; both are consultative bodies with the power to present their opinions 
and recommendations to the other institutions of the SAI.  The Business and La-
bor Advisory Councils are composed of delegates from each one of the CAN 
member states, representing the highest level of national business and labor or-
ganizations (General Secretariat Andean Community, 2007c).  More recently, in 
2002, the Andean Indigenous Board was inaugurated, with representatives of 
Andean indigenous community organizations, governmental organizations, om-
budsmen, and a group of experts.  This consultative body is charged with 
providing opinions and recommendations on matters of relevance to the Andean 
indigenous communities, particularly, reducing poverty, development with social 
equity, and recognition of the role of the indigenous communities in the Andean 
countries (General Secretariat Andean Community, 2007d).  In 2003, the Andean 
Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers passed Decision 539, which establishes 
another consultative body, the Andean Consumer Defense Board, responsible for 
ensuring fair market and commercial practices for the citizens of the CAN mem-
ber countries (General Secretariat Andean Community, 2007b).  While it is still 
difficult to determine the actual outcomes of these newly formed advisory insti-
tutions in the CAN, given their fairly recent development, their mere existence is 
an indication that the CAN, despite much less EU financial support for such initi-
atives, is taking very seriously the challenge of including civil society in the 
process of Andean integration. 
 Institutions have also been created to enhance civil society participation in 
the process of integration in MERCOSUR.  The main consultative body of this 
nature is the Economic and Social Consultative Forum (FCES) which was 
created in 1994 through the Ouro Preto Protocol, began operations in 1996, and 
is largely modeled after the EU’s EESC.  The FCES is composed of individuals 
representing national business and labor organizations of the MERCOSUR 
member states.  In addition to submitting opinions and recommendations to the 
Common Market Group, MERCOSUR’S executive institution, one of the main 
responsibilities of the FCES is to promote the inclusion of civil society in the 
MERCOSUR integration process.  The FCES is continuously involved in the 
following four issue areas: consolidation of the MERCOSUR customs union; 
deepening the process of Southern Cone integration; the external relations of 
MERCOSUR; and social aspects of integration (Administrative Secretariat 
MERCOSUR, 2007). Andean Community 
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In the context of the FCES, another advisory body was created in 1995, the 
MERCOSUR Women’s Forum (FM).  A completely nongovernmental organiza-
tion, the FM represents the issues of primary interest to women to the FCES and 
other MERCOSUR institutions. The FM interests of focus are reducing poverty 
and unemployment amongst women, and increasing gender equality and 
women’s security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).  The FM provides an in-
stitutional link to MERCOSUR for many civil society organizations and their 
interests.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the EU, the CAN, and MERCOSUR are currently experiencing com-
plications in their processes of regional integration, this does not necessarily ring 
the death bell for these regional organizations.  In fact, as has been demonstrated 
in this paper, while the difficulties have been the dominant issues in the press, 
behind the scenes, integration continues to progress, and indeed, move toward 
including certain elements of good governance in their daily practices.  It should 
be remembered that the EU which has the longest experience in the regional in-
tegration endeavor has overcome crises at the local, national and regional levels 
during its 50 years to become what many consider to be the most successful at-
tempt at regional integration in the world. 
The institutionalized inclusion of sub-national governments and civil society 
organizations in the EU, CAN and MERCOSUR integration processes remains a 
work in progress.  This is particularly the case for the CAN and MERCOSUR 
due to the relative newness of these exercises in the Southern Cone.  The nature 
of these initiatives makes it difficult to measure their outcomes though this will 
be an important area for future research.  
At the same time, sub-national governments and civil society organizations 
have begun, through consultation, to participate in the policymaking and deci-
sion-making processes of these three regional organizations, a positive 
advancement in and of itself.  Participation by the people and the organizations 
that are most interested in specific policies and/or those that will be responsible 
for the policy implementation can only serve to make these policies more effec-
tive and legitimate in the eyes of those they are developed to serve.   
Strengthening the legitimacy of these regional organizations will reinforce their 
mandates to govern those issue areas which are of common interest to the gov-
ernments and civil societies of their member states. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Origin and Evolution  
of the South American Community of Nations 
  
 
Marcos Aurelio Guedes de Oliveira 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There are three periods of initiatives for integrating the Americas since the end of 
the Cold War. The first period began with the US move that led to the US-
Canada Free Trade Agreement and to NAFTA. In South America, Brazil and 
Argentina were dealing with their problems of security celebrating bi-national 
agreements of cooperation in sensitive areas such as nuclear technology. The In-
itiative for the Americas by former President George Bush was the most 
important action of this first moment and it represented a daring proposition from 
the US perspective to deal once and for all with the issue of hemispheric integra-
tion. 
The second period started with South and Central American reaction to the 
US move what produced a revival of regional integration arrangements. The cre-
ation of Mercosur embodied this positive counter-action. At this point, if one 
takes a hegelian perspective, he/she would conclude by saying that now it would 
come the synthesis of both action and reaction. In other words the celebration of 
a hemispheric free trade agreement. Unfortunately what followed was a decline 
in US commitment to its initial proposal and disappointment in Latin America 
about US intentions. Mercosur and other regional integration processes were left 
to accomplish integration on their own. 
The third period began with the absence of Latin American issues in US for-
eign policy and its domination by security concerns. This new US action or 
inaction -what Howard Wiarda (2006) called “benign neglect”- let South Amer-
ica free enough to make a new and enlarged move in terms of foreign policy. 
This led to both the birth of the South American Community of Nations and the 
introduction of a security perspective on the debate about South American inte-
gration.  
This chapter shows the decline of trade as a central issue for the integration 
of South America and discusses the new period of integration in the region 
marked by security issues. It describes how Brazil proposed the South American 
Community of Nations (SACN) known also as South American Union (SAU) 
and what are its main goals. It also shows its differences when compared to Mer-
cosur. The basic argument is that SAU represents a new perspective on regional Guedes de Oliveira 
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integration, a new view linked to security concerns, based on geopolitical inte-
gration and on a search for a more independent and active political role for the 
region in global politics. 
 
The Decline of  Hemispheric Integration through Trade      
     
When President George Bush launched the Initiative for the Americas in 1990, 
many believed that after the end of the Cold War the Americas were about to go 
into a new era of prosperity led by the US, now as the only superpower. There 
was optimism about a possible upgrading of Latin America within US foreign 
policy. Some believed that trade and investment would drive US action in the 
region and this would promote a new wave of growth and development through-
out the region (Smith 1993; Tulchin & Espech 1998, 2001; Weintraub 1994).  
The positive impact of the Initiative for the Americas in Latin America was 
immediate. Together with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, Brazil started in 
1991 an integration process named Mercosur. Three months later, the US and the 
countries of Mercosur signed in Washington an agreement for their integration. 
Continental integration was the goal. In 1993 Brazil launched the idea of a South 
American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in order to try to unify South American 
countries and prepare to a larger integration process. One of the main explana-
tions for Mercosur at the time was given by the “theory of the Swimming Pool”. 
According to it, Mercosur was a kind of preliminary exercise in opening the re-
gional economy to the outside. The experience learned by Mercosur members 
would be important to keep economic stability when they had to integrate into 
North American economy (Florencio & Araujo 1995).   
Unfortunately the US proposal did not live to its expectations. Soon after 
President Clinton launched his FTAA in 1994, it became clear that social and 
political issues were not going to be addressed in the US initiative. Due to the 
gap between words and reality, the FTAA proposal began to be interpreted by 
many as an attempt by the US to dominate Central and South American econo-
mies and re-design its hegemony in Latin America. Supporters of FTAA pointed 
out the positive aspects of NAFTA on Mexican economy: growth of its northern 
region; growth of trade with the US and so on.  Nevertheless, the Mexican case 
also showed that the key issue of regional asymmetries in Latin America was not 
dealt with. If Mexico wanted to be looked at as a model case in favor of FTAA, 
there should be a way to address regional asymmetries in Latin America, an issue 
that has provoked social and political unrest and instability all over the region.  
Since the beginning of the FTAA initiative, Brazil has occupied a strategic 
position within its negotiations. It co-chaired the process with the US while con-
tinued to work for the development of Mercosur, a sub-regional integration 
initiative intended to go far beyond FTAA promises. Southern Cone 
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According to a former Brazilian Ambassador to the US, Rubens Barbosa
1, a 
FTAA acceptable to Brazil and Mercosur should include: a) the elimination of 
tariff barriers and the transformation of all specific customs duties into ad valo-
rem tariffs;  b) effective access to markets by means of a gradual but continual 
reduction of all non-tariff barriers (i.e. quotas, phytosanitary measures, etc.); c) 
discipline in the application of defensive trade measures (e.g. safeguards, anti-
dumping) that affect Brazilian agricultural exports to the United States as well as 
other sectors that have been traditionally subjected to selective protectionism (i.e. 
steel products, footwear, etc.);  d) a precise understanding that mechanisms that 
provide for unilateral trade sanctions must not be used;  e) the elimination of 
trade-distorting mechanisms (such as export subsidies) and the disciplined appli-
cation of domestic subsidies that affect the setting of domestic and foreign prices; 
and  f) harmonizing the FTAA negotiations with those of the WTO, in order to 
adjust the advances achieved within the scope of the Hemisphere to the efforts 
that will be undertaken in multilateral agreements. 
As one can see the issues of discord between Brazil and the US concerning 
FTAA were above all internal to the idea of trade liberalization. There was a per-
ception that the US proposal would trap important sectors of Brazilian economy 
within a set of agreements that would benefit only US business. This view en-
hanced the arguments against the FTAA proposed by the US and pushed into its 
opposition even those Latin American intellectuals who believed that interna-
tional trade increases economic welfare and supported the opening of Latin 
American economies to the US. 
In face of little progress towards a multi-lateral agreement, the US reoriented 
its policy in two directions. Firstly, to search for the establishment of bi-national 
free trade agreement with Latin American countries at the expenses of an overall 
agreement. Apart from the agreement reached with Chile, the US has not been 
able to make progress in this direction. On the contrary, this option has under-
mined the importance given to free trade in the FTAA initial proposal. Secondly, 
incapable of conciliating its proposals with Mercosur views, the US stepped back 
and accommodated itself in a kind of deadlock.  
The US took agricultural subsidies - a central issue for Latin America- off the 
negotiations and indicated the WTO as the adequate forum to deal with it. In re-
sponse Brazil suggested that intellectual property – a central issue for the US- 
should also be removed from the FTAA agenda. The optimistic idea of a FTAA 
as a way forward for the Americas was abandoned. It was gradually replaced by 
a set of summits and meetings that did not led to solutions. Politics and geopolit-
ics were dominating again the theory and practice of hemispheric integration. 
                                                 
1 Barbosa, R. The FTAA that is in Brazil’s Interest in http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geo-
graph/westernh/bush_e.asp 
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This time free trade was not the dominant factor. Regrettably, access to the US 
market had become a tool of foreign policy making.  
After September 11, the FTAA debate became irrelevant to the George W. 
Bush administration. The “securitization” of US foreign policy replaced the idea 
of opening markets and fostering free trade for the idea of closing borders and 
subordinating trade and all other issues to security. Now, one must support US 
foreign policy in order to apply for access to the US market. During the first year 
of President Bush administration, US support for the legalization of illegal work-
ers from Latin America was seen as a matter of justice. After September 11, 
Latin America became a problem due to large number of illegal and uncontrolled 
emigrants in and coming to the US.  
This situation was interpreted in Latin America as a confirmation that the 
FTAA was not part of a solution to its problems.  It also enhanced Latin America 
perception that it had to find a way by its own to foster economic growth as well 
as to reduce social asymmetries. Regional integration arrangements such as Mer-
cosur and the Andean Community regained perspective.  
It was Brazilian President Fernando Cardoso that invited South American 
Presidents to participate in September 2000 on what later became known as the 
First South American Presidential Summit. According to his assessment the 
meeting was historic and represented a step forward to the construction and ex-
change of common experiences on democracy, peace, justice and prosperity for 
all countries of South America ( Lafer 2002). Cardoso pointed out five key deci-
sions taken at the meeting.
2 
First, the countries of South America must strive together to keep and conso-
lidate democracy, human rights and freedom in the region. And this must take 
into account the history of the great South American leaders that fought for inde-
pendence and freedom. Second, Mercosur and the Andean Community must 
move into shaping an enlarged South American free trade area including also 
Guyana and Surinam. Third, each country is expected to draw a plan and projects 
for the development of South American energy and transport infrastructure. They 
would count with the support of the Inter-American Development Bank and other 
regional institutions to finance these projects. Fourth, a committee was created to 
combat money laundering as well as corruption and organized crime in the finan-
cial sector. Fifth, a regional fund was created to foster common development of 
sciences and technology. The seed of the South American Union was planted and 
the debate on regional integration began to introduce issues other than trade. 
Firstly seen as an up-dated version of the South American free trade initiative 
taken by former Brazilian President Sarney, it represented a further attempt to 
keep the debate on the need for regional integration firmly on the agenda of 
South American nations. It also introduced a new treatment to the issue of inte-
                                                 
2 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “ Cúpula Sul-Americana:Uma Avaliação” in Correiro 
Brasiliense 7 March, 2007. Southern Cone 
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gration at the levels of energy (building of dams, the use of natural gas and other 
common natural resources such as water) and communications (roads, railroads, 
waterways and ports).  
The Second South American Presidential Summit held in Guayaquil, Ecua-
dor in July 2002 advanced the decisions taken in Brasilia and represented an 
assurance that the Presidential summits were a new and very important multi-lat-
eral mechanism for the region. The countries of the Great Caribbean and of South 
America had the opportunity to link their economies and search for solutions to 
common problems. 
The Guayaquil Consensus issued by the Summit emphasized the develop-
ment of physical infrastructure for continental integration. Transport, 
telecommunications and energy were designated as the key elements of an Initia-
tive for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), 
launched at the First Summit in Brasilia in 2000. 
IIRSA's guiding vision is to facilitate integration within the three main 
coastal zones of South America-Caribbean, Atlantic and Pacific-and to link these 
with the continent's internal regions. IIRSA's Technical Coordinating Committee 
is composed of three key financial institutions: the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), and the Financial 
Fund for the Development of the River Plata Basin
3. 
Following up the call for projects at the Brasilia Summit, 162 projects in the 
three priority sectors for financing and implementation were identified. These 
include a bold scheme for road transportation linkages among Brazil, Guyana, 
Suriname and Venezuela. In Guayaquil, the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela and 
Guyana agreed to establish a Technical Committee on the construction of a direct 
road link between the two countries.  
Other agreements on the development of transport infrastructure have been 
signed between Bolivia and Chile, Chile and the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR), Chile and Argentina, and Brazil and Paraguay. There is also a 
major project for the development of multi-modal transport to link the countries 
in the Amazon River Basin to the Atlantic and the Pacific.  
Suriname, Guyana, Venezuela and Colombia are all Amazon countries and 
are participants in an ACS Program for Uniting the Caribbean by Air and Sea. In 
addition, the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP) envisages, a road, telecommunications 
and energy network linking Mexico and Central America as far south as Panama. 
The ACS, IIRSA and PPP initiatives should be seen as complementary to each 
other. Viewed as a whole, they could offer a strategic opportunity for South 
America and the Greater Caribbean to be opened up to one another, with the 
mainland Caribbean countries serving as a bridge by means of north-south and 
east-west transport linkages.  
                                                 
3 see  http://www.iirsa.org Guedes de Oliveira 
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Trade concerns were overshadowed by the initiatives for fostering the infra-
structure projects. Security was also at the Presidents agenda when they adopted 
a Declaration on keeping South America a Zone of Peace. The South American 
Peace Zone was a step to prepare the region to face the possible escalation of 
conflicts in Colombia and also aimed at gradually reducing military spending in 
the continent so as to release more resources for investments. 
Having perceived the emerging importance of security in the post 9/11 
world, Cardoso’s diplomacy started to reshape Brazilian foreign policy within the 
new paradigm. By the time President Lula took office, many thought Mercosur 
was in decline. The new Brazilian Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, declared the 
government’s interest in revitalizing Mercosur creating a development fund and a 
Parliament. President Lula became more active in foreign policy in order to pur-
sue the regional and global objectives of Brazil, thus creating new partnerships 
worldwide. In accordance to the growing concerns with security, Brazil took its 
candidature to become permanent member of the UN Security Council as a cen-
terpiece of its foreign policy. This represented a shift in the core of Brazilian 
foreign policy from economic interests to security interests. In a context in which 
the US preferred the search for terrorists to the search for a hemispheric free 
trade agreement, Brazilian diplomacy tried to follow the tide by projecting its 
interests into the center of global diplomatic concerns. 
The experience from two Presidential summits has indicated new ways to 
collectively deal with challenges raised by regional development and diplomacy. 
It has also introduced other key issues to an agenda dominated by trade. It helped 
the region to find a way to adapt regional interests into dominant global security 
issues. The formation of SAU seemed the best tool to achieve that. 
The South American Community of Nations was launched at the Third South 
American Presidential Summit in the Peruvian city of Cuzco in 2004. Peruvian 
president Alejandro Toledo, declared a new country out of the convergence be-
tween Mercosur, the Andean Community, Chile, Surinam and Guyana was being 
born and it would one day have a common currency, parliament and passport. He 
said the new community would also help member nations to confront the chal-
lenges of globalization and if in the past, geography divided South America, 
today it unites it. For him, SAU creates a market of 361 million people with a 
GDP of $973bn, exporting $181bn of goods and services. Contrary to this opti-
mistic view, doubts were raised at the time on the progress of the SAU due to 
trade disputes between Brazil and Argentina and the lack of diplomatic relations 
between Chile and Bolivia. Nevertheless, SAU somehow helped these countries 
to move towards bi-lateral dialogue in order to find viable solutions to their dis-
putes (Da Silva 2004; 2005). 
According to the Cuzco declaration the South American countries shall im-
prove the coordination of regional diplomacy and politics towards the outside 
world. It also called the regional business to come forward and participate in the 
process of integration. The convergence between Mercosur and the Andean Southern Cone 
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Community as well as the issue of energy and transport were present too. The 
locations for the summit were chosen for their historical significance and their 
association with events that reflect well on South America. Cusco was the 
ancient capital of the advanced civilization of the Incas. Ayachucho was the site 
of an 1824 decisive victory against Spanish troops by the South American 
independence movement headed by Bolivar. 
The creation of SAU represented a radical shift to the region. Trade was no 
longer the main issue. South American countries were free to enhance their 
power and practice diplomacy among them and with the outside world as they 
never did. Despite strong differences in style among South American left wing 
leaders, they all seemed to agree on the need to construct a regional pole of 
political power in order to influence world politics. At this point all regional 
interest were being shaped within the idea of security. 
 
The New Perspective of Security in South American Integration 
 
Mercosur was also affected by the drive towards security. It continued to 
negotiate with the EU and with the United States and the search to establishing 
trade agreements worldwide gained a new impetus. It made important initiatives 
towards Africa, Asia and North America and there are ongoing negotiations with 
Australia, Canada, and Mexico. Recently, successful trade agreements have been 
signed between Mercosur and India, Southern African countries and Arab 
countries. These initiatives have been criticized as if Mercosur have opted to 
abandon the will to reach agreements with the US and the EU. But it can be 
understood as a way for the bloc to enhance its global relations if looked from a 
security perspective. 
Perhaps the most important initiative by Mercosur -and which is now within 
the framework of the South American Union- has been directed towards the 
region’s infrastructure projects, some of which have for decades depended on 
outside funding. Being able to reduce its debt and enter into a period of 
sustainable development, Brazil directed the Brazilian development bank -Banco 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES)- to finance projects 
involving the integration of communications and the production of energy. 
In August 2003, 23 projects worth US$ 5.5 billion for the integration of 
South American infrastructure were presented by 12 South American countries. 
Most of these projects are near the frontier between Mercosur countries and they 
aim to transform what used to be areas beset by security concerns into ones of 
economic prosperity. Growing investment from large regional enterprises, as 
well as multinationals, is set to consolidate a new pole of economic growth at the 
heart of South America. In 2004 alone, foreign investment by Brazilian Guedes de Oliveira 
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businesses stood at US$ 9.5 billion and most of it went to the Mercosur area.
4 
There has been continuous growth in small- and medium-sized regional 
enterprises as well as in investment from Europe, North America and Asia. 
A proposal for the setting up of structural funds to combat asymmetries 
among Mercosur members was approved in 2004. According to the site 
ADNmundo, Paraguay has received in January 2007 its first share of these funds. 
US$60 million dollars are in the account of the Ministry of Economy of Paraguay 
to be spent in social projects and in the construction of roads. Mercosur fell under 
the spell of the security era. It now has to accept that SAU is the main regional 
framework and thus it must adapt to security principles. 
Europe came forward to play a role in this change. It held a summit in 
Caracas in March 2005 with Brazilian, Colombian, Spanish and Venezuelan 
leaders. They agreed to strengthen political alliances, pledged to combat 
terrorism, drug-trafficking and poverty. They also evaluted the situation of the 
region looking for ways to accelerate the geopolitical element of South American 
Integration. The Heads of State reiterated their support for the South American 
Union, evaluated progress with respect to the strengthening of ties between their 
countries and renewed their commitment to deepen the dialogue and the political 
coordination in shared areas of interest.
5  
Security issues dominated their agenda in Caracas. The four countries 
pledged support for the creation of a multi-polar world, respect for sovereignty 
and for international human rights treaties.   Although they recognized the 
fundamental role of the United Nations in preserving peace and international 
security, they affirmed that the international body, in particular, the UN Security 
Council, needed to be reformed, and decided to coordinate their views in several 
upcoming international forums. Another issue was the combat of drug trafficking 
and terrorism. Alvaro Uribe, the Colombian President received a positive 
response, as all four Heads of States affirmed that terrorism and drug trafficking 
are serious threats to democracy and security around the world, and pledged to 
coordinate joint efforts between national authorities within the bounds of 
international law. The International Agreement for the Repression of the 
Financing of Terrorism and Resolution 1373 of the Security Council were 
pointed to as valuable tools to efficiently combat and punish terrorism. At the 
summit Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero sold military equipment for both 
Venezuela and Colombia for patrolling their frontier and reducing the shipment 
of cocaine to Spain. 
Next SAU Summit was in Cochabamba, Bolivia in December 2006 and took 
place after the reelection of Lula in Brazil and Chaves in Venezuela and the 
victory of  Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. It was 
                                                 
 
4 Reynaldo Passenezi Filho, “Internacionalização, um desafio para os brasileiros”, Valor 
Económico, 28th March, 2005. 
5 Sarah Wagner “Summit in Venezuela accelerate South American Union” in 
Venezuelanalysis.com. Southern Cone 
 
185
dominated by the enthusiasm brought about by these victories and an attempt by 
Chaves to give SAU a strong populist touch by declaring that it needed urgently 
to put its decisions into practice. Declarations given by Chaves and Morales 
indicated that the trade liberalization agenda, particularly the FTAA idea, was out 
of question. Integrating South America was the main issue of this summit while a 
proposal for the creation of a South American Parliament was raised for the first 
time. 
This Summit was followed by a Mercosur meeting on January 2007 in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil. Although Mercosur represents only a part of the South American 
Union, the meeting was marked by political issues such as the move of 
Venezuela to consolidate its membership and of Ecuador and Bolivia to become 
full members of the bloc. Since Venezuela joined it, traditional economic issues 
had to concede to political ones. How to combine Mercosur search for trade 
liberalization with the new populist and nationalist views is a challenge that the 
region must face in the near future. Otherwise it might put in danger all the gains 
provided by the window of opportunity opened to the region in the post-Cold 
War era. 
 
SAU, MERCOSUL and the EU 
 
Although Mercosur and the South American Union have their own forms and 
objectives, they are both spaces for regional dialogue and their summits are the 
most telling barometer of progress and discord within South American countries. 
In spite of this common ground, the Mercosur meetings, as well as its initiatives, 
are devoted to the advancement of the process of regional economic integration. 
For instance, negotiations to accommodate the interests of different 
entrepreneurial sectors of Brazil and Argentina are done at this intergovernmental 
body. Mercosur still pursues its aims of achieving the stage of a free trade area 
and a customers union among the four founders, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and 
Paraguay. Lately, a new challenge has been added: the incorporation of 
Venezuelan economy into the incomplete regime that rules in Mercosur. 
Differently, the South American Union has become a forum for collective 
discussion of regional social and security issues. It has also identified itself with 
the fostering of infrastructure project for the physical integration of all South 
America. Perhaps its main challenge is to take out from bureaucratic desks long 
waited projects of roads, dams, bridges, and formulate new ones for the 
formation of an energy and communications network to be financed by the 
Brazilian BNDES, the Inter-American Development Bank and by Venezuelan 
petrodollars. 
Mercosur gave the region an international status it never had. It resisted 
FTAA and offered another view of regional integration to the US. It led the US to 
abandon its one-sided project of free trade for the hemisphere and recognize that 
in order to advance the process it should look at Mercosur and other regional Guedes de Oliveira 
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blocs as players to negotiate with. Unfortunately very little has changed when we 
compare the 1994 Miami declaration to the 2005 Mar del Plata one. Initial hopes 
of progress were substituted by feelings of doubts and by a perception of 
stagnation. The growing of China in the world economy dramatically reduced 
both the hemispheric and the international impact of a successful free trade 
agreement in the Americas. In the North, the US is unable to deal with issues of 
migration from the South. Mexico’s economy is stalled and the country is 
looking for other trade opportunities outside the region. In the South, the absence 
of new US initiatives has eliminated prospects for hemispheric free trade 
agreements.    
Without a US response to South America, the European Union appeared not 
only as a reference for South American integration but as a model with a social 
framework that would be essential for it to deal with its problems of social 
exclusion and development. EU and Mercosur officials have met and declared 
their wish to reach a free trade agreement many times. But attempts towards it 
were always blocked by conflicts over agriculture. For many in Latin America, 
both the EU and the US have been trying to have complete access to the sectors 
of South American economy in which they have competitive advantages without 
offering a similar compensation particularly in the US and EU heavily subsidized 
agriculture sector. 
In face of these deadlocks there appears to be two alternatives left to 
Mercosur, the US and the EU. The first one would be to leave their differences 
aside and try to reach an overall agreement within the World Trade Organization. 
The EU, the US and Mercosur are trying to do that but so far without any 
breakthrough. The other alternative is inaction. And inaction means stagnation 
and growing conflicts. Regrettably this seems to be the ways things are now in 
the hemisphere. The region needs new tool to expand its interests. If the trade 
door is closed, maybe security would offer alternatives to stagnation. 
The role of a multi-lateral SAU to boost regional integration and power has 
been effective. It has even been presented by some as similar to the EU. Some 
academics agree that SAU might lead to an EU-like system in two decades. 
Others are skeptical about its potential to solve key regional disputes over 
territory and leadership.
6 
Old issues of building up roads, producing energy, making it accessible to 
the backward areas, developing the economy and enhancing the governmental 
presence at the frontiers are back within a security view. Traditional security 
issues, such as combating organized crime, have gained new and higher status 
while new issues, such as searching for common regional security policy, are 
emerging. 
                                                 
6 “Tem futuro a Comunidade Sul-Americana?” in www-dw-world.de. Southern Cone 
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The recent agreement between Brazil, and the USA on ethanol, once 
considered a trade issue and now upgraded to a security one, indicates that 
security might help the region to achieve what trade alone cannot.  
But can a security agenda unlock hemispheric integration? Will SAU move 
closer to the EU model? Will South America deepen its links and forge at last a 
new active identity in World politics or will it succumb to its ghosts from a past 
of caudillos, radical nationalism and undemocratic practices? Developments 
throughout the next few years will possibly indicate answers to these questions. 
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